1893 -1900

Charcot (1893)

From October 1885 to February 1886 Freud worked at the Salpetriere in Paris under Charcot. This was the turning point in Freud’s career, for during this period his interest shifted from neuropathology to psychopathology, from physical science to psychology. The obituary, written only a few days after Charcot’s death, is some evidence of the greatness of Freud’s admiration for him. Charcot treated hysteria as just another topic in neuropathology. He gave a complete description of its phenomena, demonstrated that they had their own laws and uniformities, and showed how to recognize the symptoms which enable a diagnosis of hysteria to be made. Heredity was to be regarded as the sole cause of hysteria. Charcot’s concern with hypnotic phenomena in hysterical patients led to very great advances in this important field of hitherto neglected and despised facts, for the weight of his name put an end to any doubt about the reality of hypnotic manifestations.

1893
On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena. [cf. its translation into persian: K.Movallali, Sokhan Periodical, 1971, Tehran]
The English translation, “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena,” is a shorthand report of a lecture delivered and revised by Freud. It is pointed out that all the modern advances made in the understanding and knowledge of hysteria are derived from the work of Charcot. There is an affectively colored experience behind most phenomena of hysteria. If this experience is equated with the major traumatic experience underlying traumatic hysteria the following thesis is derived: there is a complete analogy between traumatic paralysis and common, nontraumatic hysteria. The memories in hysterical patients, which have become pathogenic, occupy an exceptional position as regards the wearing away process; and observation shows that, in the case of all the events which have become determinants of hysterical phenomena, the psychical traumas have not been completely abreacted. There are 2 groups of conditions under which memories become pathogenic. In the first group, the memories to which the hysterical phenomena can be traced back have for their content ideas which involve a trauma so great that the nervous system has not sufficient power to deal with it in any way. In a second group of cases the reason for the absence of a reaction lies not in the content of the psychical trauma but in other circumstances.

1894
The neuro-psychoses of defence (1894).
The problems of the neuroses, which Freud investigated during the years 1893 to 1894, fell into 2 fairly distinct groups, concerned respectively with what were later to become known as the actual neuroses and the psychoneuroses. After making a detailed study of a number of nervous patients suffering from phobias and obsessions, Freud was led to attempt an explanation of these symptoms, thus arriving successfully at the origin of the pathological ideas in new and different cases. The syndrome of hysteria justifies the assumption of a splitting of consciousness, accompanied by the formation of separate psychical groups. The characteristic factor in hysteria is not the splitting of conscious-ness but the capacity for conversion. If someone with a disposition to neurosis lacks the aptitude for conversion, but if, in order to fend off an incompatible idea, he sets about separating it from its affect, then that affect is obliged to remain in the psychical sphere. In all cases that Freud analyzed, it was the subject’s sexual life that had given rise to a distressing affect of precisely the same quality as that attaching to his obsession. In 2 instances considered, defense against the incompatible idea was effected by separating it from its affect; the idea itself remained in consciousness, even though weakened and isolated. In another type of defense the ego rejects the incompatible idea together with its affect and behaves as if the idea had never occurred to the ego at all. But from the moment at which this has been successfully done the subject is in a psychosis, which can only be classified as hallucinatory confusion. The content of a hallucinatory psychosis of this sort consists precisely in the accentuation of the idea which was threatened by the precipitating cause of the onset of illness. The ego has fended off the incompatible idea through escape into psychosis. In summary, a working hypothesis for the neuroses of defense is as follows: In mental functions something is to be distinguished (a quota of affect or sum of excitation) which possess all the characteristics of a quantity which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and which is spread over the memory traces of ideas.

The neuro-psychoses of defence (1894).
Appendix: The emergence of Freud’s fundamental hypotheses.
With the first paper on the neuropsychoses of defense, Freud gives public expression, to many of the most fundamental of the theoretical notions on which all his later work rests. At the time of writing this paper, Freud was deeply involved in the first series of psychological investigations. In his “History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement”, Freud declared that the theory of repression, or defense, to give it its alternative name, is the cornerstone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests. The clinical hypothesis of defense, however, is itself necessarily based on the theory of cathexis. Throughout this period, Freud appeared to regard the cathectic processes as material events. The pleasure principle, no less fundamental than the constancy principle, was equally present, though once more only by implication. Freud regarded the 2 principles as intimately connected and perhaps identical. It is probably correct to suppose that Freud was regarding the quota of affect as a particular manifestation of the sum of excitation. Affect is what is usually involved in the cases of hysteria and obsessional neurosis with which Freud was chiefly concerned in early days. For that reason he tended at that time to describe the displaceable quantity as a quota of affect rather than in more general terms as an excitation; and this habit seems to have persisted even in the metaphysical papers where a more precise differentiation might have contributed to the clarity of his argument.

1895
Obsessions and phobias: Their psychical mechanism and their aetiology (1895).
Obsessions and phobias cannot be included under neurasthenia proper. Since the patients afflicted with these symptoms are no more often neurasthenics than not. Obsessions and phobias are separate neuroses, with a special mechanism and etiology. Traumatic obsessions and phobias are allied to the symptoms of hysteria. Two constituents are found in every obsession: 1) an idea that forces itself upon the patient; and 2) an associated emotional state. In many true obsessions it is plain that the emotional state is the principal thing, since that state persists unchanged while the idea associated with it varies. It is the false connection between the emotional state and the associated idea that accounts for the absurdity so characteristic of obsessions. The great difference between phobias is that in the latter the emotion is always one of anxiety, fear. Among the phobias, 2 groups may be differentiated according to the nature of the object feared: 1) common phobias, an exaggerated fear of things that everyone detests or fears to some extent; and 2) contingent phobias, the fear of special conditions that inspire no fear in the normal man. The mechanism of phobias is entirely different from that of obsessions – nothing is ever found but the emotional state of anxiety which brings up all the ideas adapted to become the subject of a phobia. Phobias then are a part of the anxiety neurosis, which has a sexual origin.

Obsessions and phobias: Their psychical mechanism and their aetiology (1895).
Appendix: Freud’s views on phobias.
Freud’s earliest approach to the problem of phobias was in his first paper on the neuropsychoses of defense. In the earliest of his papers, he attributed the same mechanism to the great majority of phobias and obsessions, while excepting the purely hysterical phobias and the group of typical phobias of which agoraphobia is a model. This later distinction is the crucial one, for it implies a distinction between phobias having a psychical basis and those without. This distinction links with what were later to be known as the psychoneuroses and the actual neuroses. In the paper on obsessions and phobias, the distinction seems to be made not between 2 different groups of phobias but between the obsessions and the phobias, the latter being declared to be a part of the anxiety neurosis. In the paper on anxiety neurosis, the main distinction was not between obsessions and phobias but between phobias belonging to obsessional neurosis and those belonging to anxiety neurosis. There remain undetermined links between phobias, hysteria, obsessions, and anxiety neurosis.

1895
On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description “anxiety neurosis” (1895).
Editors’ note, introduction and Part I. The clinical symptomatology of anxiety neurosis.
The paper, “On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description Anxiety Neurosis” may be regarded as the first part of a trail that leads through the whole of Freud’s writings. According to Freud, it is difficult to make any statement of general validity about neurasthenia, so long as it is used to cover all the things which Beard has included under it. It was proposed that the anxiety neurosis syndrome be detached from neurasthenia. The symptoms of this syndrome are clinically much more closely related to one another than to those of genuine neurasthenia; and both the etiology and the mechanism of this neurosis are fundamentally different from the etiology and mechanism of genuine neurasthenia. What Freud calls anxiety neurosis may be observed in a completely developed form or in a rudimentary one, in isolation or combined with other neuroses. The clinical picture of anxiety neurosis comprises some of the following symptoms: general irritability; anxious expectation; sudden onslaughts of anxiety; waking up at night in a fright, vertigo, disturbances in digestive activities and attacks of paraesthesias. Several of the symptoms that are mentioned, which accompany or take the place of an anxiety attack, also appear in a chronic form.

1895
On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description “anxiety neurosis” (1895).
Part II. Incidence and aetiology of anxiety neurosis.
In some cases of anxiety neurosis no etiology at all is discovered. But where there are grounds for regarding the neurosis as an acquired one, careful inquiry directed to that end reveals that a set of noxae and influences from sexual life are the operative etiological factors. In females, disregarding their innate disposition, anxiety neurosis occurs in the following cases: as virginal anxiety or anxiety in adolescents; as anxiety in the newly married; as anxiety in women whose husbands suffer from ejaculatio praecox or from markedly impaired potency; and whose husbands practice coitus interruptus or reservatus; anxiety neurosis also occurs as anxiety in widows and intentionally abstinent women; and as anxiety in the climacteric during the last major increase of sexual need. The sexual determinants of anxietyneurosis in men include: anxiety of intentionally abstinent men, which is frequently combined with symptoms of defense; anxiety in men in a state of unconsummated excitation, or in those who content themselves with touching or looking at women; anxiety in men who practice coitus interruptus; and anxiety in senescent men. There are 2 other cases which apply to both sexes. 1) People who, as a result of practicing masturbation, have been neurasthenics, fall victim to anxiety neurosis as soon as they give up their form of sexual satisfaction. 2) Anxiety neurosis arises as a result of the factor of overwork or exhausting exertion.

1895
On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description “anxiety neurosis” (1895).
Part III. First steps towards a theory of anxiety neurosis.
According to Freud, the mechanism of anxiety neurosis is to be looked for in a deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the psychical sphere, and in a consequent abnormal employment of that excitation. This concept of the mechanism of anxiety neurosis can be made clearer if the following view of the sexual process, which applies to men, is accepted. In the sexually mature male organism, somatic sexual excitation is produced and periodically becomes a stimulus to the psyche. The group of sexual ideas which is present in the psyche becomes supplied with energy and there comes into being the physical state of libidinal tension which brings with it an urge to remove that tension. A psychical unloading of this kind is possible only by means of what is called specific or adequate action. Anything other than the adequate action would be fruitless, for once the somatic sexual excitation has reached threshold value, it is turned continuously into psychical excitation and something must positively take place which will free the nerve endings from the pressure on them. Neurasthenia develops whenever the adequate unloading is replaced by a less adequate one. This view depicts the symptoms of anxiety neurosis as being in a sense surrogates of the omitted specific action following on sexual excitation. In the neurosis, the nervous system is reacting against a source of excitation which is internal, whereas in the corresponding affect it is reacting against an analogous source of excitation which is external.

On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description “anxiety neurosis” (1895).
Part IV. Relation to other neuroses.
The purest cases of anxiety neurosis, usually the most marked, are found in sexually potent youthful individuals, with an undivided etiology, and an illness that is not too long standing. More often, however, symptoms of anxiety occur at the same time as, and in combination with symptoms of neurasthenia, hysteria, obsessions, or melancholia. Wherever a mixed neurosis is present, it will be possible to discover an intermixture of several specific etiologies. The etiological conditions must be distinguished for the onset of the neuroses from their specific etiological factors. The former are still ambiguous, and each of them can produce different neuroses. Only the etiological factors which can be picked out in them, such as inadequate disburdening, psychical insufficiency or defense accompanied by substitution, have an unambiguous and specific relation to the etiology of the individual major neuroses. Anxiety neurosis presents the most interesting agreement with, and differences from, the other major neuroses, in particular neurasthenia and hysteria. It shares with neurasthenia one main characteristic, namely, that the source of excitation lies in the somatic field instead of the psychical one as is the case in hysteria and obsessional neurosis. The symptomatology of hysteria and anxiety neurosis shows many points in common. The appearance of the following symptoms either in a chronic form or in attacks, the paraesthesias, the hyperaesthesias and pressure points are found in both hysterias and anxiety attacks.

On the grounds for detaching a particular syndrome from neurasthenia under the description “anxiety neurosis” (1895).
Appendix: The term “Angst” and its English translation.
There are at least 3 instances in which Freud discusses the various shades of meaning expressed by the German word Angst and the cognate Furcht and Schreck. Though he stresses the anticipatory element and absence of an object in Angst, the distinctions he draws are not entirely convincing, and his actual usage is far from invariably obeying them. Angst may be translated to many similarly common English words: fear, fright, alarm, etc. Angst often appears as a psychiatric term: The word universally adopted for the purpose has been anxiety. The English translator is driven to compromise: He must use anxiety in technical or semitechnical connections, and must elsewhere choose whatever everyday English word seems most appropriate.

1895
A reply to criticisms of my paper on anxiety neurosis (1895).
A reply to Lowenfeld’s criticisms of Freud’s paper (January 1895) on anxiety neurosis is presented. It is Freud’s view that the anxiety appearing in anxiety neurosis does not admit of a psychical derivation and he maintains that fright must result in hysteria or a traumatic neurosis, but not in an anxiety neurosis. Lowenfeld insists that in a number of cases ‘states of anxiety’ appear immediately or shortly after a psychical shock. Freud states that in the etiology of the neuroses, sexual factors play a predominant part. Lowenfeld relates experiences where he has seen anxiety states appear and disappear when a change in the subject’s sexual life had not taken place but where other factors were in play. The following concepts are postulated in order to understand the complicated etiological situation which prevails in the pathology of the neuroses: precondition, specific cause, concurrent causes, and precipitating or releasing cause. Whether a neurotic illness occurs at all depends upon a quantitative factor, upon the total load on the nervous system as compared with the latter’s capacity for resistance. What dimensions the neurosis attains depends in the first instance on the amount of the hereditary taint. What form the neurosis assumes is solely determined by the specific etiological factor arising from sexual life.

1896
Heredity and the aetiology of the neuroses (1896).
The paper, “Heredity and the Etiology of the Neuroses” is a summary of Freud’s contemporary view on the etiology of all 4 of what he then regarded as the main types of neurosis: the 2 psychoneuroses, hysteria and obsessional neurosis; and the 2 actual neuroses, neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis. Opinion of the etiological role of heredity in nervous illness ought to be based on an impartial statistical examination. Certain nervous disorders can develop in people who are perfectly healthy and whose family is above reproach. In nervous pathology, there is similar heredity and also dissimilar heredity. Without the existence of a special etiological factor, heredity could do nothing. The etiological influences, differing among themselves in their importance and in the manner in which they are related to the effect they produce, can be grouped into 3 classes: preconditions, concurrent causes, and specific causes. In the pathogenesis of the major neuroses, heredity fulfills the role of a precondition. Some of the concurrent causes of neuroses are: emotional disturbance, physical exhaustion, acute illness, intoxications, traumatic accidents, etc. The neuroses have as their common source the subject’s sexual life, whether they lie in a disorder of his contemporary sexual life or in important events in his past life.

1896
Further remarks on the neuro-psychoses of defence (1896).
Part I. The “specific” aetiology of hysteria.
“Further Remarks on the Neuropsychoses of Defense” takes up the discussion at a point that Freud reached in his first paper, (1894). The ultimate case of hysteria is always the seduction of a child by an adult. The actual traumatic event always occurs before the age of puberty, though the outbreak of the neurosis occurs after puberty. This whole position is later abandoned by Freud, and its abandonment signalizes a turning point in his views. In a short paper published in 1894, Freud grouped together hysteria, obsessions, and certain cases of acute hallucinatory confusion under the name of neuropsychoses of defense because those affections turned out to have one aspect in common. This was that their symptoms arose through the psychical mechanism of defense, that is, in an attempt to repress an incompatible idea which had come into distressing opposition to the patient’s ego. The symptoms of hysteria can only be understood if they are traced back to experiences which have a traumatic effect. These psychical traumas refer to the patient’s sexual life. These sexual traumas must have occurred in early childhood and their content must consist of an actual irritation of the genitals. All the experiences and excitations which, in the period of life after puberty, prepare the way for, or precipitate, the outbreak of hysteria, demonstrably have their effect only because they arouse the memory trace of these traumas in childhood, which do not thereupon become conscious but lead to a release of affect and to repression. Obsessions also presuppose a sexual experience in childhood.

1896
Further remarks on the neuro-psychosis of defence (1896).
Part II. The nature and mechanism of obsessional neurosis.
Sexual experiences of early childhood have the same significance in the etiology of obsessional neurosis as they have in that of hysteria. In all the cases of obsessional neurosis, Freud found a substratum of hysterical symptoms which could be traced back to a scene of sexual passivity that preceded the pleasurable action. Obsessional ideas are transformed self-reproaches which have reemerged from repression and which relate to some sexual act that was performed with pleasure in childhood. In the first period, childhood immorality, events occur which contain the germ of the later neurosis. This period is brought to a close by the advent of sexual maturation. Self-reproach now becomes attached to the memory of these pleasurable actions. The second period, illness, is characterized by the return of the repressed memories. There are 2 forms of obsessional neurosis, according to whether what forces an entrance into consciousness is solely the mnemic content of the act involving self-reproach, or whether the self-reproachful affect connected with the act does so as well. The first form includes the typical obsessional ideas, in which the content engages the patient’s attention and, he merely feels an indefinite unpleasure, whereas the only affect which would be suitable to the obsessional idea would be one of self-reproach. A second form of obsessional neurosis comes about if what has forced its way to representation in conscious psychical life is not the repressed mnemic content but the repressed self-reproach.

1896
Further remarks on the neuro-psychosis of defense (1896).
Part III. Analysis of a case of chronic paranoia.
Freud postulates that paranoia, like hysteria and obsessions, proceeds from the repression of distressing memories and that its symptoms are determined in their form by the content of what has been repressed. The analysis of a case of chronic paranoia is presented. Frau P., 32 years of age, has been married for 3 years and is the mother of a 2-year-old child. Six months after the birth of her child, she became uncommunicative and distrustful, showed aversion to meeting her husband’s brothers and sisters and complained that the neighbors in the small town in which she lived were rude and inconsiderate to her. The patient’s depression began at the time of a quarrel between her husband and her brother. Her hallucinations were part of the content of repressed childhood experiences, symptoms of the return of the repressed while the voices originated in the repression of thoughts which were self-reproaches about experiences that were analogous to her childhood trauma. The voices were symptoms of the return of the repressed. Part of the symptoms arose from primary defense, namely, all the delusional ideas which were characterized by distrust and suspicion and which were concerned with ideas of being persecuted by others. Other symptoms are described as symptoms of the return of the repressed. The delusional ideas which have arrived in consciousness by means of a compromise make demands on the thought activity of the ego until they can be accepted without contradiction.

1896
The aetiology of hysteria (1896).
“The Etiology of Hysteria” may be regarded as an amplified repetition of the first section of its predecessor, the second paper on the neuropsychoses of defense. No hysterical symptom can arise from a real experience alone, but in every case, the memory of earlier experiences plays a part in causing the symptoms. Whatever case and symptom are taken as out point of departure leads to the field of sexual experience. After the chains of memories have converged, we come to the field of sexuality and to a small number of experiences which occur for the most part at the same period of life, namely, at puberty. If we press on with the analysis into early childhood, we bring the patient to reproduce experiences which are regarded as the etiology of his neurosis. Freud put forward the thesis that for every case of hysteria there are one or more occurrences of premature sexual experience, occurrences which belong to the earliest years of childhood but which can be reproduced through the work of psychoanalysis in spite of the intervening decades. Sexual experiences in childhood consisting in stimulation of the genitals must be recognized as being the traumas which lead to a hysterical reaction to events at puberty and to the development of hysterical symptoms. Sensations and paraesthesias are the phenomena which correspond to the sensory content of the infantile scenes, reproduced in a hallucinatory fashion and often painfully intensified.

1898
Sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses (1896).
In every case of neurosis there is a sexual etiology; but in neurasthenia it is an etiology of a present day kind, whereas in the psychoneuroses the factors are of an infantile nature. The sexual causes are the ones which most readily offer the physician a foothold for his therapeutic influence. When heredity is present, it enables a strong pathological effect to come about where otherwise only a very slight one would have resulted. Neurasthenia is one of those affections which anyone might easily acquire without having any hereditary taint. It is only the sexual etiology which makes it possible for us to understand all the details of the clinical history of neurasthenics, the mysterious improvements in the middle of the course of the illness and the equally incomprehensible deteriorations, both of which are usually related by doctors and patients to whatever treatment has been adopted. Since the manifestations of the psychoneuroses arise from the deferred action of unconscious psychical traces, they are accessible to psychotherapy. The main difficulties which stand in the way of the psychoanalytic method of cure are due to the lack of understanding among doctors and laymen of the nature of the psychoneuroses.

1898
The psychical mechanism of forgetfulness (1898).
The phenomenon of forgetfulness, which has been universally experienced, usually affects proper names. Two accompanying features of forgetfulness are an energetic deliberate concentration of attention which proves powerless, to find the lost name and in place of the name we are looking for, another name promptly appears, which we recognize as incorrect and reject, but which persists in coming back. The best procedure of getting hold of the missing name is not to think of it and after a while, the missing name shoots into one’s mind. While Freud was vacationing, he went to Herzegovina. Conversation centered around the condition of the 2 countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the character of their inhabitants. The discussion turned to Italy and of pictures. Freud recommended that his companions visit Orvieto some time, in order to see the frescoes there of the End of the World and the Last Judgement. Freud was unable to think of the artist’s name. He could only think of Botticelli and Boltraffio. He had to put up with this lapse of memory for several days until he met someone who told him that the artist’s name was Luca Signorelli. Freud interpreted the forgetting as follows: icelli contains the same final syllables as Signorelli; the name Bosnia showed itself by directing the

1899
Screen memories (1899).
The age to which the content of the earliest memories of childhood is usually referred back is the period between the ages of 2 and 4. The most frequent content of the first memories of childhood are occasions of fear, shame, physical pain, etc., and important events such as illnesses, deaths, fires; births of brothers and sisters, etc. A case is presented of a man of university education, aged 38, who moved at the age of 3. His memories of his first place of residence fall into 3 groups. The first group consists of scenes of which his parents have repeatedly since described to him. The second group comprises scenes which have not been described and some of which could not have been described to him. The pictures and scenes of the first 2 groups are probably displaced memories from which the essential element has for the most part been omitted. In the third group, there is material, which cannot be understood. Two sets of phantasies were projected onto one another and a childhood memory was made of them. A screen memory is a recollection whose value lies in that it represents in the memory impressions and thoughts of a later date whose content is connected with its own by symbolic or similar links. The concept of screen memory owes its value as a memory not to its own content but to the relation existing between that content and some other, that has been suppressed. Different classes of screen memories can be distinguished according to the nature of that relation. A screen memory may be described as retrogressive. Whenever in a memory the subject himself appears as an object among other objects, the contrast between the acting and the recollecting ego may be taken as evidence that the original impression has been worked over.

1901
Autobiographical note (1901).
Freud’s autobiographical note, written in the autumn of 1899 is presented. He regarded himself as a pupil of Brucke and of Charcot. His appointment as Privatdozent was in 1885 and he worked as physician and Dozent at Vienna University after 1886. Freud produced earlier writings on histology and cerebral anatomy, and subsequently, clinical works on neuropathology; he translated writings by Charcot and Bernheim. Since 1895, Freud turned to the study of the psychoneuroses and especially hysteria, and in a series of shorter works he stressed the etiological significance of sexual life for the neuroses. He has also developed a new psychotherapy of hysteria, on which very little has been published. TOP

1900 to1920

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter I: The scientific literature dealing with the problems of dreams.
(A) The relation of dreams to waking life.
The scientific literature dealing with the problems of dreams is discussed. The prescientific view of dreams adopted by the peoples of antiquity was in complete harmony with their view of the universe in general, which led them to project into the external world as though they were realities, things which in fact enjoyed reality only within their own minds. The unsophisticated waking judgment of someone who has just awakened from sleep assumes that his dreams, even if they did not themselves come from another world, had carried him off into another world. Two views of the relation of dreams to waking life are discussed: 1) that the mind is cut off in dreams, almost without memory, from the ordinary content and affairs of waking life or 2) that dreams carry on waking life and attach themselves to the ideas previously residing in consciousness. Due to the contradiction between these 2 views, a discussion of the subject is presented by Hildebrandt who believes that it is impossible to describe the characteristics of dreams at all except by means of a series of (3) contrasts which seem to sharpen into contradictions. It is concluded that the dream experience appears as something alien inserted between 2 sections of life which are perfectly continuous and consistent with each other.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter I: The scientific literature dealing with the problems of dreams.
(B) The material of dreams-Memory in dreams.
All the material making up the content of a dream is in some way derived from experience. Dreams have at their command memories which are inaccessible in waking life. It is a very common event for a dream to give evidence of knowledge and memories which the waking subject is unaware of possessing. One of the sources from which dreams derive materials for reproduction, material which is in part neither remembered nor used in the activities of waking thought, is childhood experience. A number of writers assert that elements are to be found in most dreams, which are derived from the last very few days before they were dreamt. The most striking and least comprehensible characteristic of memory in dreams is shown in the choice of material reproduced: what is found worth remembering is not, as in waking life, only what is most important, but what is most indifferent and insignificant. This preference for indifferent, and consequently unnoticed, elements in waking experience is bound to lead people to overlook the dependence of dreams upon waking life and to make it difficult in any particular instance to prove that dependence. The way memory behaves in dreams is of the greatest importance for any theory of memory in general.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter I: The scientific literature dealing with the problems of dreams.
(C) The stimuli and sources of dreams.
There are 4 kinds of sources of dreams: external (objective) sensory excitations; internal (subjective) sensory excitations; internal (organic) somatic stimuli; and purely psychical sources of stimulation. There are a great number of sensory stimuli that reach us during sleep, ranging from unavoidable ones which the state of sleep itself necessarily involves or must tolerate, to the accidental, rousing stimuli which may or do put an end to sleep. As sources of dream images, subjective sensory excitations have the advantage of not being dependent, like objective ones, upon external chance. The body, when in a diseased state, becomes a source of stimuli for dreams. In most dreams, somatic stimuli and the psychical instigators work in cooperation.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter I: The scientific literature dealing with the problems of dreams.
(D) Why dreams are forgotten after waking.
It is a proverbial fact that dreams melt away in the morning. All the causes that lead to forgetting in waking life are operative for dreams as well. Many dream images are forgotten because they are too weak, while stronger images adjacent to them are remembered. It is in general as difficult and unusual to retain what is nonsensical as it is to retain what is confused and disordered. Dreams, in most cases, are lacking in intelligibility and orderliness. The compositions which constitute dreams are barren of the qualities (strength intensity, nonunique experience, orderly groupings) which would make it possible to remember them, and they are forgotten because as a rule they fall to pieces a moment after awakening, and because most people take very little interest in their dreams.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter I: The scientific literature dealing with the problems of dreams.
(E) The distinguishing psychological characteristics of dreams.
It is assumed that dreams are products of our own mental activity. One of the principal peculiarities of dream life makes its appearance during the very process of falling asleep and may be described as a phenomenon heralding sleep. Dreams think predominantly in visual images, but make use of auditory images as well. In dreams, the subjective activity of our minds appears in an objective form, for our perceptive faculties regard the products of our imagination as though they were sense impressions. Sleep signifies an end of the authority of the self, hence, falling asleep brings a certain degree of passivity along with it. The literature that involves the psychological characteristics of dreams shows a very wide range of variation in the value which it assigns to dreams as psychical products. This range extends from the deepest disparagement through hints at a yet undisclosed worth, to an overvaluation which ranks dreams far higher than any of the functions of waking life.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter I: The scientific literature dealing with the problems of dreams.
(F) The moral sense in dreams.
The moral sense in dreams is discussed. Some assert that the dictates of morality have no place in dreams, while others maintain that the moral character of man persists in his dream life. Those who maintain that the moral personality of man ceases to operate in dreams should, in strict logic, lose all interest in immoral dreams. Those who believe that morality extends to dreams are careful to avoid assuming complete responsibility for their dreams. The emergence of impulses which are foreign to our moral consciousness is merely analogous to the fact that dreams have access to ideational material which is absent in our waking state or plays but a small part in it. Affects in dreams cannot be judged in the same way as the remainder of their content; and we are faced by the problem of what part of the psychical processes occurring in dreams is to be regarded as real (has a claim to be classed among the psychical processes of waking life).

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter I: The scientific literature in dealing with the problems of dreams.
(G) Theories of dreaming and its function.
Theories of dreaming and its function are discussed. Some theories (i.e. Delboeuf) states that the whole of psychical activity continues in dream. The mind does not sleep and its apparatus remains intact; but, since it falls under the conditions of the state of sleep, its normal functioning necessarily produces different results during sleep. There are other theories which presuppose that dreams imply a lowering of psychical activity, a loosening of connections, and an impoverishment of the material accessible. These theories must imply the attribution to sleep of characteristics quite different from those suggested by Delboeuf. A third group of theories ascribe to the dreaming mind a capacity and inclination for carrying out special psychical activities of which it is largely or totally incapable in waking life. The putting of these faculties into force usually provides dreaming with a utilitarian function. The explanation of dreaming by Schemer as a special activity of the mind, capable of free expansion only during the state of sleep is presented. He states that the material with which dream imagination accomplishes its artistic work is principally provided by the organic somatic stimuli which are obscure during the daytime.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter I: The scientific literature dealing with the problems of dreams.
(H) The relations between dreams and mental diseases.
When we speak of the relation of dreams to mental disorders we may have 3 things in mind: 1) etiological and clinical connections, as when a dream represents a psychotic state, or introduces it, or is left over from it; 2) modifications to which dream life is subject in cases of mental disease; and 3) intrinsic connections between dreams and psychoses, analogies pointing to their being essentially akin. In addition to the psychology of dreams physicians will some day turn their attention to psychopathology of dreams. In cases of recovery from mental diseases it can often be observed that while functioning is normal during the day, dream life is still under the influence of the psychosis. The indisputable analogy between dreams and insanity is one of the most powerful factors of the medical theory of dream life which regards dreaming as a useless and disturbing process and as the expression of a reduced activity of the mind.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter II: The method of interpreting dreams: An analysis of a specimen dream.
The method of interpreting dreams is presented. The aim that Freud sets is to show that dreams are capable of being interpreted. The lay world has hitherto made use of 2 essentially different methods: 1) It considers the content of the dream as a whole and seeks to replace it by another content which is intelligible and in certain respects analogous to the original one, this is (symbolic dream interpreting). 2) The decoding method, which treats dreams as a kind of cryptography in which each sign can be translated into another sign having a known meaning, in accordance with a fixed key. Neither of the 2 popular procedures for interpreting dreams can be employed for a scientific treatment of the subject. The object of the attention is not the dream as a whole but the separate portions of its content.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter II: The method of interpreting dreams: An analysis of a specimen dream (preamble and dream).
An analysis of one of Freud’s dreams, the dream of July twenty 4hird to the twenty-fourth, 1895, is presented. During the summer of 1895, Freud had been giving psychoanalytic treatment to a woman who was on very friendly terms with him and his family. This woman was involved in the dream as a central figure (Irma). The dream was analyzed, one line or thought at a time. The dream fulfilled certain wishes which were initiated by the events of the previous evening. The conclusion of the dream was that Freud was not responsible for the persistence of Irma’s pains, but that Otto (a junior colleague) was. Otto had annoyed Freud by his remarks about Irma’s incomplete cure, and the dream gave Freud his revenge by throwing the reproach back. Certain other themes played a part in the dream, which were not so obviously connected with his exculpation from Irma’s illness: his daughter’s illness and that of his patient who bore the same name, the injurious effect of cocaine, the disorder of his patient who was traveling in Egypt, his concern about his wife’s health and about that of his brother and of Dr. M., his own physical ailments, and his anxiety about his absent friend who suffered from suppurative rhinitis. Freud concluded that when the work of interpretation is completed, it is perceived that a dream is the fulfillment of a wish.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter III: A dream is the fulfillment of a wish.
It is easy to prove that dreams often reveal themselves as fulfillments of wishes. In a dream of convenience, dreaming has taken the place of action, as it often does elsewhere in life. Dreams which can only be understood as fulfillments of wishes and which bear their meaning upon their faces without disguise are found under the most frequent and various conditions. They are mostly short and simple dreams, which afford a pleasant contrast to the confused and exuberant compositions that have in the main attracted the attention of the authorities. The dreams of young children are frequently pure wish fulfillments and are subsequently quite uninteresting compared with the dreams of adults. A number of cases of dreams of children are presented and interpreted.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter IV: Distortion in dreams.
The fact that the phenomena of censorship and of dream distortion correspond to their smallest details justifies assumption that they are similarly determined, therefore, it is supposed that dreams are given their shape in individual human beings by the operation of 2 psychical forces; and that one of these forces constructs the wish which is expressed by the dream, while the other exercises a censorship upon this dream wish and, by the use of that censorship, forcibly brings about a distortion in the expression of the wish. The very frequent dreams, which appear to stand in contradiction to Freud’s theory because their subject matter is the frustration of a wish or the occurrence of something clearly unwished for, may be brought together under the heading of counter wish dreams. If these dreams are considered as a whole, it seems possible to trace them back to 2 principles. One of the 2 motive forces is the wish that Freud may be wrong, the second motive involves the masochistic component in the sexual constitution of many people. Those who find their pleasure, not in having physical pain inflicted on them, but in humiliation and mental torture, may be described as mental masochists. People of this kind can have counter wish dreams and unpleasurable dreams, which are none the less wish fulfillments since they satisfy their masochistic inclinations. Anxiety dreams (a special subspecies of dreams with a distressing content) do not present a new aspect of the dream problem but present the question of neurotic anxiety. The anxiety that is felt in a dream is only apparently explained by the dream’s content. In cases of both phobias and anxiety dreams the anxiety is only superficially attached to the idea that accompanies it; it originates from another source. Since neurotic anxiety is derived from sexual life and corresponds to libido which has been diverted from its purpose and has found no employment, it can be inferred that anxiety dreams are dreams with a sexual content, the libido belonging to that which has been transformed into anxiety.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter V: The material and sources of dreams.
(A) Recent and indifferent material in dreams.
Recent and indifferent material and sources of dreams are discussed. Dreams show a clear preference for the impressions of the immediately preceding days and make their selection upon different principles from our waking memory, since they do not recall what is essential and important but what is subsidiary and unnoticed. Dreams have at their disposal the earliest impressions of childhood and details from that period of life which is trivial and which in the waking state are believed to have been long forgotten. In each of Freud’s dreams, it is possible to find a point of contact with the experiences of the previous day. The instigating agent of every dream is to be found among the experiences which one has not yet slept on. Dreams can select their material from any part of the dreamer’s life, provided that there is a train of thought linking the experience of the dream day with the earlier ones. The analysis of a dream will regularly reveal its true, psychically significant source in waking life, though the emphasis has been displaced from the recollection of that source on to that of an indifferent one. The source of a dream may be either: 1) a recent and psychically significant experience, 2) several recent and significant experiences combined into 1 unit by the dream, 3) 1 or more recent and significant experiences represented in the dream content by a mention of a contemporary but indifferent experience or 4) an internal significant experience which is invariably represented in the dream by mention of a contemporary but indifferent impression. Considering these 4 cases, a psychical element which is significant but not recent can be replaced by an element which is recent but indifferent provided 1) the dream content is connected with a recent experience, and 2) the dream instigator remains a psychically significant process. Freud concludes that there are no indifferent dream instigators, therefore, no innocent dreams.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter V: The material and sources of dreams.
(B) Infantile material as a source of dreams.
Infantile material is discussed as a source of dreams. Experiences from childhood play a part in dreams whose content would never have led one to suppose it. In the case of another group of dreams, analysis shows that the actual wish which instigated the dream, and the fulfillment of which is represented by the dream, is derived from childhood, so that we find the child and the child’s impulses still living on in the dream. The deeper one carries the analysis of a dream, the more often one comes upon the track of experiences in childhood which have played a part among the sources of that dream’s latent content. Trains of thought reaching back to earliest childhood lead off even from dreams which seem at first sight to have been completely interpreted, since their sources and instigating wish have been discovered without difficulty. Dreams frequently seem to have more than one meaning. Not ouly may they include several wish fulfillments, one alongside the other, but a succession of meanings or wish fulfillments may be superimposed on one another, the bottom one being the fulfillment of a wish dating from earliest childhood.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter V: The material and sources of dreams.
(C) The somatic sources of dreams.
The somatic sources of dreams are discussed. There are 3 different kinds of somatic sources of stimulation: objective sensory stimuli arising from external objects, internal states of excitation of the sense organs having only a subjective basis, and somatic stimuli derived from the interior of the body. The significance of objective excitations of the sense organs is established from numerous observations and has been experimentally confirmed. The part played by subjective sensory excitations is demonstrated by the recurrence in dreams of hypnagogic sensory images. Though it is impossible to prove that the images and ideas occurring in dreams can be traced to internal somatic stimuli, this origin finds support in the universally recognized influence exercised upon dreams by states of excitation in digestive, urinary, and sexual organs. When external nervous stimuli and internal somatic stimuli are intense enough to force psychical attention to themselves, they then serve as a fixed point for the formation of a dream, a nucleus in its material; a wish fulfillment is then desired that shall correspond to this nucleus. Somatic sources of stimulation during sleep, unless they are of unusual intensity, play a similar part in the formation of dreams to that played by recent but indifferent impressions remaining from the previous day.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter V: The material and sources of dreams.
(D) Typical dreams: (a) Embarassing dreams of being naked.
There are a certain number of typical dreams which almost everyone has dreamt and which we assume must have the same meaning for everyone. Dreams of being naked or insufficiently dressed in the presence of strangers sometimes occur with the additional feature of their being a complete absence of any such feeling of shame on the dreamer’s part. Freud is concerned only with those dreams of being naked in which one does feel shame and embarassment and tries to escape or hide, and is then overcome by a strange inhibition which prevents one from moving and makes one feel incapable of altering the distressing situation. The nature of the undress involved is customarily far from clear. The people in whose presence one feels ashamed are almost always strangers, with their features left indeterminate. The core of a dream of exhibiting lies in the figure of the dreamer himself (not as he was as a child but as he appears at the present time) and his inadequate clothing (which emerges indistinctly, whether owing to superimposed layers of innumerable later memories of being in undress or as a result of the censorship). Repression plays a part in dreams of exhibiting; for the distress felt in such dreams is a reaction against the content of the scene of exhibiting having found expression in spite of the ban upon it.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter V: The material and sources of dreams.
(D) Typical dreams: (b) Dreams of the death of persons of whom the dreamer is fond.
There is a group of dreams which contains the death of some loved relative; for instance, of a parent, of a brother or sister, or of a child. Two classes of such dreams are distinguished: those in which the dreamer is unaffected by grief, so that on awakening he is astonished at his lack of feeling, and those in which the dreamer feels deeply pained by the death and may even weep bitterly in his sleep. Analyses of the dreams of class 1 show that they have some meaning other than the apparent one, and that they are intended to conceal some other wish. The meaning of the second class of dreams, as their content indicates, is a wish that the person in question may die. A child’s death wishes against his brothers and sisters are explained by the childish egoism which makes him regard them as his rivals. Dreams of the death of parents apply with preponderant frequency to the parent who is of the same sex as the dreamer. It is as though a sexual preference were making itself felt at an early age: as though boys regarded their fathers and girls their mothers as their rivals in love, whose elimination could not fail to be to their advantage.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter V: The material and sources of dreams.
(D) Typical dreams: (c) Other typical dreams.
Since Freud has no experience of his own regarding other typical dreams in which the dreamer finds himself flying through the air to the accompaniment of agreeable feelings or falling with feelings of anxiety, he uses information provided by psychoanalysis to conclude that these dreams reproduce impressions of childhood and they relate to games involving movement, which are extraordinarily attractive to children. What provokes dreams of flying and falling is not the state of the tactile feelings during sleep or sensations of the movement of lungs: These sensations are themselves reproduced as part of the memory to which the dream goes back: rather, they are part of the content of the dream and not its source. All the tactile and motor sensations which occur in these typical dreams are called up immediately when there is any psychical reason for making use of them and they can be disregarded when no such need arises. The relation of these dreams to infantile experiences has been established due to indications from the analyses of psychoneurotics.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter V: The material and sources of dreams.
(D) Typical dreams: (d) Examination dreams.
Everyone who has passed the matriculation examination at the end of his school studies complains of the obstinacy with which he is pursued by anxiety dreams of having failed, or of being obliged to take the examination again, etc. In the case of those who have obtained a University degree this typical dream is replaced by another one which represents them as having failed in the University finals; and it is in vain that they object, even while still asleep, that for a year they have been practicing medicine or working as University lecturers or heads of offices. The examination anxiety of neurotics owes its intensification to childhood fears. Anxious examination dreams search for some occasion in the past in which great anxiety has turned out to be unjustified and has been contradicted by the event. This situation would be a striking instance of the content of a dream being misunderstood by the waking agency (the dreamer).

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VI: The dream-work:
(A) The work of condensation.
Every attempt that has hitherto been made to solve the problem of dreams has dealt directly with their manifest content as it is presented in memory. The dream thoughts and the dream content are presented like 2 versions of the same subject matter in 2 different languages. The dream content seems like a transcript of dream thoughts into another mode of expression, whose characters are syntactic laws are discovered by comparing the original and the translation. The dream thoughts are immediately comprehensible, as soon as we have learned them. The dream content is expressed as it were in a pictographic script, the characters of which have to be transposed individually into the language of the dream thoughts. The first thing that becomes clear to anyone who compares the dream content with the dream thoughts is that a work of condensation on a large scale has been carried out. Dreams are brief, meager, and laconic in comparison with the range and wealth of the dream thoughts. The work of condensation in dreams is seen at its clearest when it handles words and names. The verbal malformations in dreams greatly resemble those which are familiar in paranoia but which are also present in hysteria and obsessions. When spoken sentences occur in dreams and are expressly distinguished as such from thoughts, it is an invariable rule that the words spoken in the dream are derived from spoken words remembered in the dream material.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VI: The dream-work. (B) The work of displacement.
The dream is differently centered from the dream thoughts; its content has different elements as its central point. It seems plausible to suppose that in dream work a psychical force is operating which strips the elements which have a high psychical value of their intensity and, by means of overdetermination, creates from elements of low psychical value new values, which afterwards find their way into the dream content. If that is so, a transference and displacement of psychical intensities occurs in the process of dream formation, and it is as a result of these that the difference between the test of the dream content and that of the dream thoughts come about. We may assume that dream displacement comes about through the influence of the censorship of endopsychic defense. Those elements of the dream thoughts which make their way into the dream must escape the censorship imposed by resistance.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VI: The dream-work. (C) The means of representation in dreams.
The means of representation in dreams are discussed. In the process of transforming the latent thoughts into the manifest content of a dream, 2 factors are at work: dream condensation and dream displacement. The logical relation between the dream thoughts are not given any separate representation in dreams. If a contradiction occurs in a dream, it is either a contradiction of the dream itself or a contradiction derived from the subject matter of one of the dream thoughts. Dreams take into account the connection which undeniably exists between all the portions of the dream thoughts by combining the whole material into a single situation or event. Similarity, consonance, and the possession of common attributes are all represented in dreams by unification which may either by already present in the material of the dream thoughts or may be freshly constructed. Identification or the construction of composite figures serves various purposes in dreams: firstly to represent an element common to 2 persons, secondly to represent a displaced common element, and thirdly, to express a merely wishful common element. The content of all dreams that occur during the same night forms part of the same whole; the fact of their being divided into several sections, as well as the groupings and number of those sections has a meaning and may be regarded as a piece of information arising from the latent dream thoughts.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VI: The dream-work.
(D) Considerations of representability.
The material of the dream thoughts, stripped to a large extent of its interrelations, is submitted to a process of compression, while at the same time displacements of intensity between its elements necessarily bring about a psychical transvaluation of the material. There are 2 sorts of displacements. One consists in the replacing of a particular idea by another in some way closely associated with it, and they are used to facilitate condensation in so far as, instead of 2 elements, a single common element intermediate between them finds its way into the dream. Another displacement exists and reveals itself in a change in verbal expression of the thoughts concerned. The direction taken by the displacement usually results in the exchange of a colorless and abstract expression in dream thought for a pictorial and concrete one. Of the various subsidiary thoughts attached to the essential dream thoughts, those which admit of visual representations will be preferred. The dream work does not shrink from the effort of recasting unadaptable thoughts into a new verbal form, provided that that process facilitates representation and so relieves the psychological pressure caused by constricted thinking.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VI: The dream-work.
(E) Representation by symbols in dreams-Some further typical dreams.
Since symbolism is used for representing sexual material in dreams, the question arises whether many of these symbols do not occur with a permanently fixed meaning. This symbolism is not peculiar to dreams, but is characteristic of unconscious ideation, in particular among the people (laymen). It is to be found in folklore, in popular myths, legends, linguistic idioms, proverbial wisdom and current jokes, to a more complete extent than in dreams. The following ideas or objects show dream representation by symbols: a hat as a symbol of a man or of male genitals; a little hat as the genital organ; being run over as a symbol of sexual intercourse; the genitals represented by buildings, stairs, and shafts; the male organ represented by persons and the female organ by a landscape. The more one is concerned with the solution of dreams, the more one is driven to recognize that the majority of the dreams of adults deal with sexual material and give expression to erotic wishes. Many dreams, if they are carefully interpreted, are bisexual, since they unquestionably admit of an over interpretation in which the dreamer’s homosexual impulses are realized, impulses which are contrary to his normal sexual activities. A large number of dreams, often accompanied by anxiety and having as their content such subjects as passing through narrow spaces or being in water, are based upon phantasies of intrauterine life, of existence in the womb, and of the act of birth.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VI: The dream-work.
(F) Some examples. Calculations and speeches in dreams.
A few instances of peculiar or unusual modes of representation in dreams are presented. For the purpose of representation in dreams, the spelling of words is far less important than their sound. The dream work makes use, for the purpose of giving a visual representation of the dream thoughts, of any methods within its reach, whether waking criticism regards them as legitimate or illegitimate. The dream work can often succeed in representing very refractory material, such as proper names, by a farfetched use of out-of4he-way associations. The dream work does not in fact carry out any calculations at all, whether correctly or incorrectly; it merely throws into the form of a calculation numbers which are present in the dream thoughts and can serve as allusions to matter that cannot be represented in any other way. The dream work treats numbers as a medium for the expression of its purpose in precisely the same way as it treats any other idea, including proper names and speeches that occur recognizably as verbal presentations. The dream work cannot actually create speeches. However much speeches and conversations, whether reasonable or unreasonable in themselves, may figure in dreams, analysis invariably proves that all that the dream has done is to extract from the dream thoughts fragments of speeches which have really been made or heard.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VI: The dream-work.
(G) Absurd dreams-Intellectual activity in dreams.
Absurdity in dreams is discussed. The frequency with which dead people appear in dreams and act and associate with us as though they were alive has produced some remarkable explanations which emphasize our lack of understanding of dreams. Often we think, what would that particular person do, think or say if he were alive. Dreams are unable to express an if of any kind except by representing the person concerned as present in some particular situation. Dreams of dead people whom the dreamer has loved raise problems in dream interpretation and these cannot always be satisfactorily solved due to the strongly marked emotional ambivalence which dominates the dreamer’s relation to the dead person. A dream is made absurd if a judgment that something is absurd is among the elements included in the dream thoughts. Absurdity is accordingly one of the methods by which the dream work represents a contradiction, besides such other methods as the reversal in the dream content of some material relation in the dream thoughts, or the exploitation of the sensation of motor inhibition. Everything that appears in dreams as the ostensible activity of the function of judgment is to be regarded, not as an intellectual achievement of the dream work, but as belonging to the material of the dream thought and as having been lifted from them into the manifest content of the dream as a readymade structure. Even the judgments, made after waking, upon a dream that has been remembered, and the feelings called up by the reproduction of such a dream form part of the latent content of the dream and are to be included in its interpretation. An act of judgment in a dream is only a repetition of some prototype in the dream thoughts.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VI: The dream-work.
(H) Affects in dreams.
In dreams, the ideational content is not accompanied by the affective consequences that should be regarded as inevitable in waking thought. In the case of a psychical complex which has come under the influence of the censorship imposed by resistance, the affects are least influenced and can indicate how we should derive the missing thoughts. In some dreams the affect remains in contact with the ideational material which has replaced that to which the affect was originally attached, in others, the dissolution of the complex has proceeded further. The affect makes its appearance completely detached from the idea which belongs to it and is introduced at some other point in the dream, where it fits in with the new arrangement of the dream elements. If an important conclusion is drawn in the dream thoughts, the dream also contains a conclusion, but this latter conclusion may be displaced on to quite different material. Such a displacement not infrequently follows the principle of antithesis. The dream work can also turn the affects in the dream thoughts into their opposite. A dominating element in a sleeper’s mind may be constituted by a tendency to some affect and this may then have a determining influence upon his dreams. A mood of this kind may arise from his experiences or thoughts during the preceding day, or its sources may be somatic. In either case it will be accompanied by trains of thought appropriate to it.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VI: The dream-work.
(1) Secondary revision.
A majority of the critical feelings in dreams are not in fact directed against the content of the dream, but are portions of the dream thoughts which have been taken over and used to an appropriate end. The censoring agency is responsible for interpolations and additions (secondary revisions) in the dream content. The interpolations are less easily retained in the memory than genuine derivatives of the material of the dream thoughts; if the dream is to be forgotten they are the first part of it to disappear. Daytime phantasies share a large number of their properties with night dreams. Like dreams, they are wish fulfillments; like dreams, they are based to a great extent on impressions of infantile experiences; like dreams, they benefit by a certain degree of relaxation of censorship. Dream work makes use of a ready made phantasy instead of putting one together out of the material of the dream thoughts. The psychical function which carries out what is described as the secondary revision of the content of dreams is identified with the activity of our waking thought. Our waking (preconscious) thinking behaves towards any perceptual material with which it meets in just the same way as secondary revision behaves towards the content of dreams. Secondary revision is the one significant factor in the dream work which has been observed by the majority of writers on the subject.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VII: The psychology of the dream-processes.
(A) The forgetting of dreams.
The psychology of forgetting dreams is discussed. What we remember of a dream and what we exercise our interpretative arts upon has been mutilated by the untrustworthiness of our memory, which seems incapable of retaining a dream and may well have lost precisely the most important parts of its content. Our memory of dreams is not only fragmentary but positively inaccurate and falsified. The most trivial elements of a dream are indispensable to its interpretation and the work in hand is held up if attention is not paid to these elements until too late. The forgetting of dreams remains inexplicable unless the power of the psychical censorship is taken into account. The forgetting of dreams is tendentious and serves the purpose of resistance. Waking life shows an unmistakable inclination to forget any dream that has been formed in the course of the night, whether as a whole, directly after waking, or bit by bit in the course of the day. The agent chiefly responsible for this forgetting is the mental resistance to the dream which has already done what it could against it during the night. We need not suppose that every association that occurs during the work of interpretation has a place in the dream work during the night.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VII: The psychology of the dream processes.
(B) Regression.
The path leading through the preconscious to consciousness is barred to the dream thoughts during the daytime by the censorship imposed by resistance, but during the night they are able to obtain access to consciousness. In hallucinatory dreams, the excitation moves in a backward direction, instead of being transmitted towards the motor system it moves towards the sensory system and finally reaches the perceptual system. If we describe as ‘progressive’ the direction taken by psychical processes arising from the unconscious during waking life, then dreams are spoken of as having a regressive character. We call it regression when in a dream an idea is turned back into the sensory image from which it was originally derived. Regression is an effect of a resistance opposing the progress of a thought into consciousness along the normal path, and of a simultaneous attraction exercised upon the thought by the presence of memories possessing great sensory force. In the case of dreams, regression may perhaps be further facilitated by the cessation of the progressive current which streams in during the daytime from the sense organs; in other forms of regression, the absence of this accessory factor must be made up for by a greater intensity of other motives for regression. There are 3 kinds of regression: topographical regression, temporal regression, and formal regression.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VII: The psychology of the dream processes.
(C) Wish-fulfillment.
Dreams are fulfillments of wishes. There are some dreams which appear openly as wish fulfillments, and others in which the wish fulfillment is unrecognizable and often disguised. Undistorted wishful dreams are found principally in children; however, short, frankly wishful dreams seem to occur in adults as well. There are 3 possible origins for the wish. 1) It may have been aroused during the day and for external reasons may not have been satisfied. 2) It may have arisen during the day but been repudiated. 3) It may have no connection with daytime life and be one of those wishes which only emerge from the suppressed part of the mind and become active at night. Children’s dreams show that a wish that has not been dealt with during the day can act as a dream instigator. A conscious wish can only become a dream instigator if it succeeds in awakening an unconscious wish with the same tenor and in obtaining reinforcement from it. Dreaming is a piece of infantile mental life that has been superseded. Wishful impulses left over from conscious waking life must be relegated to a secondary position in respect to the formation of dreams. The unconscious wishful impulses try to make themselves effective in daytime as well, and the fact of transference, as well as the psychoses, show us that they endeavor to force their way by way of the preconscious system into consciousness and to obtain control of the power of movement. It can be asserted that a hysterical symptom develops only where the fulfilments of 2 opposing wishes, arising each from a different psychical system, are able to converge in a single expression.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VII: The psychology of the dream processes.
(D) Arousal by dreams-The function of dreams-Anxiety-dreams.
The function of dreams is discussed. The state of sleep makes the sensory surface of consciousness which is directed toward the preconscious far more insusceptible to excitation than the surface directed towards the perceptual systems. Interest on the thought processes during sleep is abandoned while unconscious wishes always remain active. There are 2 possible outcomes for any particular unconscious excitatory process: Either it may be left to itself, in which case it eventually forces its way through consciousness and finds discharge for its excitation in movement; or it may come under the influence of the preconscious, and its excitation, instead of being discharged, may be bound by the preconscious. This second alternative occurs in the process of dreaming. The cathexis from the preconscious which goes halfway to meet the dream after it has become perceptual binds the dream’s unconscious excitation and makes it powerless to act as a disturbance. The theory of anxiety dreams forms part of the psychology of the neuroses. Since neurotic anxiety arises from sexual sources Freud analyses a number of anxiety dreams in order to indicate the sexual material present in their dream thoughts.

1900
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
Chapter VII: The psychology of the dream processes.
(E) The primary and secondary processes-Repression.
The view that dreams carry on the occupations and interest of waking life has been confirmed by the discovery of concealed dream thoughts. The theory of dreams regards wishes originating in infancy as the indispensable motive force for the formation of dreams. A dream takes the place of a number of thoughts which are derived from our daily life and which form a completely logical sequence. Two fundamentally different kinds of psychical processes are concerned in the formation of dreams: One of these produces perfectly rational dream thoughts, of no less validity than normal thinking; while the other treats these thoughts in a manner which is bewildering and irrational. A normal train of thought is only submitted to abnormal psychical treatment if an unconscious wish, derived from infancy and in a state of repression, has been transferred on to it. As a result of the unpleasure principle, the first psychical system is totally incapable of bringing anything disagreeable into the context of its thoughts. It is unable to do anything but wish. The second system can only cathect an idea if it is in a position to inhibit any development of unpleasure that may proceed from it. Anything that could evade that inhibition would be inaccessible to the second system as well as to the first; for it would promptly be dropped in obedience to the unpleasure principle. Described is the psychical process of which the first system alone admits as the primary process, and the process which results from the inhibition imposed by the second system as the secondary process. The second system is obliged to correct the primary process. Among the wishful impulses derived from infancy there are some whose fulfillment would be a contradiction of the purposive ideas of secondary thinking. The fulfillment of these wishes would no longer generate an affect of pleasure but of unpleasure; and it is this transformation of affect which constitutes the essence of ‘repression.’ It is concluded that what is suppressed continues to exist in normal people as well as abnormal, and remains capable of psychical functioning.

The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901).
Editor’s introduction (1960).
Only one other of Freud’s works, the Introductory Lectures (1916 to 1917) rivals The Psychopathology of Everyday Life in the number of German editions it has passed through and the number of foreign languages into which it has been translated. In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life almost the whole of the basic explanations and theories were already present in the earliest editions; the great mass of what was added later consisted merely in extra examples and illustrations to amplify what he had already discussed. Freud first mentioned parapraxis in a letter to Fliess of August 26, 1898. The special affection with which Freud regarded parapraxes was no doubt due to the fact that they, along with dreams, were what enabled him to extend to normal mental life the discoveries he had first made in connection with neuroses.

Chapter I: The forgetting of proper names.
There are certain characteristics of the forgetting of proper names which can be recognized clearly in individual cases. These are cases in which a name is in fact not only forgotten, but wrongly remembered. In the course of our efforts to recover the name that has dropped out, substitute names enter our consciousness; we recognize them at once as incorrect, but they keep on returning and force themselves upon us with great persistence. The process that should lead to the reproduction of the missing name has been displaced and therefore has led to an incorrect substitute. Freud’s hypothesis is that this displacement is not left to arbitrary psychical choice but follows paths which can be predicted and which conform to laws. The name or names which are substituted are connected in a discoverable way with the missing name. The conditions necessary for forgetting a name, when forgetting it is accompanied by paramnesia, may be summarized as follows: 1) a certain disposition for forgetting the name, 2) a process of suppression carried out shortly before, and 3) the possibility of establishing an external association between the name in question and the element previously suppressed.

ChapterII: The forgetting of foreign words.
The current vocabulary of our own language, when it is confined to the range of normal usage, seems to be protected against being forgotten. With the vocabulary of a foreign language it is notoriously otherwise and the disposition to forget it extends to all parts of speech. An early stage in functional disturbance is revealed by the fluctuations in the control we have over our stock of foreign words, according to the general condition of our health and to the degree of our tiredness. The forgetting of a nonsubstantial word in a Latin quotation is presented. The appearance or nonappearance in the memory of incorrect substitutes cannot be made the basis for any radical distinction. The disturbance in reproduction in the example presented occurred from the very nature of the topic in the quotation, since opposition unconsciously arose to the wishful idea expressed in it.

Chapter III: The forgetting of names and sets of words.
The forgetting of names and sets of words is discussed. The forgotten or distorted matter is brought by some associative path into connection with an unconscious thought content, a thought content which is the source of the effect manifested in the form of forgetting. There are various reasons why names and sets of words are forgotten. Some of them are: professional complex, family complex, personal reference, sublimated grudge against the bearer of it, guilty conscience, and personal complex. In a large number of cases, a name is forgotten not because the name itself arouses such motives, but because, owing to similarity in sound and to assonance, it touches upon another name against which these motives do operate. The mechanism of names being forgotten consists in the interference with the intended reproduction of the name by an alien train of thought which is not at the time conscious. Between the name interfered with and the interfering complex either a connection exists from the outset, or else such a connection has established itself, often in ways that appear artificial. Among the interfering complexes, those of personal reference prove to have the greatest effect. In general, 2 main types of name forgetting may be distinguished: those cases where the name itself touches on something unpleasant, and those where it is brought into connection with another name which has that effect.

Chapter IV: Childhood memories and screen memories.
A person’s earliest childhood memories seem frequently to have preserved what is indifferent and unimportant, whereas no trace is found in an adult’s memory of impressions dating from that time which are important, impressive and rich in affect. There is a similarity between the forgetting of proper names accompanied by paramnesia, and the formation of screen memories. Of the childhood memories that have been retained a few strike us as perfectly understandable, while others seem odd or unintelligible. It is not difficult to correct certain errors regarding both sorts. If the memories that a person has retained are subjected to an analytic enquiry, it is easy to establish that there is no guarantee of their accuracy. Some of the mnemic images are falsified, incomplete, or displaced in time and place. Remembering in adults makes use of a variety of psychical material but all dreams are predominantly of visual images only. This development is reversed in childhood memories; they are plastically visual even in people whose later function of memory has to do without any visual element. Thus visual memory preserves the type of infantile memory. It is suspected that in the so called earliest childhood memories we possess not the genuine memory trace but a later revision of it, a revision which may have been subjected to the influences of a variety of later psychical forces. Thus the childhood memories of individuals acquire the significance of screen memories.

Chapter V: Slips of the tongue.
The slips of the tongue that are observed in normal people give an impression of being the preliminary stages of the so-called paraphasias that appear under pathological conditions. Among the slips of the tongue that Freud collected only a very few can be solely attributed to the contact effects of sounds. He almost invariably discovers a disturbing influence which comes from something outside the intended utterance; and the disturbing element is either a single thought that has remained unconscious, which manifests itself in the slip of the tongue and which often can be brought to consciousness only by means of searching analysis, or it is a more general psychical motive force which is directed against the entire utterance. Slips of the tongue are contagious. A slip of the tongue has a cheering effect during psychoanalytic work, when it serves as a means of providing the therapist with a confirmation that may be very welcome to him if he is engaged in a dispute with the patient. People give slips of the tongue and other parapraxes the same interpretation that Freud advocates even if they do not theoretically endorse his view and even if they are disinclined, so far as it applies to themselves, to renounce the convenience that goes along with tolerating parapraxes.

Chapter VI: Misreadings and slips of the pen. (A). Misreadings.
Misreadings and slips of the pen are discussed. When we come to mistakes in reading and writing, we find that our general approach and our observations in regard to mistakes in speaking hold here also. Some examples of misreadings are presented, carefully analyzed and the misreadings found to be due to some of the following causes: questions of priority; long standing habits; the reader’s preparedness; the reader’s profession or present situation; something which rouses the reader’s defenses; and personal motives.

Chapter VI: Misreadings and slips of the pen
(B). Slips of the pen.
Slips of the pen are made more readily than slips of the tongue for the following reason: In the course of normal speaking the inhibitory function of the will is continuously directed to bringing the course of ideas and the articulatory movements into harmony with each other. If the expressive movement which follows the ideas is retarded (as in writing) such anticipations make their appearance easily. Twenty-one examples of slips of the pen are presented, analyzed and thought due to some of the following causes: the expression of a wish; unconscious hostility; similar subject matter; making a joke; and secondary revision. These examples have not justified assumption that there is a quantitative lessening of attention, but rather, a disturbance of attention by an alien thought which claims consideration. Between slips of the pen and forgetting may be inserted the situation where someone forgets to append a signature. An unsigned check has the same significance as a forgotten check.

Chapter VII: The forgetting of impressions and intentions.
(A). The forgetting of impressions and knowledge.
The forgetting of impressions is discussed. No psychological theory can give a connected account of the fundamental phenomenon of remembering and forgetting. We assume that forgetting is a spontaneous process which may be regarded as requiring a certain length of time. Some examples of forgetting, most of which Freud observed in himself, are presented. Freud distinguishes the forgetting of impressions and experiences from the forgetting of intentions. He states the invariable result of the entire series of observations: in every case the forgetting turned out to be based on a motive of unpleasure. Mislaying something is really the same as forgetting where it has been put. There are abundant signs to be found in healthy nonneurotic people that the recollection of distressing impressions and the occurrence of distressing thoughts are opposed by a resistance. The architectonic principle of the mental apparatus lies in a stratification, a building up of superimposed agencies. It is quite possible that this defensive endeavor belongs to a lower psychical agency and is inhibited by higher agencies. In a very similar way to the forgetting of names, the forgetting of impressions can be accompanied by faulty recollection; and this, where it finds credence, is described as paramnesia.

Chapter VII: The forgetting of impressions and intentions.
(B). The forgetting of intentions.
No group of phenomena is better qualified than the forgetting of intentions for demonstrating the thesis that, in itself, lack of attention does not suffice to explain parapraxes. An intention is an impulse to perform an action: an impulse which has already found approval but whose execution is postponed to a suitable occasion. There are 2 situations in life in which even the layman is aware that forgetting cannot in any way claim to be considered as an elementary phenomenon not further reducible, but entitles him to conclude that there are such things as unavowed motives: love relationships are military disciplines. But the service of women and military service demand that everything connected with them should be immune to forgetting. Freud made a collection of the cases of omitting to do something as a result of forgetting which he observed in himself. He found that they could be traced to interference by unknown and unavowed motives; or, to a counter-will. Where intentions of some importance are concerned we have found in general that they are forgotten when obscure motives rise against them. In the case of rather less important intentions we can recognize a second mechanism of forgetting: a counter-will is transferred to the intention from some other topic, after an external association has been formed between the other topic and the content of the intention.

Chapter VIII: Bungled actions.
The term ‘bungled actions’ is used to describe all the cases in which a wrong result, i.e., a deviation from what was intended, seems to be the essential element. The others, in which it is rather the whole action that seems to be inappropriate, Freud calls symptomatic and chance actions. No sharp line can be drawn between them, and we are forced to conclude that all the divisions made in this study have no significance other than a descriptive one and run counter to the inner unity in this field of phenomena. Included in the category of bungled actions are also those actions which result in breakage or self-injury.

Chapter IX: Symptomatic and chance actions.
Chance actions differ from ‘bungled’ actions because they do not have the support of a conscious intention, are in no need of a pretext and appear on their own account. We perform them without thinking there is anything in them, quite accidentally, just to have something to do; and such information will put an end to any enquiry into the significance of the action. These actions, which cannot be excused on grounds of clumsiness have to fulfill certain conditions: they must be unobtrusive and their effects must be slight. Symptomatic acts is a better name for these actions than chance actions. They give expression to something which the agent himself does not suspect in them, and which he does not as a rule intend to impart to other people but to keep to himself. The richest supply of such chance or symptomatic acts is obtained during psychoanalytic treatment of neurotics. An example is given of how there can be a close connection between a symbolic action performed through force of habit and the most intimate and important aspects of a healthy person’s life. Chance actions and symptomatic acts occurring in matrimonial matters (often of serious significance) are discussed along with the human habit of ‘losing things,’ with examples given of each. Following these is a brief and varied collection of symptomatic acts found in healthy and neurotic people. The images and turns of phrase to which a person is particularly given are rarely without significance when one is forming a judgment of him; and others often turn out to be allusions to a theme which is being kept in the background at the time, but which has powerfully affected the speaker.

Chapter X: Errors.
Errors of memory are distinguished from forgetting accompanied by paramnesia by the single feature that in the former the error (the paramnesia) is not recognized as such but finds credence. Of all parapraxes errors seem to have the least rigid mechanism. The occurrence of an error is a quite general indication that the mental activity in question has had to struggle with a disturbing influence; but the particular form that the error takes is not determined by the quality of the concealed disturbing idea. Every time we make a skip in talking or writing we may infer that there has been a disturbance due to mental processes lying outside our intention; but it must be admitted that slips of the tongue and of the pen often obey the laws of resemblance, of indolence or of the tendency to haste, without the disturbing element succeeding in imposing any part of its own character on the resulting mistake in speech or writing. Seventeen examples of errors are reported.

Chapter XI: Combined parapraxes.
Combined parapraxes are discussed and examples given. Mislaying, breaking, and forgetting were interpreted as an expression of a counterwill that has been pushed back. Repeated forgetfulness resulted in an eventually bungled performance. A change in the form taken by the parapraxis while outcome remains the same gives a vivid impression of a will striving for a definite aim, and contradicts the notion that a parapraxis is a matter of chance and needs no interpretation. It was found that a conscious intention completely failed to prevent the success of the parapraxis.

Chapter XII: Determinism, belief in chance and superstition -Some points of view.
(A) and (B).
Certain shortcomings in our psychical functioning and certain seemingly unintentional performances are proven by analysis to have valid motives and to be deter-mined by motives unknown to consciousness. In order to be included in a class of phenomena explicable in this way, a psychical parapraxis must fulfill the following conditions: 1) it must not exceed certain dimensions fixed by our judgment, 2) it must be in the nature of a momentary and temporary disturbance; and 3) if we perceive the parapraxis at all, we must not be aware in ourselves of any motive for it. If we agree that a part of our psychical functioning cannot be explained by purposive ideas, we are failing to appreciate the extent of determination in mental life. A number of examples indicate that one cannot make a number occur to one at one’s own free arbitrary choice any more than a name, rather, that it is strictly determined by certain circumstances, memories, etc. Many people contest the assumption of complete psychical determinism by appealing to a special feeling of conviction that there is a free will. It is not necessary to dispute the right to the feeling of conviction of having a free will. If the distinction between conscious and unconscious motivation is taken into account, our feeling of conviction informs us that conscious motivation does not extend to all our motor decisions.

Chapter XII: Determinism, belief in chance and superstition -Some points of view.
(C) and (D).
There are 2 spheres in which it is possible to demonstrate phenomena that appear to correspond to an unconscious, and therefore displaced, knowledge of that motivation. A striking and generally observed feature of the behavior of paranoiacs is that they attach the greatest significance to the minor details of other people’s behavior which we ordinarily neglect, interpret them and make them the basis of far reaching conclusions. Another indication that we possess unconscious and displaced knowledge of the motivation in chance actions and parapraxes is to be found in the phenomenon of superstition. Superstition is in large part the expectation of trouble. We must also include in the category of the miraculous and the uncanny the peculiar feelings we have, in certain moments and situations, of having once before been in the same place, though our efforts never succeed in clearly remembering the previous occasion.

Chapter XII: Determinism, belief in chance and superstition -Some points of view.
(E), (F) and (G).
Every time Freud analyzed forgetting, a connection was clearly shown to exist between the forgetting of a name and a reason for the forgetting. It is not possible to interpret every dream but a dream which proves refractory during an attempt to solve it the next day will be more vulnerable to analysis a week or a month later, after a change has come about and has reduced the contending psychical values. The same applies to the solving of parapraxes and symptomatic acts. Parapraxes have a hidden motivation. The basic determinants of the normal process of forgetting are unknown while the motive for forgetting (in cases that require a special explanation) is invariably an unwillingness to remember something which can evoke distressing feelings. In the forgetting of intentions another factor emerges. The conflict, which could only be surmised in the repression of what was distressing to remember, here becomes tangible, and in the analysis of the examples a counter will can regularly be recognized which opposes the intention without putting an end to it. Consequently, 2 types of psychical process are recognized: either the counter-will is turned directly against the intention or it is unrelated in its nature to the intention itself and establishes its connection with it by means of an external association. The same conflict governs ‘bungled’ actions while in chance or symptomatic actions and internal conflict becomes less and less important. The mechanism of parapraxes and chance actions correspond in its most essential points with the mechanism of dream formation. In both cases we find condensations and compromise formations. It is concluded that both severe and mild psychopathology (and also in parapraxes and chance actions) have 1 factor in common: the phenomena can be traced back to incompletely suppressed psychical material, which, although pushed away by consciousness, has nevertheless not been robbed of all capacity for expressing itself.

1905
Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria (1905).
Prefatory remarks.
Prefatory remarks to a Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria are presented. If it is true that the causes of hysterical disorders are to be found in the intimacies of the patients’ psychosexual life, and that hysterical symptoms are the expression of their most secret and repressed wishes, then the complete elucidation of a case of hysteria involves the revelation of those intimacies and the betrayal of those secrets. Freud believes it is the physician’s duty to publish what he believes he knows of the causes and structure of hysteria, and it becomes cowardice to neglect doing so, as long as he can avoid causing direct personal injury to the patient concerned. Some ways in which Freud overcame some of the technical difficulties in drawing up the report of this case history are presented. The material which elucidated the case was grouped around 2 dreams and the treatment covered only 3 months and was not carried through to its appointed end, but was broken off at the patient’s request when it reached a certain point.

Chapter I: The clinical picture.
The family of the 18-year-old girl (Dora), who is the patient, included her parents and a brother who was 1-1/2 years her senior. Her father was the dominating figure in the family, owing to his intelligence and character as much as to the circumstances of his life. His daughter was very tenderly attached to him, and for that reason her critical powers, which developed early, took all the more offense at many of his actions and peculiarities. Her affection for him was further increased by the many severe illnesses which he had since her sixth year. The patient had begun to develop neurotic symptoms at the age of 8 and became subject at that time to chronic dyspnea with occasional episodes in which the symptom was very much aggravated. Freud first saw her when she was 16 at which time she was suffering from a cough and from hoarseness. The experience with Herr K., his making love to her and the insult to her honor which was involved seem to provide the psychical trauma which Breuer and Freud declared to be the indispensable prerequisite for the production of a hysterical disorder. Thus there are 3 symptoms, disgust, sensation of pressure on the upper part of the body, and the avoidance of men engaged in affectionate conversation, all derived from this single experience. Next considered were her motives for being ill. The relation between Dora and her father, Herr K. and Frau K. and the relation between Dora’s father and Frau K. were the primary contributors to Dora’s hysteria. It was concluded that no one can undertake the treatment of a case of hysteria until he is convinced of the impossibility of avoiding the mention of sexual subjects, or unless he is prepared to allow himself to be convinced by experience.

Chapter II: The first dream.
Dora’s first dream which keeps recurring is presented:
Chapter III: The second dream.
A few weeks after the first dream, a second dream occurred. Dora was wandering about alone in a strange town, and saw streets and squares. The wandering about was overdetermined and led back to one of the exciting causes from the day before. Dora returned to her own house and found a note from her mother saying that since she had left home without her parents’ knowledge, the mother had not wanted to write and say her father was ill. Now he was dead, and Dora could come if she liked. This was interpreted as revenge against her father. The fact that she asked a certain question, “Where is the station?” nearly a hundred times in her dream led to another cause of the dream which was related to the previous evening. The thick wood near the station in her dream was interpreted as a symbolic geography of sex. There lay concealed behind the first situation in the dream a phantasy of defloration, the phantasy of a man seeking to force an entrance into the female genitals. It was concluded that incapacity for meeting a real erotic demand is one of the most essential features of a neurosis and that neurotics are dominated by the opposition between reality and phantasy. If what they long for most intensely in their phantasies is presented to them in reality, they flee from it; and they abandon themselves to their phantasies most readily where they need no longer fear to see them realized.

Chapter IV: Postscript.
The theory of hysteria does not by any means fail to point out that neuroses have an organic basis, though it does not look for that basis in any pathological anatomical changes, and provisionally substitutes the conception of organic functions for the chemical changes which we should expect to find but which we are at present unable to apprehend. Sexuality does not simply intervene on one single occasion, at some point in the working of the processes which characterize hysteria, but it provides the motive power for every single symptom, and for every single manifestation of a symptom. The symptoms of the disease are nothing else than the patient’s sexual activity. During psychoanalytic treatment, the formation of new symptoms is invariably stopped. But the productive powers of the neurosis are by no means extinguished; they are occupied in the creation of a special class of mental structures, for the most part unconscious, to which the name of transference may be given. Transferences are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; however, they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician.

1905
Three essays on the theory of sexuality (1905).
Chapter I: The sexual aberrations:
(1). Deviations in respect of the sexual object.
a.) Inversion b.) Sexually immature persons and animals as sexual objects.
Sexual aberrations are discussed. The person from whom sexual attraction proceeds is called the sexual object and the act towards which the instinct tends is called the sexual aim. Some deviations in respect of the sexual object are presented. The behavior of inverts (people with ‘contrary sexual feelings,’ such as homosexuals) varies greatly in several respects: 1) They may be absolute inverts; 2) they may be amphigenic inverts, that is psychosexual hermaphrodites, or: 3) they may be contingent inverts. The earliest assessments regarded inversion as an innate indication of nervous degeneracy. The attribution of degeneracy in this connection is open to the objections which can be raised against the indiscriminate use of the word in general. Innateness is only attributed to the first class of inverts. The existence of the 2 other classes is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of the innateness of inversion. The nature of inversion is explained neither by the hypothesis that it is innate nor by the alternative hypothesis that it is acquired. The facts of anatomy lead us to suppose that an originally bisexual physical disposition has, in the course of evolution, become modified into a unisexual one, leaving behind only a few traces of the sex that has become atrophied. The theory of psychical hermaphroditism presupposes that the sexual object of an invert is the opposite of that of a normal person. No one single aim can apply in cases of inversion. Sexual instinct and the sexual object are merely close together: sexual instinct is independent of its object and its origin is not likely due to its object’s attractions. Cases in which sexually immature persons (children) are chosen as sexual objects and cases of sexual intercourse with animals are judged as sporadic aberrations. It is concluded that under a great number of conditions and in surprisingly numerous individuals, the nature and importance of the sexual object recedes into the background. What is essential and constant in the sexual instinct is something else.

Chapter I: The sexual aberrations.
(2). Deviations in respect of the sexual aim.
a). Anatomical extensions. b). Fixation of preliminary sexual aims.
Some deviations of the sexual aim are presented. Per-versions are sexual activities which either extend, in an anatomical sense, beyond the regions of the body that are designed for sexual union, or linger over the intermediate relations to the sexual object which should normally be traversed rapidly on the path towards the final sexual aim. The use of the mouth as a sexual organ is regarded as a perversion if the lips (or tongue) of one person are brought into contact with the genitals of another, but not if the mucous membranes of the lips of both of them come together. Where the anus is concerned it becomes still clearer that it is disgust which stamps that sexual aim as a perversion. Unsuitable substitutes, called fetishes, (such as hair, piece of clothing, etc.) for the sexual object are discussed. Every external or internal factor that hinders or postpones the attainment of the normal sexual aim will evidently lend support to the tendency to linger over the preparatory activities and to turn them into new sexual aims that can take the place of the normal one. Pleasure in looking (scopophilia) becomes a perversion if it is restricted exclusively to the genitals, or if it is concerned with the overriding of disgust, or if, instead of being preparatory to the normal sexual aim, it supplants it. The most common and the most significant of all the perversions is the desire to inflict pain (sadism) upon the sexual object, and its reverse (masochism). The roles of passivity and activity in sadism and masochism are discussed in view of the fact that in this perversion both forms are habitually found in the same individual.

Chapter I: The sexual aberrations.
(3). The perversions in general.
The perversions in general are discussed. In the majority of instances, the pathological character in a perversion is found to lie not in the content of the new sexual aim but in its relation to the normal. If a perversion, instead of appearing merely alongside the normal sexual aim and object, supplants it completely and takes its place in all circumstances, so that the perversion has the characteristics of exclusiveness and fixation, then we shall be justified in regarding it as a pathological symptom. The sexual instinct has to struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistances, of which shame and disgust are the most prominent. Some perversions are only made intelligible if we assume the convergence of several motive forces.

Chapter I: The sexual aberrations.
(4). The sexual instinct in neurotics.
The sexual instinct in neurotics is discussed. The only means of obtaining information about the sexual life of persons known as psychoneurotics is through psychoanalytic investigation. Experience shows that these psychoneuroses, hysteria, obsessional neuroses, neurasthenia, schizophrenia, and paranoia, are based on sexual instinctual forces. The removal of the symptoms of hysterical patients by psychoanalysis proceeds on the supposition that those symptoms are substitutes for a number of emotionally cathected mental processes, wishes and desires, which, by the operation of a special psychical procedure (repression), have been prevented from obtaining discharge in psychical activity that is admissible to consciousness. The findings of psychoanalysis show that symptoms represent a substitute for impulses the sources of whose strength is derived from the sexual instinct. In the case of anyone who is predisposed to hysteria, the onset of his illness is precipitated when he finds himself faced by the demands of a real sexual situation. Between the pressure of the instinct and his antagonism to sexuality, illness offers escape. The sexual instinct of psychoneurotics exhibits all the aberrations and manifestations of abnormal sexual life. The unconscious mental life of all neurotics shows inverted impulses, fixation of their libido upon persons of their own sex. In any fairly marked case of psychoneurosis it is unusual for only a single one of the perverse instincts to be developed.

Chapter I: The sexual aberrations.
(5). Component instincts and erotogenic zones.
The component instincts and erotogenic zones are discussed. An instinct is provisionally understood to be the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation, as contrasted with a stimulus, which is set up by single excitations coming from without. Excitations of 2 kinds arise from the somatic organs, based upon differences of a chemical nature. One of these kinds of excitation is specifically sexual, and the organ concerned is the erotogenic zone of the sexual component instinct arising from it. The part played by the erotogenic zones is immediately obvious in the case of those perversions which assign a sexual significance to the oral and anal orifices. In hysteria these parts of the body and the neighboring tracts of mucous membrane become the seat of new sensations and of changes in innervation in just the same way as do the actual genitalia under the excitations of the normal sexual processes. In obsessional neurosis, what is striking is the significance of those impulses which create new sexual aims and seem independent of erotogenic zones. In scopophilia and exhibitionism the eye corresponds to an erotogenic zone, while in the case of those components of the sexual instinct which involve pain and cruelty the same role is assumed by the skin.

Chapter I: The sexual aberrations.
(6). Reasons for the apparent preponderance of perverse sexuality in the psychoneuroses.
(7). Intimation of the infantile character of sexuality.
Most psychoneurotics fall ill only after the age of puberty as a result of the demands made upon them by normal sexual life, or illnesses of this kind set in later when the libido fails to obtain satisfaction along normal lines. In both cases the libido behaves like a stream whose main bed has become blocked and it proceeds to fill up collateral channels which may hitherto have been empty. Thus what appears to be the strong tendency of psychoneurotics to perversion may be collaterally determined and must be collaterally intensified. Different cases of neurosis may behave differently: in one case the preponderating factor may be the innate strength of the tendency to perversion, in another it may be the collateral increase of that tendency owing to the libido being forced away from a normal sexual aim and sexual object. Neurosis will always produce its greatest effects when constitution and experience work together in the same direction. The disposition to perversions is itself of no great rarity but must form a part of what passes as the normal constitution. It is debatable whether the perversions go back to innate determinants or arise owing to chance experiences. There is something innate lying behind the perversions but it is something innate in everyone, though as a disposition it may vary in its intensity and may be increased by the influences of actual life. The postulated constitution, containing the germs of all the perversions, will only be demonstrable in children, even though in them it is only with modest degrees of intensity that any of the instincts can emerge. Thus a formula emerges which states that the sexuality of neurotics has remained in, or has been brought back to, an infantile state.

Chapter II: Infantile sexuality:
(1). The period of sexual latency in childhood and its interruptions.
Infantile amnesia, which turns everyone’s childhood into something like a prehistoric epoch and conceals from him the beginnings of his own sexual life, is responsible for the fact that no importance is attached to childhood in the development of sexual life. The period of sexual latency in childhood and its interruptions are discussed. The germs of sexual impulses are already present in the newborn child and these continue to develop for a time, but are then overtaken by a progressive process of suppression; this in turn is itself interrupted by periodical advances in sexual development or may be held up by individual peculiarities. The sexual life of children usually emerges in a form accessible to observation around the third or fourth year of life. It is during the period of total or only partial latency that the mental forces which later impede the course of the sexual instinct are built up. Powerful components are acquired for every kind of cultural achievement by the diversion of sexual instinctual forces from sexual aims and their direction to new ones, a process called sublimation. The same process plays a part in the development of the individual and its beginning is in the period of sexual latency of childhood. Interruptions of the latency period are discussed.

Chapter II: Infantile sexuality.
(2). The manifestations of infantile sexuality.
The manifestations of infantile sexuality are discussed. Thumbsucking (or sensual sucking) is regarded as an example of the sexual manifestations of childhood. Thumbsucking appears in early infancy and may continue into maturity, or even persist all through life. A grasping instinct may appear and may manifest itself as a simultaneous rhythmic tugging at the lobes of the ears or a catching hold of some part of another person for the same purpose. Sensual sucking involves a complete absorption of the attention and leads either to sleep or even to a motor reaction in the nature of an orgasm. The behavior of a child who indulges in thumbsucking is determined by a search for some pleasure which has already been experienced and is now remembered. To begin with, sexual activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not become independent of them until later. The 3 essential characteristics of an infantile sexual manifestation are: 1) at its origin it attaches itself to one of the vital somatic functions; 2) it has as yet no sexual object, and is thus autoerotic; and 3) its sexual aim is dominated by an erotogenic zone.

Chapter II: Infantile sexuality.
(3). The sexual aim of infantile sexuality.
The sexual aim of infantile sexuality is discussed. An erotogenic zone is a part of the skin or mucous membrane in which stimuli of a certain sort evoke a feeling of pleasure possessing a particular quality. A rhythmic character must play a part among the special conditions which produce the pleasure. There are predestined erotogenic zones; however, any other part of the skin or mucous membrane can take over the functions in that direction. Thus the quality of the stimulus has more to do with producing the pleasurable feeling than has the nature of the part of the body concerned. A child who indulges in sensual sucking searches about his body and chooses some part of it to suck, a part which is afterwards preferred by him by force of habit. A precisely analogous tendency to displacement is also found in the symptomatology of hysteria; here repression affects most of all the actual genital zones and these transmit their susceptibility to stimulation to other erotogenic zones which then behave exactly like genitals. The sexual aim of the infantile instinct consists in obtaining satisfaction by means of an appropriate stimulation of the erotogenic zone which has been selected in one way or another. This satisfaction must have been previously experienced in order to have left behind a need for its repetition. A sexual aim consists in replacing the projected sensation of stimulation in the erotogenic zone by an external stimulus which removes that sensation by producing a feeling of satisfaction.

II: Infantile sexuality.
(4). Masturbatory sexual manifestations.
Masturbatory sexual manifestations are discussed. The anal zone is well suited by its position to act as a medium through which sexuality may attach itself to other somatic functions. The intestinal disturbances which are so common in childhood see to it that this zone does not lack intense excitations. The masturbation of early infancy seems to disappear after a short time, but at some point of childhood (usually before the fourth year) the sexual instinct belonging to the genital zone usually revives and persists for a time until it is once more supressed or it may continue without interruption. The sexual excitation returns, either as a centrally determined tickling stimulus which seeks satisfaction in masturbation, or as a process in the nature of nocturnal emission which, like the nocturnal emissions of adult years, achieves satisfaction without the help of any action by the subject. The reappearance of sexual activity is determined by internal causes and external contingencies, both of which can be guessed at in cases of neurotic illness from the form taken by their symptoms. Under the influence of seduction, children can become polymorphously perverse, and can be led into all possible kinds of sexual irregularities. This shows that an aptitude for them is innately present in their disposition. Infantile sexual life, in spite of the preponderating dominance of erotogenic zones, exhibits components which involve other people as sexual objects. Such are the instincts of scopophilia, exhibitionism and cruelty. The cruel component of the sexual instinct develops in childhood even more independently of the sexual activities that are attached to erotogenic zones. The impulse of cruelty arises from the instinct for mastery and appears at a period of sexual life at which the genitals have not yet taken over their later role. It then dominates a phase of sexual life which is described as a pregenital organization.

Chapter II: Infantile sexuality.
(5). The sexual researches of childhood.
At about the same time as the sexual life of children reaches its first peak, between the ages of 3 and 5, the children begin to show signs of the activity which may be ascribed to the instinct for knowledge or research. Its activity corresponds to a sublimated manner of obtaining mastery, while it also makes use of the energy of scopophilia. A male child believes that a genital like his own is to be attributed to everyone he knows, and he cannot make its absence tally with his picture of these other people. This conviction is energetically maintained by boys; is obstinately defended against the contradictions which soon result from observation; and is only abandoned after severe internal struggles (the castration complex). The substitutes for the penis which they feel is missing in women play a great part in determining the form taken by many perversions. When girls see that boys’ genitals are formed differently from their own, they are ready to recognize them immediately and are overcome by envy for the penis. Children’s theories of birth are discussed as is their sadistic view of sexual intercourse. The sexual theories of children are, in general, reflections of their own sexual constitution. In spite of their grotesque errors, the theories show more understanding of sexual processes than children are given credit for.

Chapter II: Infantile sexuality.
(6). The phases of development of the sexual organization.
Infantile sexual life is essentially autoerotic and its individual component instincts are disconnected and independent of one another in their search for pleasure. The study of the inhibitions and disturbances of the process of development of the sexual organization enables us to recognize abortive beginnings and preliminary stages of a firm organization of the component instincts. The name pregenital is given to organizations of sexual life in which the genital zones have not yet taken over their predominant part. The first of these is the oral organization. A second pregenital phase is that of the sadistic anal organization. In this stage sexual polarity and an extraneous object are observable but organization and subordination to the reproductive function are still absent. This form of sexual organization can persist throughout life and can permanently attract a large portion of sexual activity. The opposing pairs of instincts (activity and passivity) are developed to an equal extent and are described by the term ambivalence. It is concluded that the whole of the sexual currents have become directed towards a single person in relation to whom they seek to achieve their aims, this then being the closest approximation possible in childhood to the final form taken by sexual life after puberty. It may be regarded as typical of the choice of an object that the process is diphasic, that is, that it occurs in 2 waves. The first of these begins between the ages of 2 and 5, and is brought to a halt or to a retreat by the latency period. The second wave starts with puberty and determines the final outcome of sexual life.

Chapter II: Infantile sexuality.
(7). The sources of infantile sexuality.
Sexual excitation arises: 1) as a reproduction of a satisfaction experienced in connection with other organic processes; 2) through appropriate peripheral stimulation of erotogenic zones; and 3) as an expression of certain instincts. Sexual excitation can also be produced by rhythmic mechanical agitation of the body. Stimuli of this kind operate in 3 different ways: on the sensory apparatus of the vestibular nerves, on the skin, and on the deeper parts. Children feel a need for a large amount of active muscular exercise and derive extraordinary pleasure from satisfying it. In many people, the infantile connection between romping and sexual excitation is among the determinants of the direction subsequently taken by their sexual instinct. All comparatively intense affective processes, including even terrifying ones, infringe upon sexuality, a fact which may incidentally help to explain the pathogenic effect of emotions of that kind. Concentration of the attention upon an intellectual task and intellectual strain in general produce a concomitant sexual excitation in many young people as well as adults. The same pathways along which sexual disturbances infringe upon the other somatic functions also perform another important function in normal health; they serve for the attraction of sexual instinctual forces to aims that are other than sexual, that is to say, for the sublimation of sexuality.

Chapter III: The transformations of puberty.
(1). The primacy of the genital zones and the fore-pleasure.
With the arrival of puberty, changes set in which are destined to give infantile sexual life its final, normal shape. A normal sexual life is only assured by an exact convergence of the affectionate current and the sensual current both being directed towards the sexual object and sexual aim. The new sexual aim in men consists in the discharge of the sexual products. The most striking of the processes at puberty has been picked upon as constituting its essence: the manifest growth of the external genitalia. Stimuli can impinge on it from 3 directions: from the external world by means of the excitation of the erotogenic zones, from the organic interior, and from mental life, which is a storehouse for external impressions and a receiver for internal excitations. All three types of stimuli produce sexual excitement. The erotogenic zones are used to provide a certain amount of pleasure by being stimulated in the way appropriate to them. This pleasure then leads to an increase in tension which in its turn is responsible for producing the necessary motor energy for the conclusion of the sexual act. The penultimate stage of that act is once again the appropriate stimulation of an erotogenic zone by the appropriate object; and from the pleasure yielded by this excitation the motor energy is obtained, this time by a reflex path, which brings about the discharge of the sexual substances.

Chapter III: The transformations of puberty.
(2). The problem of sexual excitation.
The problem of sexual excitation is discussed. We remain in complete ignorance both of the origin and of the nature of the sexual tension which arises simultaneously with the pleasure when erotogenic zones are satisfied. A certain degree of sexual tension is required for the excitability of the erotogenic zones. The accumulation of the sexual substances creates and maintains sexual tension; the pressure of these products upon the walls of the vesicles containing them might be supposed to act as a stimulus upon a spinal center, the condition of which would be perceived by higher centers and would then give consciousness to the familiar sensation of tension. Observations on castrated males seem to show that sexual excitation can occur to a considerable degree independently of the production of the sexual substances. It seems probable that special chemical substances are produced in the interstitial portion of the sex glands; these are then taken up in the blood stream and cause particular parts of the central nervous system to be charged with sexual tension. It is concluded that substances of a peculiar kind arise from sexual metabolism.

Chapter III: The transformations of puberty.
(3). The libido theory.
The libido theory is discussed. Libido is defined as a quantitatively variable force which could serve as a measure of processes and transformations occurring in the field of sexual excitation. The idea of a quantity of libido is presented and the mental representation of it is given the name of ego libido. The production, increase or diminution, distribution and displacement of it should afford us possibilities for explaining the psychosexual phenomena observed. This ego libido is, however, only conveniently accessible to analytic study when it has been put to the use of cathecting sexual objects, that is, when it has become object libido. It should be the task of a libido theory of neurotic and psychotic disorders to express all the observed phenomena and inferred processes in terms of the economics of the libido. In contrast to object libido, ego libido is described as narcissistic libido. Narcissistic or ego libido seems to be the great reservoir from which the object cathexes are sent out and into which they are withdrawn once more; the narcissistic libidinal cathexis of the ego is the original state of things, realized in earliest childhood, and is merely covered by the later extrusions of libido, but in essentials persists behind them.

Chapter III: The transformations of puberty
(4). The differentiation between men and women.
The differentiation between men and women is discussed. It is not until puberty that the sharp distinction is established between the masculine and feminine characters. From that time on, this contrast has a more decisive influence than any other upon the shaping of human life. The development of the inhibitions of sexuality takes place in little girls earlier and in the face of less resistance than in boys. The autoerotic activity of the erotogenic zones is, however, the same in both sexes. The leading erotogenic zone in female children is located at the clitoris, and is thus homologous to the masculine genital zone of the glans penis. Puberty, which brings about so great an accession of libido in boys, is marked in girls by a fresh wave of expression, in which it is precisely clitoral sexuality that is affected. When erotogenic susceptibility to stimulation has been successfully transferred by a woman from the clitoris to the vaginal orifice, it implies that she has adopted a new leading zone for the purpose of her later sexual activity. A man retains his leading zone unchanged from childhood.

Chapter III: The transformations of puberty.
(5). The finding of an object.
The processes at puberty establish the primacy of the genital zones; and in a man, the penis, which has now become capable of erection, presses forward insistently towards the new sexual aim, penetration into a cavity in the body which excites his genital zone. Simultaneously on the psychical side the process of finding an object, for which preparations have been made from earliest childhood, is completed. All through the period of latency children learn to feel for other people who help them in their helplessness and satisfy their needs. Their love is modeled after and a continuation of, their relation as sucklings to their mother. Children behave as though their dependence on the people looking after them were in the nature of sexual love. Anxiety in children is originally an expression of the fact that they are feeling the loss of the person they love. The barrier against incest is maintained by the postponing of sexual maturation until the child can respect the cultural taboo upheld by society. The sexual life of maturing youth is almost entirely restricted to indulging in phantasies. When incestuous fantasies are overcome, detachment from parental authority is completed. The closer one comes to the deeper disturbances of psychosexual development, the more unmistakably the importance of incestuous object choice emerges. In psychoneurotics, a large portion or the whole of their psychosexual activity in finding an object remains in the unconscious as a result of their repudiation of sexuality. Even a person who has avoided an incestuous fixation of his libido does not entirely escape its influence. One of the tasks implicit in object choice is that it should find its way to the opposite sex.

Summary.
The onset of sexual development in human beings occurs in 2 phases. This appears to be one of the necessary conditions of the aptitude of men for developing a higher civilization, but also of their tendency to neurosis. It is not rare to find perversions and psychoneuroses occurring in the same family, and distributed between the 2 sexes in such a way that the male members of the family are positive perverts, while the females, are negative perverts, that is, hysterics. This is good evidence of the essential conditions which exist between the 2 disorders. If an abnormal relationship between all the different dispositions persists and grows stronger at maturity, the result can only be a perverse sexual life. If the genital zone is weak, the combination, which is required to take place at puberty, is bound to fail, and the strongest of the other components of sexuality will continue its activity as a perversion. If in the course of development some of the components which are of excessive strength in the disposition are submitted to the process of repression, the excitations concerned continue to be generated as before; but they are prevented by psychical obstruction from attaining their aim and are diverted into numerous other channels until they find their way to expression as symptoms. Sublimation enables excessively strong excitations arising from particular sources of sexuality to find an outlet and use in other fields, so that an increase in psychical efficiency results from a disposition which in itself is perilous.

1904
Freud’s psycho-analytic procedure (1904).
Freud’s psychotherapeutic procedure, described as psychoanalysis, is an outgrowth of the cathartic method. The cathartic method presupposed that the patient could be hypnotized, and was based on the widening of consciousness that occurs under hypnosis. Its aim was the removal of the pathological symptoms. The cathartic method renounced suggestion; Freud gave up hypnosis as well and found a substitute for hypnosis in the associations of his patients. Freud insisted that the patients include everything that comes into their heads when they discuss their case history. Freud noticed that gaps (amnesias) appeared in the patient’s memory thus making up the determining factor of his entire theory. If the patient is urged to fill the gaps discomfort occurs when the memory really returns. From this Freud concludes that the amnesias are the result of a process which he calls repression and the motive for which he finds in feelings of unpleasure. The psychical forces which have brought about this repression can be detected in the resistance which operates against the recovery of the lost memories. The factor of resistance has become a cornerstone of his theory. The greater the resistance, the greater the distortion of the repressed psychical phenomena. Freud developed the art of interpretation which takes on the task of extracting repressed thoughts from unintentional ideas. The work of interpretation is applied not only to the patient’s ideas but also to his dreams. The therapeutic procedure remains the same for all the various clinical pictures that may be presented in hysteria and all forms of obsessional neurosis. The qualifications that are required for anyone who is to be beneficially affected by psychoanalysis include: periods of psychically normal condition, natural intelligence, and ethical development.

1905
On psychotherapy (1905).
On Psychotherapy was delivered as a lecture before the Wiener medizinisches Doktorenkollegium on December 12, 1904. Psychotherapy is not a modern method of treatment. The majority of primitive and ancient medical methods must be classed under the head of psychotherapy. Certain diseases, in particular, the psychoneuroses, are far more readily accessible to mental influences than to any other form of medication. The many ways and means of practicing psychotherapy that lead to recovery are good. Several thoughts are presented concerning psychotherapy. 1) This method is often confused with hypnotic treatment by suggestion. There is the greatest possible degree of antithesis between these 2 techniques. Suggestion is not concerned with the origin, strength and meaning of morbid states but superimposes a suggestion hopefully capable of restraining the pathogenic idea. Analysis concerns itself with the genesis of the morbid symptoms and its function is to bring out factors during analysis. 2) The technique of searching for the origins of an illness and removing its manifestations is not easy and can not be practiced without training. 3) The analytic investigation and probing do not indicate speedy results and resistance can result in unpleasantness; however, all the effort of psychoanalytic therapy seems worthwhile when we consider that it has made a large number of patients who were permanently unfit for existence, fit for existence. 4) The indications or contraindications for psychoanalysis are that a patient should have a reasonable degree of education and a fairly reliable character, a normal mental condition, and be less than 50 yrs. old. Psychoanalysis should not be attempted when speedy removal of dangerous symptoms is required. 5) No injury to the patient is to be feared when the treatment is conducted with comprehension. 6) It is concluded that this therapy is based on the recognition that unconscious ideas, or the unconsciousness of certain mental processes, are the direct cause of the morbid symptoms. Psychoanalytic treatment may, in general, be conceived of as a re-education in overcoming internal resistances. Freud’s last comment is to advise against recommending sexual activity in psychoneuroses.

1906
My views on the part played by sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses (1906).
The part played by sexuality in the etiology of the neuroses is discussed. Originally, Freud’s theory related only to the clinical pictures comprised under the term neurasthenia including neurasthenia proper and anxiety neurosis. With more experiences, it was discovered that the cause of lifelong hysterical neuroses lies in what are in themselves the trivial sexual experiences of early childhood. A number of phantasies of seduction are explained as attempts at fending off memories of the subject’s own sexual activity (infantile masturbation). The importance of sexuality and of infantilism are stressed. The patient’s symptoms constitute his sexual activity, which arise from the sources of the normal or perverse component instincts of sexuality. The etiology of the neuroses comprises everything which can act in a detrimental manner upon the processes serving the sexual function. The most important are the noxae which affect the sexual function itself; next are every other type of noxa and trauma which, by causing general damage to the organism, may lead secondarily to injury to its sexual processes. The onset of illness is the product of a summation of etiological factors and the necessary total of these factors can be completed from any direction.

1905
Psychical (or mental) treatment (1905).
Psychical treatment denotes treatment taking its start in the mind, treatment (whether of mental or physical disorders) by measures which operate upon the human mind. Foremost among such measures is the use of words, and words are the essential tool of mental treatment. There is a large number of patients, suffering from disorders of greater or less severity, whose disorders and complaints make great demands on the skill of their physicians, but in whom no visible or observable signs of a pathological process can be discovered. One group of these patients are distinguished by the copiousness and variety of their symptoms (which are influenced by excitement). In this case, the illness is of the nervous system, as a whole and is called “nervousness” (neurasthenia or hysteria). The affects are often sufficient in themselves to bring about both diseases of the nervous system accompanied by manifest anatomical changes and also diseases of other organs. States of illness that are already present can be considerably influenced by violent affects. The processes of volition and attention are also capable of exercising a profound effect on somatic processes and of playing a large part in promoting or preventing physical illnesses. The mental state of expectation puts in motion a number of mental forces that have the greatest influence on the onset and cure (such as faith or miracle cure) of physical diseases. The use of hypnosis and the knowledge gained from it are discussed. By means of hypnosis the mind can increase its control over the body and the physician can cause changes in the patient’s waking state by posthypnotic suggestion. Disadvantages of hypnosis include the damage it can cause and the patient’s dependence on the physician.
.

1905
Jokes and their relation to the unconscious (1960).
Editor’s preface.
In the course of discussing the relation between jokes and dreams, Freud mentions his own subjective reason for taking up the problem of jokes: the fact that when Wilhelm Fliess was reading the proofs of The Interpretation of Dreams in the autumn of 1899, he complained that the dreams were too full of jokes. The episode acted as a precipitating factor, and led to Freud’s giving closer attention to the subject; but it cannot possibly have been the origin of his interest in it. Quite apart from dreams, there is evidence of Freud’s early theoretical interest in jokes. There is a serious difficulty in translating this particular work, a terminological difficulty which runs through the whole of it. The German and English terms covering the phenomena discussed seem never to coincide. So is the case concerning any translation to any other language including Farsi. The unconscious is so structured by anguage that it dwells in the hart of our relation to speech.

A. Analytic part.
I. Introduction.
Anyone who has had occasion to enquire from the literature of esthetics and psychology the nature of jokes and the position they occupy will probably have to admit that jokes have not received nearly as much philosophical consideration as they deserve in view of the part they play in mental life. The first impression one derives from the literature is that it is quite impracticable to deal with jokes otherwise than in connection with the comic. A favorite definition of joking has long been the ability to find similarity between dissimilar things, that is, hidden similarities. The criteria and characteristics of jokes include: activity, relation to the content of our thoughts, the characteristic of playful judgment, the coupling of dissimilar things, contrasting ideas, sense in nonsense, the succession of bewilderment and enlightenment, the bringing forward of what is hidden, and the peculiar brevity of wit. We are entirely without insight into the connection that presumably exists between the separate determinants (i.e. what the brevity of a joke can have to do with its characteristic of being a playful judgment).

A. Analytic part.
II. The technique of jokes
(1) & (2). Jokes are similar to dreams.
The character of a joke does not reside in the thought but in the technique. Examples are given of jokes in which the thought is condensed by introducing, as a substitute, a striking composite word (e.g. anecdotage for anecdote and dotage) which is unintelligible in itself but is immediately understood in its context. In related cases the substitute is not a composite word but a slight modification (e.g. tete-a-bete for tete-a-tete). In general, the slighter the modification, the better the joke. Condensation and modification involved in these types of jokes are compared to condensation and modification which occurs in dream-work.

A. Analytic part.
II. The technique of jokes.
(3). Condensations and substitutive formations in dreams.
The first thing that we want to learn is whether the process of condensation with substitute formation is to be discovered in every joke, and can therefore be regarded as a universal characteristic of the technique of jokes. Three examples are presented in which substitute formation does not occur. In each of them, a name is used twice, once as a whole and again divided up into its separate syllables, which, when they are thus separated, give another sense. The multiple use of the same word, once as a whole and again in the syllables into which it falls, is the first instance we have come across of a technique differing from that of condensation. The cases of multiple use, which can also be brought together under the title of double meaning, can easily be divided into subclasses: 1) cases of the double meaning of a name and of a thing denoted by it; 2) double meaning arising from the literal and metaphorical meanings of a word; and 3) double meaning proper, or play upon words.

A. Analytic part.
II. The technique of jokes.
(4) & (5). Summary and puns.
The different joke techniques are summarized as follows: condensation, with formation of composite word or with modification; the multiple use of the same material as a whole and in parts, in a different order, with slight modification, and of the same words full and empty; and double meaning as a name and as a thing, metaphorical and literal meanings, double meaning proper (play upon words), double entendre, and double meaning with an allusion. The multiple use of the same material is only a special case of condensation; play upon words is nothing other than a condensation without substitute formation. All these techniques are dominated by a tendency to compression, or rather to saving (economy). The most numerous group of jokes is influenced by the contempt with which they are regarded. This kind is generally known as puns and passes as the lowest form of verbal joke, probably because it can be made with the least trouble. Puns make the least demand on the technique of expression, just as the play upon words proper makes the highest. Puns merely form a subspecies of the group which reaches its peak in the play upon words proper.

A. Analytic part.
II. The technique of jokes.
(6) & (7). Puns; absurdity as a joke technique.
There are jokes whose technique resists almost any attempt to connect it with the groups (those derived from condensation, multiple use of the same material or double meaning) that have been considered. In the case of a displacement joke, the joke itself contains a train of thought in which a displacement has been accomplished. The displacement is part of the work which has created the joke; it is not part of the work necessary for understanding it. The technique of the nonsensical or absurd jokes consists in presenting something that is stupid and nonsensical, the sense of which lies in the revelation and demonstration of something else that is stupid and nonsensical. A number of displacement and nonsensical jokes are presented and analyzed.

A. Analytic part.
II. The technique of jokes.
(8) &(9). Relation of jokes to the comic; unification as a joke technique.
The uncovering of psychical automatism is one of the techniques of the comic, just as is any kind of revelation or self-betrayal. The technique of this group of jokes lies in bringing forward faulty reasoning. Unification lies at the bottom of jokes that can be described as ready repartees. Repartee consists in the defense going to meet the aggression, in turning the tables on someone, or paying someone back in his own coin, that is, in establishing an unexpected unity between attack and counterattack. Unification has another, quite specially interesting technical instrument at its disposal: stringing things together with the conjunction ‘and’. If things are strung together in this way, it implies that they are connected: understanding it as so cannot be helped.

A. Analytic part.
II. The technique of jokes.
(10) & (11). Representation by opposite; conceptual jokes.
Examples are presented of jokes in which the technique employed is “representation by the opposite”, e.g. representation of ugliness through resemblances to what is most beautiful. In some cases this technique can be combined with displacement. A related technique is the use of overstatement. Representation by the opposite is not confined to jokes but may be used in irony. Representation by something similar or akin forms the basis for another category of jokes. This technique is often complicated by allusion. The replacing element may be merely a resemblance in sound but, in contrast to puns, the resemblance in sound involves whole sentences or phrases rather than just 2 words. Another kind of allusion consists in omission; this type of joke often cannot be distinguished from condensation without formation of a substitute. Allusion, which is probably the commonest and most easily used method of joking and which forms a basis for most short4ived jokes found in conversations, can be described as indirect representation. Categories of jokes discussed so far which would fall into this category include faulty reasoning, unification, and representation by the opposite.

A. Analytic part.
II. The technique of jokes.
(12). Analogy as a joke technique.
Analogy is a kind of indirect representation used by jokes. There are remarkably fine and effective examples of analogies that do not strike us as being jokes. There are also analogies which contain a striking juxtaposition, often a combination that sounds absurd, or which are replaced by something of the sort as the outcome of the analogy. A strange juxtaposition or the attribution of an absurd epithet can stand by itself as the outcome of an analogy. An analogy can in itself possess the characteristics of being a joke, without this impression being accounted for by a complication with one of the familiar joke techniques. Analogy is included among the species of indirect representation used by the joke technique.

A. Analytic part.
III. The purposes of jokes.
(1) & (2). Innocent jokes; smut and the purpose of jokes.
The purpose of jokes is discussed. Innocent or abstract jokes (both are nontendentious) do not have the same meaning as jokes that are trivial or lacking in substance; they merely connote the opposite of the tendentious jokes. An innocent joke may be of great substance, it may assert something of value. We receive from joking remarks a total impression in which we are unable to separate the share taken by the thought content from the share taken by the joke work. Where a joke is not an aim in itself (where it is not innocent), it is either a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire, or defense) or an obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure). The technical species of the joke, whether it is a verbal or a conceptual joke, bears no relation to these 2 purposes. A tendentious joke calls for 3 people: in addition to the one who makes the joke, there must be a second who is taken as the object of the hostile or sexual aggressiveness, and a third in whom the joke’s aim of producing pleasure is fulfilled. When the first person finds his libidinal impulse inhibited by a woman, he develops a hostile trend against that second person and calls on the originally interfering third person as his ally. Through the first person’s smutty speech the woman is exposed before the third, who, as a listener, has now been bribed by the effortless satisfaction of his own libido. Thus jokes make possible the satisfaction of instinct (whether lustful or hostile) in the face of an obstacle which stands in the way. The obstacle in the way is woman’s incapacity to tolerate undisguised sexuality. This power which makes it difficult or impossible for women, and to a lesser degree for men as well, to enjoy undisguised obscenity is termed repression. Tendentious jokes have sources of pleasure at their disposal besides those open to innocent jokes, in which all the pleasure is in some way linked to their technique.

A. Analytic part.
III. The purpose of jokes.
(3), (4), (5). Hostile, cynical and skeptical jokes.
Hostile impulses against our fellow men have always been subject to the same restrictions, the same progressive repression, as our sexual urges. A joke will allow us to exploit something ridiculous in our enemy which we could not, on account of obstacles in the way, bring forward openly or consciously; here again the joke will evade restrictions and open sources of pleasure that have become inaccessible. Tendentious jokes are highly suitable for attacks on the great, the dignified and the mighty, who are protected by internal inhibition and external circumstances from direct disparagement. Among the institutions which cynical jokes are in the habit of attacking none is more important or more strictly guarded by oral regulations than the institution of marriage, at which the majority of cynical jokes are aimed. There is no more personal claim than that for sexual freedom and at no point has civilization tried to exercise more severe suppression than in the sphere of sexuality. A particularly favorable occasion for tendentious jokes is presented when the intended rebellious criticism is directed against the subject himself, or against someone in whom the subject has a share, a collective person, (the subject’s own nation, for instance). Jokes that attack not a person or an institution but the certainty of our knowledge itself are called skeptical jokes.

B. Synthetic part.
IV. The mechanism of pleasure and the psychogenesis of jokes. (1).
The mechanism of pleasure and the psychogenesis of jokes is discussed. The pleasure in the case of a tendentious joke arises from a purpose being satisfied whose satisfaction would otherwise not have taken place. The techniques of jokes are themselves sources of pleasure. In one group of jokes, the technique consists in focusing our psychical attitude upon the sound of the word instead of upon its meaning. A second group of technical methods used in jokes (unification, similarity of sound, multiple use, modification of familiar phrases, allusions to quotations) has as the common characteristic the fact that in each of them something familiar is rediscovered. This is the basis for the use of another technical resource in jokes, topicality. The third group of joke techniques for the most part conceptual jokes, which comprises faulty thinking, displacements, absurdity, representation by the opposite, etc., may at first glance seem to bear a special impress and to have no kinship with the techniques of rediscovery of what is familiar or the replacement of object associations by word associations. Nevertheless the theory of economy or relief in psychical expenditure applies here. The first and third of these groups, the replacement of thing associations by word associations and the use of absurdity, can be brought together as reestablishing old liberties and getting rid of the burden of intellectual upbringing; they are psychical reliefs, which can be contrasted with the economizing which constitutes the technique of the second group. From these 2 principles all the techniques of jokes, and accordingly all pleasure from these techniques, are derived: relief from psychical expenditure that is already there and economizing in psychical expenditure that is only about to be called for.

B. Synthetic part.
IV. The mechanism of pleasure and the psychogenesis of jokes.
(2). The purpose and functions of jokes.
Before there is such a thing as a joke, there is something that we may describe as play or as a jest. Play with words and thoughts, motivated by certain pleasurable effects of economy, are the first stages of jokes. This play is brought to an end by the strengthening of a factor described as the critical faculty or reasonableness. Next a second preliminary stage of jokes sets in, the jest. it is now a question of prolonging the yield of pleasure from play, but at the same time silencing the objections raised by criticism which would not allow the pleasurable feeling to emerge. The psychogenesis of jokes reveals that the pleasure in a joke is derived from play with words or from the liberation of nonsense, and that the meaning of the joke is merely intended to protect that pleasure from being done away with by criticism. If what a jest says possesses substance and value, it turns into a joke. The tendentious jokes use the pleasure from jokes as a fore-pleasure to produce new pleasure by lifting suppressions and repressions.

B. Synthetic part.
V. The motives of jokes-Jokes as a social process.
Jokes are discussed as a social process. Although the joke work is an excellent method of getting pleasure out of psychical processes, it is nevertheless evident that not everyone is equally capable of making use of that method. The impression is given that the subjective determinants of the joke work are often not far removed from those of neurotic illness. The great majority of jokes, and especially those that are constantly being newly produced in connection with the events of the day, are circulated anonymously. The motive force for the production of innocent jokes is not infrequently an ambitious urge to show one’s cleverness, to display oneself. In laughter, the conditions are present under which a sum of psychical energy which has hitherto been used for cathexis is allowed free discharge. Since laughter is an indication of pleasure, we shall be inclined to relate this pleasure to the lifting of the cathexis which has previously been present. If a quota of cathectic energy capable of discharge is to be liberated, there are several conditions which must be fulfilled or which are desirable in order to act as encouragement: 1) it must be ensured that the person is really making this cathectic expenditure; 2) it is necessary to guard against the cathectic expenditure, when it is liberated, finding some other psychical use instead of offering itself for motor discharge; and 3) it is an advantage if the cathexis which is to be liberated in the third person is intensified beforehand.

C. Theoretic part.
VI. The relation of jokes to dreams and to the unconscious.
The relation of jokes to dreams and to the unconscious is discussed. Thought transformation with a view to the possibility of representation, condensation and displacement are the 3 major achievements that may be ascribed to the dream work. The characteristics and effects of jokes are linked with certain forms of expression or technical methods, among which the most striking are condensation, displacement, and indirect representation. Processes, however, which lead to the same results have become known to us as peculiarities of the dream work. Jokes are formed as a preconscious thought is given over for a moment to unconscious revision and the outcome of this is at once grasped by conscious perception. The characteristics of jokes which can be referred to their formation in the unconscious are presented: 1) the peculiar brevity of jokes; 2) displacements; 3) representation by the opposite; and 4) the use of nonsense. Dreams serve predominantly for the avoidance of unpleasure, jokes for the attainment of pleasure; but all our mental activities converge in these 2 aims.

C. Theoretic part.
VII. Jokes and the species of the comic. (1).
Jokes are a subspecies of the comic. The comic, which behaves differently socially from jokes; is concerned with 2 persons, (the first who finds what is comic and a second in whom it is found) while a third person intensifies, but doesn’t add to the comic process. A joke is made, the comic is found. The type of the comic which stands nearest to jokes is the naive. The comic arises as an unintended discovery derived from human social relations. It is found in people, in their movements, forms, actions and traits of character, originally in all probability only in their physical characteristics but later in their mental ones as well or in the expression of those characteristics. Nonsense and stupidity, which so often produce a comic effect, are nevertheless not felt as comic in every case. The comic that is found in someone else’s intellectual and mental characteristics is the outcome of a comparison between him and self, though a comparison which has produced the opposite result to that in the case of a comic movement or action. A person appears comic to us if, in comparison with ourselves, he makes too great an expenditure on his bodily functions and too little on his mental ones. It can not be denied that in both these cases our laughter expresses a pleasurable sense of the superiority which we feel in relation to him.

C. Theoretic part.
VII. Jokes and the species of the comic.
(2). Psychical location distinguishes jokes from the comic.
It is possible to produce the comic in relation to oneself in order to amuse other people. To make other people comic, the principal means is to put them in situations in which a person becomes comic as a result of human dependence on external events, particularly on social factors, without regard to the personal characteristics of the individual concerned. This putting of someone in a real comic situation is called a practical joke. Other means of making things comic which deserve special consideration and also indicate fresh sources of comic pleasure include mimicry, caricature, parody, and travesty. Contact with the comic is not to be found in all jokes or even in the majority of them and, in most cases, a clear distinction is to be made between jokes and the comic. The pleasure in jokes is located in the unconscious while there is no justification for making the same localization in the case of the comic. Jokes and the comic are distinguished in their psychical localization: the joke is the contribution made to the comic from the realm of the unconscious.

C. Theoretic part.
VII. Jokes and the species of the comic.
(3) & (4). Differences between jokes and comic.
The comic of mimicry is permeated with caricature, the exaggeration of traits that are not otherwise striking, and also involves the characteristic of degradation. Jokes present a double face to their hearer, force him to adopt 2 different views of them. In a nonsense joke, the one view regards it as nonsense; the other view passes through the hearer’s unconscious and finds an excellent sense in it. Every theory of the comic is objected to by its critics on the score that its definition overlooks what is essential to the comic: The comic is based on a contrast between ideas. The most favorable condition for the production of comic pleasure is a generally cheerful mood in which one is inclined to laugh. A similarly favorable effect is produced by an expectation of the comic, by being attuned to comic pleasure. Unfavorable conditions for the comic arise from the kind of mental activity with which a particular person is occupied at the moment. The opportunity for the release of comic pleasure disappears, too, if the attention is focused precisely on the comparison from which the comic may emerge. The comic is greatly interfered with if the situation from which it ought to develop gives rise at the same time to a release of strong affect. The generating of comic pleasure can be encouraged by any other pleasurable accompanying circumstance as though by some sort of contagious effect.

C. Theoretic part.
VII. Jokes and the species of the comic.
(5), (6), (7), (8). Comic things are not proper in jokes; relation of humour to jokes.
The comic of sexuality and obscenity are discussed using the starting point of exposure. A chance exposure has a comic effect on us because we compare the ease with which we have enjoyed the sight with the great expenditure which would otherwise be required for reaching this end. Every exposure of which we are made the spectator by a third person is equivalent to the exposed person being made comic. The comic difference is found either by a comparison between another person and oneself, or by a comparison entirely within the other person, or by a comparison entirely within oneself. The first case includes the comic of movement and form, of mental functioning and of character. The second case includes the most numerous possibilities, the comic of situation, of exaggeration, of mimicry, of degradation, and of unmasking. The comic of expectation, the third case is the remotest in children. The release of distressing affects is the greatest obstacle to the emergence of the comic. Humor is the most easily satisfied among the species of comic. It completes its course within a single person. An economy of pity is one of the most frequent sources of humourous pleasure. The pleasure in jokes arises from an economy in expenditure upon inhibition, the pleasure in the comic from an economy in expenditure upon ideation (upon cathexis) and the pleasure in humor from an economy in expenditure upon feeling.
‘first rate furs straight.’

1907
Delusions and dreams in Jensen’s Gradiva (1907).
Part I. Synopsis of Jensen’s Gradiva.
The story of Gradiva is summarized by Freud. A young archaeologist, Norbert Hanold, had discovered in a museum of antiquities in Rome a relief which attracted him . He obtained a plaster cast of it. The sculpture represented a fully grown girl stepping along, with her flowing dress a little pulled up so as to reveal her sandaled feet. The interest taken by the hero of the story in this relief is the basic psychological fact in the narrative. As an outcome of studies, he was forced to the conclusion that Gradiva’s gait was not discoverable in reality; and this filled him with regret and vexation. Soon afterwards he had a terrifying dream, in which he found himself in ancient Pompeii on the day of the eruption of Vesuvius and witnessed the city’s destruction. Gradiva disappeared and the hero searched for her. She appeared to come to life in someone else’s body. Hanold met her, Zoe Bertgang, and they went away together. With the triumph of love, what was beautiful and precious in the delusion found recognition as well. In his last simile, however, of the childhood friend who had been dug out of the ruins, Jensen presented the key to the symbolism of which the hero’s delusion made use in disguising his repressed memory.

Part II. Gradiva and the psychology of the unconscious.
In Gradiva Jensen presented a perfectly correct psychiatric study, upon which we may measure our understanding of the workings of the mind, a case history and the history of a cure which might have been designed to emphasize certain fundamental theories of medical psychology. Norbert Hanold’s condition is often spoken of as a delusion, and we have no reason to reject that designation. The state of permanently turning away from women produces a susceptibility or a predisposition to the formation of a delusion. The development of the mental disorder sets in at the moment when a chance impression arouses the childhood experiences which have been forgotten and which have traces, at least, of an erotic coloring. Norbert Hanold’s memories of his childhood relations with the girl with the graceful gait were repressed. The first manifestations of the process that had been set going in Hanold by the relief that he saw were phantasies, which played around the figure represented in it. Norbert Hanold’s delusion was carried a step further by a dream which occurred in the middle of his efforts to discover a gait like Gradiva’s in the streets of the town where he lived. Hanold’s dream was an anxiety dream; its content was frightening; the dreamer felt anxiety while he slept and he was left with painful feelings afterwards.

Part III. Relations between dreams and delusions.
The construction of the fresh delusion about Gradiva’s death during the destruction of Pompeii in the year 79 was not the only result of the first dream in Jensen’s Gradiva. Immediately after it, Hanold decided on his journey to Italy. The journey was undertaken for reasons which its subject did not recognize at first and only admitted to himself later, reasons described as unconscious. The view of Hanold’s journey as a flight from his awakening erotic longing for the girl whom he loved and who was so close to him is the only one which will fit in with the description of his emotional states during his stay in Italy. The appearance of Zoe Bertgang marks the climax of tension in the story. This unusually clever girl was determined to win her childhood friend for her husband, after she had recognized that the young man’s love for her was the motive force behind the delusion. If a patient believes in his delusion so firmly, it is not because his faculty of judgment has been overturned and does not arise from what is false in the delusion. On the contrary, there is a grain of truth concealed in every delusion, there is something in it that really deserves belief, and this is the source of the patient’s conviction, which is to that extent justified. Hanold’s second dream concerns the replacement of an elderly gentlemen by Gradiva and the introduction of an enigmatic female colleague.

Part IV.Treatment of the delusions in Gradiva.
Postscript to the second edition (1912).
Jensen has arbitrarily tacked a love story on to his archaeological phantasy. The beginnings of a change in Hanold were not shown only in his abandoning his delusion. Simultaneously, and before his delusion was cleared up, an unmistakable craving for love awakened in him, which found its outcome in his courting the girl who had freed him from his delusion. The procedure which Zoe adopts for curing her childhood friend’s delusion agrees with the therapeutic method, introduced by Breuer and Freud, called cathartic by Breuer and analytic by Freud. The similarity between Gradiva’s procedure and the analytic method of psychotherapy includes: the making conscious of what has been repressed, the coinciding of explanation with cure, and the awakening of feelings. The latent dream thoughts in Gradiva are day’s residues. But in order for a dream to develop out of them, the cooperation of a wish (usually an unconscious one) is required; this contributes the motive force for constructing the dream, while the day’s residues provide the material. The first was a wish to have been present as an eyewitness at the catastrophe in the year 79. The other wish was to be there when the girl he loved lay down to sleep. Two other stories by Jensen (The Red Parasol and In the Gothic House) were discussed in the postscript to the second edition. All 3 stories treat the same theme: the development of a love as an aftereffect of an intimate association in childhood of a brother and sister kind.

1907
Obsessive actions and religious practices (1907).
Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices was written in February 1907. This was Freud’s introductory incursion into the psychology of religion. Freud was struck by the resemblance between obsessive actions in sufferers from nervous disorders and the observances by means of which believers give expression to their piety. People who carry out obsessive actions or ceremonials belong to the same class as those who suffer from obsessive thinking, obsessive ideas, obsessive impulses, and the like. Neurotic ceremonials consist in making small adjustments to particular everyday actions, small additions or restrictions or arrangements which have always to be carried out in the same, or in a methodically varied manner. Any activities may become obsessive actions if they are elaborated by small additions or given a rhythmic character. In obsessive actions everything has its meaning and can be interpreted. The same is true of ceremonials in the strict sense. A ceremonial starts as an action for defense or insurance, a protective measure. The sense of guilt of obsessional neurotics finds its counterpart in the protestations of pious people that they know at heart they are miserable sinners; and the pious observances with which such people preface every daily act, seem to have the value of defensive or protective measures. Obsessional neurosis is regarded as a pathological counterpart of the formation of a religion. That neurosis is described as an individual religiosity and religion is described as a universal obsession.

1908
Hysterical phantasies and their relation to bisexuality (1908).
Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality consists of a discussion of the relation between phantasies and symptoms. A common source and normal prototype of all the creations of phantasy is found in the day dreams of youth. They occur with equal frequency in both sexes. In girls and women, they are of an erotic nature; in men they may be either erotic or ambitious. A closer investigation of a man’s day dreams shows that all his heroic exploits are carried out and all his successes achieved in order to please a woman and to be preferred by her to other men. These phantasies are satisfactions of wishes proceeding from deprivation and longing. The day dreams are cathected with a large amount of interest. Unconscious phantasies have either been unconscious all along and have been formed in the unconscious, or they were once conscious phantasies, day dreams, and have since been purposely forgotten and have become unconscious through repression. Unconscious phantasies are the immediate psychical precursors of a number of hysterical symptoms. The following characteristics of hysterical symptoms are presented:mnemic symbols, substitutes, an expression of the fulfillment of a wish, the realization of an unconscious phantasy. They serve the purpose of sexual satisfaction, correspond to a return of a mode of sexual satisfaction, arise as a compromise between 2 opposite affective and instinctual impulses, are never without a sexual significance, and are the expression of a masculine unconscious sexual phantasy and also a feminine one. The bisexual nature of hysterical symptoms is a confirmation of the view that the postulated existence of an innate bisexual disposition in man is clearly visible in the analysis of psychoneurotics.

1908
Character and anal erotism (1908).
The relationship between character and anal eroticism is discussed. The people that Freud describes are noteworthy for a regular combination of the 3 following characteristics. They are especially orderly, parsimonious, and obstinate. These people took a comparatively long time to overcome their infantile fecal incontinence, and even in later childhood they suffered from isolated failures of this function. Anal erotism is one of the components of the sexual instinct which, in the course of development and in accordance with the education demanded by our present civilization, has become unserviceable for sexual aims. It is therefore plausible to suppose that these character traits of orderliness, parsimony, and obstinacy, which are so often prominent in people who were formerly anal erotics, are to be regarded as the first and most constant results of the sublimation of anal erotism. Freud theorizes that the permanent character traits are either unchanged prolongations of the original instincts, or sublimations of those instincts, or reaction formations against them.

1908
On the sexual theories of children.
On the Sexual Theories of Children presents the notions of fertilization through the mouth, of birth through the anus, of parental intercourse as something sadistic, and of the possession of a penis by members of both sexes. The material is derived from several sources: the direct observation of what children say and do; what adult neurotics consciously remember from their childhood and relate during psychoanalytic treatment; and the inferences and constructions and the unconscious memories translated into conscious material, which result from the psychoanalysis of neurotics. The false sexual theories all contain a fragment of truth. Childhood opinions about the nature or marriage, which are not seldom retained by conscious memory, have great significance for the symptomatology of later neurotic illness.

1909
Some general remarks on hysterical attacks (1909).
When one carries out the psychoanalysis of a hysterical woman whose complaint is manifested in attacks, one soon becomes convinced that these attacks are nothing else but phantasies translated into the motor sphere, projected on to motility and portrayed in pantomime. A hysterical attack needs to be subjected to the same interpretive revision as that employed for night dreams. The attack becomes unintelligible since it represents several phantasies in the same material simultaneously. The attack becomes obscured because the patient attempts to carry out the activities of both the figures who appear in the phantasy through multiple identification. The onset of hysterical attacks follows certain laws. Since the repressed complex consists of a libidinal cathexis and an ideational content, the attack can be evoked associatively, organically, in the service of the primary purpose, or in the service of the secondary purposes. Investigation of the childhood history of hysterical patients shows that the hysterical attack is designed to take the place of an autoerotic satisfaction previously practiced and since given up. What points the way for the motor discharge of the repressed libido in a hysterical attack is the reflex mechanism of the act of coition, a mechanism which is ready to hand in everybody, including women, and which we see coming into manifest operation when an unrestrained surrender is made to sexual activity.

1909
Family romance (1909).
The psychology of the neuroses teaches us that, among other factors, the most intense impulses of sexual rivalry contribute to the feeling of being slighted. As a child grows up and tries to break away from the authority of his parents he regards this authority as hostility and responds by feeling that his own affection is not reciprocated fully. A boy has more hostile impulses towards his father than his mother. The next of later stages in the development of the neurotic’s estrangement from his parents is described as ‘the neurotic’s family romance.’ When the child comes to know the difference in the parts played by fathers and mothers in their sexual relations, the family romance undergoes a curious curtailment: it contents itself with exalting the child’s father, but no longer casts any doubt on his maternal origin. This second (sexual) stage of the family romance is actuated by another motive as well, which is absent in the first (asexual) stage. The child, having learned about sexual processes, tends to picture to himself erotic situations and relations, the motive force behind this being his desire to bring his mother into situations of secret infidelity and into secret love affairs. In this way the child’s phantasies, which started by being asexual, are brought up to the level of his later knowledge. The overvaluation that characterizes a child’s earliest years is evident in these phantasies.

The Cases of ‘Little Hans’ and the ‘Rat Man’ (1909)

1909
Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy.
Editor’s note(1955).
Part I. Introduction (1909).
The Analysis of a Phobia in a 5-Year-Old Boy describes the course of the illness and recovery of a very youthful patient. The first reports of Hans date from a period when he was not quite 3 years old. At that time he was showing a quite peculiar lively interest in that portion of his body which he used to describe as his ‘widdler.’ Around the age of 3-1/2 he realized an essential characteristic for differentiating between animate and inanimate objects: the presence or absence of a widdler. His thirst for knowledge seemed to be inseparable from sexual curiosity and his curiosity was particularly directed towards his parents through his interest in the presence of his mother’s and father’s widdlers. At 3-1/2, Hans’ mother threatened him with castration because he was masturbating. The great event of Hans’ life was the birth of his little sister Hanna when he was exactly 3-1/2, He noticed and remarked on the smallness of her widdler. At 3-3/4 he showed his first, but not his last trace of homosexuality. When he was 4-1/4, he made it clear that having his knickers unbuttoned and his penis taken out was pleasurable. When Hans was 4-1/2, he finally acknowledged the distinction between male and female genitals.

Part II. Case history and analysis of little Hans.
The case history and analysis of Little Hans is presented. Hans, almost 5 years old, woke up one morning in tears. Asked why he was crying, he said to his mother that he thought she was gone. This is interpreted as an anxiety dream. The fundamental phenomenon in his condition was that his affection for his mother became enormously intensified. Hans relates a phantasy concerning a big giraffe and a crumpled giraffe. This is interpreted as the big giraffe (long neck) being his father’s penis and the crumpled one as his mother’s genital organ. Hans comes to his mother’s bed in the morning and is caressed by her, thus defying his father. Hans was afraid of big animals (especially horses) because big animals have big widdlers. His anxiety, which corresponded to a repressed erotic longing was, like every infantile anxiety, without an object to begin with. After an attack of influenza, his phobia of horses increased so much that he could not be induced to go out. The immediate precipitating cause of his phobia was the fall of a big heavy horse; one of the interpretations of this impression seems to be that emphasized by his father, namely, that Hans at that moment perceived a wish that his father might fall down in the same way and be dead. Hans wished that his father would die and then he, Hans, would take his father’s place with his mother. The theme of Han’s sister Hanna is Discussed in relation to his viewing her as being in a box (womb).

Part III. Discussion: I.
The observation of the development and resolution of a phobia in a boy under 5 years of age is examined. It is possible that Hans was not normal, but a neurotic degenerate; however, Freud discounts this. Little Hans was described by his parents as a cheerful, straight-forward child. The first trait in Hans which can be regarded as part of his sexual life was a peculiar interest in his ‘widdler,’ This interest aroused in him the spirit of inquiry, and he thus discovered that the presence or absence of a widdler made it possible to differentiate between animate and inanimate objects. He assumed that all animate objects were like himself and possessed this important bodily organ; he observed that it was present in the larger animals, suspected that this was so too in both his parents, and was not deterred by the evidence of his own eyes from authenticating the fact in his newborn sister. In little Hans’ sexual constitution, the genital zone was from the outset the one among his erotogenic zones which afforded him the most intense pleasure. The most important influence upon the course of Hans’ psychosexual development was the birth of a baby sister when he was 3-1/2 years old. That event accentuated his relations to his parents and gave him some insoluble problems to think about. In his triumphant final phantasy, he summed up all his erotic wishes, both those derived from his autoerotic phase and those connected with his object love. Hans really was a little Oedipus who wanted to have his father out of the way so that he could sleep with his mother. In that phantasy he was married to his beautiful mother and had innumerable children whom he could look after in his own way.

Part III. Discussion: II. Little Hans case sheds light on phobias.
The observation of the development and resolution of a phobia in a boy under 5 years of age is examined. One day while Hans was in the street he was seized with an attack of anxiety. Hans’s phobia soon ceased having any relation to the question of locomotion and became more and more clearly concentrated upon horses. In the early days of his illness, when the anxiety was at its highest pitch, he expressed a fear that a horse would come into his room. The outbreak of the anxiety state was not as sudden as it appeared. A few days earlier the child had awakened from an anxiety dream to the effect that his mother had gone away. His parents represented to him that his anxiety was the result of masturbation, and encouraged him to break himself of the habit. Hans was not only afraid of horses biting him but also of carts, of furniture vans, and of buses, of horses that started moving, of horses that looked big and heavy, and of horses that drove quickly. The meaning of these specifications was explained by Hans himself: he was afraid of horses falling down, and consequently incorporated in his phobia everything that seemed likely to facilitate their falling down. The falling horse represented not only his dying father but also his mother in childbirth. The birth of his sister aroused in Hans the question of birth and the idea that his father had something to do with it. The anxiety in this phobia is explained as being due to the repression of Hans’s aggressive propensities.

1909
Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy (1909).
Part III. Discussion: III. Little Hans case and childhood education.
Postscript (1922).
The observation of the development and resolution of a phobia in a boy under 5 years of age is examined. Hans was not a degenerate child. On the contrary, he was well formed physically, and was a cheerful, amiable, active-minded young fellow who might give pleasure to more people than his own father. He was not the only child who has been overtaken by phobia at some time or other in his childhood. The 9nly results of the analysis were that Hans recovered, that he ceased to be afraid of horses, and that he got on to rather familiar terms with his father. Analysis replaced the process of repression, which was an automatic and excessive one, by a temperate and purposeful control on the part of the highest agencies of the mind. Freud claims that he would have ventured to give the child one remaining piece of enlightenment which his parents withheld from him. He would have confirmed his instinctive premonitions, by telling him of the existence of the vagina and of copulation, thus diminishing further his unsolved residue, and putting an end to his stream of questions. Freud was tempted to claim for this neurosis of childhood the significance of being a type and a model, and to suppose that the multiplicity of the phenomena of repression exhibited by neuroses and the abundance of their pathogenic material do not prevent their being derived from a very limited number of processes concerned with identical ideational complexes.

1909
Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis (1909).
Part I. Extracts from the case history:
(A) The beginning of the treatment. (B) Infantile sexuality.
Extracts from a case history of obsessional neurosis are presented. A youngish man of university education introduced himself with the statement that he had suffered from obsessions ever since his childhood, but with particular intensity for the last 4 years. The chief features of his disorder were fears that something might happen to 2 people of whom he was very fond, his father and a lady whom he admired. Besides this he was aware of compulsive impulses, such as an impulse to cut his throat with a razor; and further he produced prohibitions, sometimes in connection with quite unimportant things. The beginning of the treatment involved a pledge on the part of the patient to say everything that came into his head, even if it was unpleasant to him, or seemed unimportant or irrelevant, or senseless. As a result of his statements, Freud discovered that the patient was under the domination of a component of the sexual instinct, the desire to look (scopophilia), as a result of which there was a constant recurrence in him of a very intense wish connected with persons of the female sex who pleased him, the wish to see them naked. This wish corresponded to the later obsessional or compulsive idea. Side by side with the obsessive wish, and intimately associated with it, was an obsessive fear: every time he had a wish of this kind he could not help fearing that something dreadful would happen. Obsessional neuroses make it much more obvious than hysterias that the factors which go to form a psychoneurosis are to be found in the patient’s infantile sexual life and not in his present one.

Part I. Extracts from the case history.
(C) The great obsessive fear.
Extracts from a case history of obsessional neurosis are presented. The patient revealed his great obsessive fear that some rats would bore their way into the anus of a lady whom he admired and also into the anus of his father. As his father had died many years previously, this obsessive fear was much more nonsensical even than the first, and accordingly the fear concerning his father was not confessed to for a little while longer. He had ordered a replacement pince-nez which was sent to him through the mails. He felt that unless he paid the charge back directly to a particular person, (Lieutenant A) the rat would actually act upon the lady. He vowed to pay the money directly to that particular person. He stated this vow in such a way that the actual payment was made very difficult. In reality, he owed the money to no one but the official at the post office. The captain who had told him he owed Lieutenant A the money made a mistake which the patient must have known was a mistake – In spite of this the patient made his vow of payment founded upon the mistake. In so doing he suppressed the episode of the other Captain (B) and the trusting young lady at the post office. He was determined to see a doctor and thought that a doctor would give him a certificate to the effect that it was necessary for him, in order to recover his health, to perform his particular obsessional actions.

Part I. Extracts from the case history.
(D) Initiation into the nature of the treatment.
Extracts from a case history of obsessional neurosis are presented – Nine years previously the patient’s father had died one evening, when the patient was not there, and the son had felt guilty ever since – Freud helped him to conclude that he actually wished for the death of his father. The patient confessed that from the age of 7, he had had a fear that his parents guessed his thoughts, and this fear had persisted all his life. When he was 12 he felt that if his father died his death might make him rich enough to marry a girl he loved. During the seventh session, he said that he could not believe that he had ever entertained such a wish against his father. He went on to state that his illness had become so enormously intensified since his father’s death; and Freud said that he agreed with him in so far as he regarded his sorrow at his father’s death as the chief source of the intensity of his illness. His sorrow had found a pathological expression in his illness. Whereas a normal period of mourning would last from 1 to 2 years, a pathological one like this would last indefinitely.

Part I. Extracts from the case history.
(E) Some obsessional ideas and their explanation.
Extracts from a case history of obsessional neurosis are presented. Obsessional ideas have an appearance of being either without motive or without meaning, just as dreams have. The wildest and most eccentric obsessional ideas can be cleared up if they are investigated deeply enough. The solution is effected by bringing the obsessional ideas into temporal relationship with the patient’s experiences, that is to say, by enquiring when a particular obsessional idea made its first appearance and in what external circumstances it is apt to recur. One of the suicidal impulses which appeared frequently in the patient was explained. It was related to the absence of his lady because she was taking care of her mother. He wanted to kill her mother for depriving him of his lady, and suicide was the way to punish himself for these thoughts. His obsession for protecting can only have been a reaction, as an expression of remorse and penitence, to a contrary, that is a hostile, impulse which he must have felt towards his lady. His obsession for counting during the thunderstorm can be interpreted as having been a defensive measure against fears that someone was in danger of death.

Part I. Extracts from the case history.
(F) The precipitating cause of the illness.
Extracts from a case history of obsessional neurosis are presented and the precipitating cause of the illness discussed. The infantile precondition of obsessional neurosis may be overtaken by amnesia, though this is often an incomplete one; but the immediate occasions of the illness are, on the contrary, retained in the memory. Repression makes use of another, and in reality a simpler, mechanism. The trauma, instead of being forgotten, is deprived of its affective cathexis so that what remains in consciousness is nothing but its ideational content, which is perfectly colorless and is judged to be unimportant. The distinction between what occurs in hysteria and in an obsessional neurosis lies in the psychological processes which we can reconstruct behind the phenomenon. The chief result of his illness was an obstinate incapacity for work, which allowed him to postpone the completion of his education for years. A conflict was stirred in him as to whether he should remain faithful to the lady he loved in spite of her poverty, or whether he should follow in his father’s footsteps and marry the lovely, rich, and well-connected girl who had been assigned to him. By falling ill he avoided the task of resolving the conflict in real life.

Part I. Extracts from the case history.
(G) The father complex and the solution of the rat idea.
Extracts from a case history of obsessional neurosis about rats are presented. The patient found himself in a situation similar to that in which, as he knew or suspected, his father had been before his marriage; and the patient was thus able to identify himself with his father. The conflict at the root of his illness was a struggle between the persisting influence of his father’s wishes and his own amatory predilections. Freud put forward a construction that, when the patient was a child of under 6 he had been guilty of some sexual misdemeanor connected with masturbation and had been soundly castigated for it by his father. This punishment put an end to his masturbating, but left behind it a grudge against his father and had established him in his role of an interferer with the patient’s sexual enjoyment. The patient’s mother said that he was punished because he had bitten someone. The story of the rat punishment (a rat boring its way into the anus of his lady and his father), provoked all his suppressed cruel, egoistic and sexual impulses. The rat punishment evoked anal eroticism, which played an important part in his childhood and had been kept in activity for many years by a constant irritation due to worms. In this way rats came to have the meaning of money (Rattus is the genus for rat and Rate is German for installment). The relation of some sexual theories of children to this obsession is presented.

Part II. Theoretical section.
(A) Some general characteristics of obsessional structures.
Some general characteristics of obsessional structures are discussed. Obsessional structures can be classed as wishes, temptations, impulses, reflections, doubts, commands, or prohibitions. During the secondary defensive struggle, which the patient carries on against the obsessional ideas that have forced their way into his consciousness, psychical structures make their appearance which deserve to be given a special name. They are not purely reasonable considerations arising in opposition to the obsessional thoughts, but, as it were, hybrids between the 2 species of thinking. They accept certain of the premises of the obsession they are combating, and thus, while using the weapons of reason, are established upon a basis of pathological thought. The patients themselves do not know the wording of their own obsessional ideas. Obsessional thoughts have undergone a distortion similar to that undergone by dream thoughts before they become the manifest content of a dream. The technique of distortion by ellipsis seems to be typical of obsessional neuroses.

Part II. Theoretical section.
(B) Some psychological peculiarities of obsessional neurotics: Their attitude towards reality, superstition and death.
Some psychological peculiarities of obsessional neurotics are discussed, especially their attitude towards reality, superstition, and death. The patient was highly superstitious, although he was a well educated and enlightened man of considerable acumen, and although he was able at times to assure Freud that he did not believe a word of all this rubbish. His superstition was that of an educated man, and he avoided such prejudices as being afraid of Friday or of the number 13, and so on. But he believed in premonitions and in prophetic dreams. He would constantly meet the very person of whom, for some inexplicable reason, he had just been thinking. Another mental need which is shared by obsessional neurotics is the need for uncertainty, or for doubt in their life. The creation of uncertainty which is among the objects of every psychoneurotic disorder, is one of the methods employed by the neurosis for drawing the patient away from reality and isolating him from the world. In obsessional neuroses, the uncertainty of memory is used to the fullest extent as a help in the formation of symptoms. The patient had a quite peculiar attitude towards the question of death. He showed the deepest sympathy whenever anyone died. In his imagination he was constantly making away with people so as to show his heartfelt sympathy for their bereaved relatives. In every conflict which enters their lives they are on the lookout for the death of someone who is of importance to them.

Part II. Theoretical section.
(C) The instinctual life of obsessional neurotics, and the origins of compulsion and doubt.
The instinctual life of obsessional neurotics and the origins of compulsion and doubt are discussed. The patient fell ill when he was in his twenties, on being faced with a temptation to marry another woman instead of the one whom he had loved so long, and he avoided a decision of this conflict by postponing all the necessary preliminary actions. The means for doing this was given him by his neurosis. If we consider a number of analyses of obsessional neurotics, we shall find it impossible to escape the impression that a relation between love and hatred such as we have found in our present patient is among the most frequent, the most marked, and probably, therefore, the most important characteristic of obsessional neurosis. It is doubt that leads the patient to uncertainty about his protective measures and to his continual repetition of them in order to banish that uncertainty. It is this doubt, too, that eventually brings it about that the patient’s protective acts themselves become as impossible to carry out as his original inhibited decision in connection with his love. The compulsion is an attempt at a compensation for the doubt and at a correction of the intolerable conditions of inhibition to which the doubt bears witness. By a sort of regression, preparatory acts become substituted for the final decision, thinking replaces acting, and, instead of the substitutive act, some thought preliminary to it asserts itself with all the force of compulsion. An obsessive or compulsive thought is one whose function it is to represent an act regressively.

191O
Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood (1910).
Part I. Biographical material.
Leonardo da Vinci (1452 to 1519) was admired even by his contemporaries as one of the greatest men of the Italian renaissance. It is possible that the idea of a radiantly happy and pleasure-loving Leonardo is only applicable to the first and longer period of the artist’s life. Afterwards, when he was forced to leave Milan, until he found his last asylum in France, the sparkle of his temperament may have grown dim and some strange sides of his nature may have been thrown into prominence. The slowness with which Leonardo worked was proverbial. The slowness which had all along been conspicuous in Leonardo’s work is seen to be a symptom of his inhibition and to be the forerunner of his subsequent withdrawal from painting. Leonardo was notable for his quiet peaceableness and his avoidance of all antagonism and controversy. In an age which saw a struggle between sensuality without restraint and gloomy asceticism, Leonardo represented the cool repudiation of sexuality, a thing that would scarcely be expected of an artist and a portrayer of feminine beauty. When he became a Master, he surrounded himself with handsome boys and youths whom he took as pupils. The core of his nature, and the secret of it, would appear to be that after his curiosity had been activated in infancy in the service of sexual interest he succeeded in sublimating the greater part of his libido into an urge for research.

Part II. Leonardo’s childhood memory.
One of Leonardo’s childhood memories concerns a vulture that came down while Leonardo was in his cradle, opened his mouth with its tail, and struck him many times with its tail against his lips. This scene with the vulture is not a memory of Leonardo’s but a phantasy, which he formed at a later date and transposed to his childhood. This is often the way in which childhood memories originate. What the phantasy conceals is merely a reminiscence of suckling, or being suckled, at his mother’s breast, a scene of human beauty that he, like so many artists, undertook to depict with his brush in the guise of the mother of god and her child. The reminiscence has been transformed by the man Leonardo into a passive homosexual phantasy. The replacement of his mother by the vulture indicates that the child was aware of his father’s absence and found himself alone with his mother. The fact of Leonardo’s illegitimate birth is in harmony with his vulture phantasy; it was only on this account that he could compare himself to a vulture child.

Part III. Sexual interpretation of Leonardo’s childhood memory.
There is a strong presumption that Leonardo da Vinci, who had phantasies of a vulture was a homosexual. In this phantasy a mother who suckles her child is turned into a vulture and her breast into a vulture’s tail which signifies a penis. He appears as a man whose sexual need and activity were exceptionally reduced, as if a higher aspiration had raised him above the common animal need of mankind. It has always been emphasized that he took only strikingly handsome boys and youths as pupils, treated them with kindness and consideration, looked after them and, when they were ill, nursed them himself. Leonardo’s mother came to Milan in 1493 to visit her son; she fell ill there, was taken to the hospital by Leonardo, and when she died was honored by him with a costly funeral. A comparison with what happens in obsessional neurosis can explain Leonard’s account of the expenses of his mother’s funeral. In his unconscious he was still tied to her by erotically colored feeling, as he had been in childhood. Before a child. comes under the dominance of a castration complex, at a time when he still holds women at full value, he begins to display an intense desire to look, as an erotic instinctual activity. It was through Leonardo’s erotic relation with his mother that he became a homosexual. The opposition that came from the subsequent repression of this childhood love did not allow him to set up a different and worthier memorial to her in his diary. But what emerged as a compromise from this neurotic conflict had to be carried out; and thus it was that the financial account was entered in the diary, and has come to the knowledge of posterity as something unintelligible.

Part IV. The blissful smiles in Leonardo’s paintings.
Leonardo’s vulture phantasy is compounded from the memory of being suckled and being kissed by his mother. The idea that 2 distinct elements are combined in Mona Lisa’s smile is one that has struck several critics. They accordingly find in the beautiful Florentine’s expression the most perfect representation of the contrasts which dominate the erotic life of women; the contrast between reserve and seduction, and between the most devoted tenderness and a sensuality that is ruthlessly demanding. Leonardo da Vinci spent 4 years painting at this picture which contains the synthesis of the history of his childhood: its details are to be explained by reference to the most personal impressions in Leonardo’s life. In his father’s house he found not only his kind stepmother, Donna Albiera, but also his grandmother, his father’s mother, Monna Lucia, who was no less tender to him than grandmothers usually are. If Leonardo was successful in reproducing on Mona Lisa’s face the double meaning which this smile contained, the promise of unbounded tenderness and at the same time sinister menace, then here too he had remained true to the content of his earliest memory. For this mother’s tenderness was fateful for him; it determined his destiny and the privations that were in store for him. The violence of the caresses, to which his phantasy of the vulture points, was only too natural.

Part V. Effects of father-loss on Leonardo.
Among the entries in Leonardo’s notebooks there is one which catches the reader’s attention owing to the importance of what it contains and to a minute formal error. The note refers to the death of Leonardo’s father. The small error consists of the repetition of the time of day (at 7 o’clock), which is given twice, as if Leonardo had forgotten at the end of the sentence that he had already written it at the beginning. This type of repetition is called perseveration and indicates affective color. The note is a case in which Leonardo was unsuccessful in suppressing his affect. The effect which Leonardo’s identification with his father had on his paintings was a fateful one. He created them and then cared no more about them. Psychoanalysis has shown that there is a connection between the father complex and belief in God. Leonardo was charged with unbelief or with apostasy from Christianity during his lifetime. The great Leonardo remained like a child for the whole of his life. Even as an adult he continued to play, and this was one of the reasons why he often appeared uncanny and incomprehensible to his contemporaries. Whenever children feel their sexual urges, they dream of fulfilling their wishes through flying. Leonardo admits that he has always felt bound to the problem of flight. It is probable that Leonard’s play instinct vanished in his mature years; but its long duration can teach us how slowly anyone tears himself from his childhood if in his childhood days he has enjoyed the highest erotic bliss, which is never again attained.

Part VI. Justification of pathobiography.
Freud insists that he never reckoned Leonardo da Vinci as a neurotic. The aim of the work has been to explain the inhibitions in Leonardo’s sexual life and in his artistic activity. His illegitimate birth deprived him of his father’s influence until perhaps his fifth year, and left him open to the tender seductions of a mother whose only solace he was. A powerful wave of repression brought his childhood excess to an end and established the dispositions which were to become manifest in the years of puberty. The most obvious result of the transformation was the avoidance of every crudely sensual activity; Leonardo was enabled to live in abstinence and to give the impression of being an asexual human being. Leonardo emerges from the obscurity of Iris boyhood as an artist, a painter and a sculptor. It seems as if only a man who had had Leonardo’s childhood experiences could have painted the Mona Lisa and the St. Anne.

1910
A special type of choice of object made by men.
(Contributions to the psychology of love I) (1910).
In the course of psychoanalytic treatment there are opportunities for collecting impressions of the way in which neurotics behave in love. A number of necessary preconditions for loving a particular object choice are presented. The first of the preconditions for loving is termed the precondition that there should be an injured third party; it stipulates that the person in question shall never choose as his love object a woman who is disengaged but only one to whom another man can claim right of possession. The second precondition is that a woman who is chaste and whose reputation is irreproachable never exercises an attraction that might raise her to the status of a love object but only a woman who is in some way or other, of bad repute sexually. This is connected with the experiencing of jealousy. The lover’s behavior towards the object he has chosen is also presented. In normal love the woman’s value is measured by her sexual integrity and is reduced by any approach to the characteristic of being like a prostitute. Hence the fact that women with this characteristic are considered by neurotic men to be love objects of the highest value seems to be a striking departure from the normal. A fourth precondition is where the relationship is a compulsive one with the man showing an urge to rescue the woman he loves. The psychical origins of neurotic love are derived from the infantile fixation of tender feelings on the mother and represent one of the consequences of that fixation. The love objects are mother surrogates. There is a connection between the rescue motif and the parental complex which results in an urge to rescue the loved one.

1918
The taboo of virginity. (Contributions to the psychology of love III) (1918).
For primitive peoples, defloration is a significant act; but it has become the subject of a religious taboo. Instead of reserving it for the girl’s bridegroom and future partner in marriage, custom demands that he shall shun the performance of it. The first attempt at explanation is based on the horror of blood among primitive races who consider blood as the seat of love. A second explanation suggests that primitive man is prey to a perpetual lurking apprehensiveness, just as the psychoanalytic theory of the neuroses claims it to be the case with people suffering from anxiety neurosis. A third explanation draws attention to the fact that the taboo of virginity is part of a large totality which embraces the whole of sexual life. Wherever primitive man has set up a taboo he fears some danger and it cannot be disputed that a generalized dread of women is expressed. The intention underlying the taboo of defloration is that of denying or sparing the future husband something which cannot be dissociated from the first sexual act. The first act of intercourse mobilizes a number of impulses which are out of place in the desired feminine attitude. Defloration has not only the one, civilized consequence of binding the woman lastingly to the man; it also unleashes an archaic reaction of hostility towards him, which is expressed in the appearance of inhibitions in the erotic side of married life, and to which we may ascribe the fact that second marriages so often turn out better than the first.

1910
The psycho-analytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision (1910).
The psychoanalytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vision is presented. Hysterical blindness is taken as the type of a psychogenic visual disturbance. In a hysteric, the idea of being blind arises spontaneously. In patients predisposed to hysteria there is an inherent tendency to dissociation, to a falling apart of the connections in their mental field, as a consequence of which some unconscious processes do not continue as far as into the conscious. The hysterical patient is blind, not as the result of an autosuggestive idea that he cannot see, but as the result of a dissociation between unconscious and conscious processes in the act of seeing. The eyes perceive not only alterations in the external world, which are important for the preservation of life, but also characteristics of objects which lead to their being chosen as objects of love, their charms. The closer the relation into which an organ with a dual function enters with one of the major instincts, the more it withholds itself from the other. This principle is bound to lead to pathological consequences if the 2 fundamental instincts are disunited and if the ego maintains a repression of the sexual component instinct concerned. If an organ which serves the 2 sorts of instinct increases its erotogenic role, it is to be expected that this will not occur without the excitability and innervation of the organ undergoing changes which will manifest themselves as disturbances of its function in the service of the ego.

1910
‘Wild’ Psycho-analysis (1910).
A middle aged lady called upon Freud for a consultation complaining of anxiety states. The precipitating cause of her anxiety states had been a divorce from her last husband but these states became worse after she consulted a young physician and he had informed her that the cause of her anxiety was her lack of sexual satisfaction. The doctor’s advice to the lady shows in what sense he understands the expression sexual life, namely, in which by sexual needs nothing is meant but the need for coitus or analogous acts producing orgasms and emission of the sexual substances. In contrast, in psychoanalysis, the concept of what is sexual comprises all the activities of the tender feelings which have primitive sexual impulses as their source. For this reason we prefer to speak of psychosexuality, thus laying stress on the point that the mental factor in sexual life should not be overlooked or underestimated. The doctor’s suggesting she solve this need for sexual satisfaction by going back to her husband, taking a lover, or masturbating leaves no room for psychoanalysis. It is a long superseded idea that the patient suffers from a sort of ignorance, and that if one removes this ignorance by giving him information he is bound to recover. The pathological factor is not his ignorance in itself, but the root of this ignorance in his inner resistances. The task of the treatment lies in combating these resistances. Psychoanalytic intervention requires a fairly long period of contact with the patient. First, the patient must reach the area of what he has repressed, and secondly, he must have formed a sufficient attachment (transference) to the physician for his emotional relationship to him to make a fresh flight into neurosis impossible. It is concluded that ‘wild’ analysts do more harm to the cause of psychoanalysis than to the individual patients.

1911
Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of
a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides) (1911).
Part I. Case history of Schreber.
A case history of paranoia is discussed. Dr. Schreber’s first illness began in the autumn of 1884, and by the end of 1885 he had completely recovered. The second illness set in at the end of October 1893 and grew rapidly worse. The patient was very preoccupied with his pathological experiences. He was inaccessible to any other impression and would sit perfectly rigid and motionless for hours. His delusional ideas gradually assumed a mystical and religious character. There were certain people (especially his physician, Flechsig) by whom he thought he was being persecuted and injured, and upon whom he poured abuse. By 1899, the patient’s condition had undergone a great change, and he now considered himself capable of carrying on an independent existence. The court judgment that gave Dr. Schreber back his liberty summarizes the content of his delusional system in a few sentences: He believed that he had a mission to redeem the world and to restore it to its lost state of bliss. This, however, he could only bring about if he were first transformed from a man into a woman. The emasculation phantasy was of a primary nature and originally independent of the Redeemer motif. The idea of being transformed into a woman was the salient feature and the earliest germ of his delusional system. He thought there was a conspiracy against him that once his illness was recognized as incurable he would be handed over to a certain person who would take his soul and then to another person who would transform him into a female and sexually abuse him. Schreber’s mixture of reverence and rebelliousness in his attitudes towards God are discussed at length. One of the delusions the patient felt was that through God’s misunderstanding of living men, He was the instigator of the plot against him. In Schreber’s system, the 2 principal elements of his delusions (his transformation into a woman and his favored relation to God) are linked in his assumption of a feminine attitude towards God. It will be shown that there is a genetic relationship between these 2 elements.

Part II. Attempts at interpretation.
Attempts at interpretation of the case history of paranoia are presented. Schreber’s case, at first took the form of delusions of persecution, and did not begin to lose it until the turning point of his illness. During the incubation period of his illness, between June 1893, and the following October, Schreber repeatedly dreamt that his old nervous disorder had returned. Schreber dreamed that Flechsig committed, or attempted to commit, soul murder upon him. This act was thought to be comparable to the efforts made by the devil or by demons to gain possession of a soul. The exciting cause of the illness was the appearance in him of a feminine (that is, a passive homosexual) wishful phantasy, which took as its object the figure of his doctor. An intense resistance to this phantasy arose on the part of Schreber’s personality, and the ensuing defensive struggle, took on that of a delusion of persecution. The person he longed for now became his persecutor, and the content of his wishful phantasy became the content of his persecution. The patient’s struggle with Flechsig became revealed to him as a conflict with God. This is construed as an infantile conflict with the father whom he loved; the details of that conflict were what determined the content of his delusions. In the final stage of Schreber’s delusion a magnificent victory was scored by the infantile sexual urge; for voluptuousness became God-fearing, and God Himself (his father) never tired of demanding it from him. His father’s most dreaded threat, castration, actually provided the material for his wishful phantasy of being transformed into a woman.

Part III. On the mechanism of paranoia.
The distinctive character of paranoia is found in the form assumed by the symptoms. Paranoia is a disorder in which a sexual etiology is by no means obvious; rather, the strikingly prominent features in the causation of paranoia, especially among males, are social humiliations and slights. The really operative factor in these social injuries lies in the part played in them by the homosexual components of emotional life. What lies at the core of the conflict in cases of paranoia among males is a homosexual wishful phantasy of loving a man. The familiar principal forms of paranoia can all be represented as contradictions of the single proposition: “I (a man) love him (a man),” and that they exhaust all the possible ways in which such contradictions could be formulated. The proposition is contradicted by: 1) delusions of persecution; 2) erotomania; and 3) jealousy, alcoholic delusions of jealousy and delusions of jealousy in women. We can detect an element of megalomania in most other forms of paranoiac disorder. The most striking characteristic of symptom formation in paranoia is the process which deserves the name of projection. Repression is also connected with paranoia in the following 3 phases: fixation, repression proper, and irruption. Freud concluded that the neuroses arise from a conflict between the ego and the sexual instinct, and that the forms which the neuroses assume, retain the imprint of the course of development followed by the libido, and by the ego.

Postscript.
In dealing with the case history of Schreber, Freud purposely restricted himself to a minimum of interpretation. Since he published his work upon Schreber, a chance acquisition of knowledge has put him in a position to appreciate one of his delusional beliefs more adequately, and to recognize the wealth of its bearing upon mythology: the patient’s peculiar relation to the sun, explained as a sublimated father symbol. When Schreber boasts that he can look into the sun unscathed and undazzled, he has rediscovered the mythological method of expressing his filial relation to the sun, and has confirmed Freud once again in his view that the sun is a symbol of the father.

1911
Papers on technique.
The handling of dream-interpretation in psycho-analysis (1911).
The handling of dream interpretation in psychoanalysis is presented. Anyone coming from dream interpretation to analytic practice will retain his interest in the content of dreams, and his inclination will be to interpret as fully as possible every dream related by the patient. The amount of interpretation which can be achieved in one session should be taken as sufficient and it is not to be regarded as a loss if the content of the dream is not fully discovered. On the following day, the interpretation of the dream is not to be taken up again as a matter of course, until it has become evident that nothing else has meanwhile forced its way into the foreground of the patient’s thoughts. Dream interpretation should not be pursued in analytic treatment as an art for its own sake, but its handling should be subject to those technical rules that govern the conduct of the treatment as a whole. The great majority of dreams forge ahead of the analysis; so that, after subtraction of everything in them which is already known and understood, there still remains a more or less clear hint at something which has hitherto been hidden.

1912
Papers on technique.
The dynarnics of transference (1912).
The dynamics of transference are discussed. Each individual, through the combined operation of his innate disposition and the influences brought to bear on him during his early years, has acquired a specific method of his own in his conduct of his erotic life. This produces what might be described as a stereotype plate, which is constantly repeated in the course of the person’s life. If someone’s need for love is not entirely satisfied by reality, he is bound to approach every new person whom he meets with libidinal anticipatory ideas. Thus it is a perfectly normal and intelligible thing that the libidinal cathexis of someone who is partly unsatisfied, a cathexis which is held ready in anticipation, should be directed as well to the figure of the doctor. The cathexis will introduce the doctor into one of the psychical series which the patient has already formed. When anything in the complexive material (in the subject matter of the complex) is suitable for being transferred on to the figure of the doctor, that transference is carried out. It is inferred that the transference idea has penetrated into consciousness in front of any other possible associations because it satisfies the resistance. Transference in the analytic treatment invariably appears in the first instance as the strongest weapon of the resistance, and we may conclude that the intensity and persistence of the transference are an effect and an expression of the resistance. Transference to the doctor is suitable for resistance to the treatment only in so far as it is a negative transference or a positive transference of repressed erotic impulses.

1912
Papers on technique.
Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis (1912).
Recommendations are presented to physicians practicing psychoanalysis. The first problem is the task of keeping in mind all the innumerable names, dates, detailed memories and pathological products which each patient communicates, and of not confusing them with similar material produced by other patients under treatment simultaneously or previously. The physician should maintain the rule of giving equal notice to everything. This is the necessary counterpart to the demand made on the patient that he should communicate everything that occurs to him without criticism or selection. Freud cannot advise the taking of full notes, the keeping of a shorthand record, etc., during analytic sessions. The notes focus attention, tie up mental activity, and make an unfavorable impression. It is not a good thing to work on a case scientifically while treatment is still proceeding. The most successful cases are those in which one proceeds without any purpose in view. Under present day conditions the feeling that is most dangerous to a psychoanalyst is the therapeutic ambition to achieve, by this novel and much disputed method, something that will produce a convincing effect upon other people. The doctor should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown to him. He should not bring his own feelings into play. Efforts to make use of the analytic treatment to bring about sublimation of instinct are, far from advisable in every case. The patient’s intellectual capacities should not be taxed. Mental activities such as thinking something over or concentrating the attention solve none of the riddles of a neurosis. This can be done only by obeying the psychoanalytic rule.

1913
Papers on technique.
On beginning the treatment. (Further recommendations on the technique of psychoanalysis I) (1913).
Recommendations on the technique of psycho. analysis concerning beginning the treatment are presented. Lengthy preliminary discussions before the beginning of the analytic treatment, previous treatment by another method and also previous acquaintance between the doctor and the patient who is to be analyzed, have special disadvantageous consequences for which one must be prepared. They result in the patient’s meeting the doctor with a transference attitude which is already established and which the doctor must first slowly uncover instead of having the opportunity to observe the growth and development of the transference from the outset. One must mistrust all prospective patients who want to make a delay before beginning their treatment. Points of importance at the beginning of the analysis are arrangement about time and money. ‘What the material is with which one starts the treatment is a matter of indifference. But in any case the patient must be left to do the talking and must be free to choose at what point he shall begin. So long as the patient’s communications and ideas run on without any obstruction, the theme of transference should be left untouched. In each case we must wait until the disturbance of the transference by the successive emergency of transference resistances has been removed.

1914
Papers on technique.
Remembering, repeating and working-through. (Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II)
Remembering, repeating, and working through are discussed. Forgetting impressions, scenes or experiences nearly always reduces itself to shutting them off. There is one special class of experiences for which no memory can as a rule be recovered. These are experiences which occurred in very early childhood and were not under-stood at the time but which were subsequently understood and interpreted. The patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without knowing that he is repeating it. Transference is itself only a piece of repetition; the repetition is a transference of the forgotten past not only on to the doctor but also on to all the other aspects of the current situation. The patient yields to the compulsion to repeat, which now replaces the impulsion to remember, not only in his personal attitude to his doctor but also in every other activity and relationship which may occupy his life at the time. The main instrument for curbing the patient’s compulsion to repeat and for turning it into a motive for remembering, lies in the handling of the transference. We render the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the right to assert itself in a definite field. The first step in overcoming the resistances is made by the analyst’s uncovering the resistance, which is never recognized by the patient, and acquainting him with it. One must allow the patient time to become more conversant with the resistance with which he has now become acquainted, to work through it, to overcome it, by continuing, in defiance of it, the analytic work. Only when the resistance is at its height can the analyst discover the repressed instinctual impulses which are feeding the resistance. The working through of the resistances may in practice turn out to be an arduous task for the subject of the analysis and a trial of patience for the analyst. Theoretically, working through may correlate with the abreacting of the quotas of affect strangulated by repression.

1915
Papers on technique.
Observations on transference-love. (Further recommendations on the technique of psychoanalysis III) (1915).
Observations on transference love (when a woman patient declares her love for the doctor) are presented. For the doctor, the phenomenon signifies a valuable piece of enlightenment and a useful warning against any tendency to a counter transference. He must recognize that the patient’s falling in love is induced by the analytic situation. The patient has 2 alternatives; she must relinquish psychoanalytic treatment, or she must accept falling in love with her doctor as an inescapable fate. After falling in love, the patient loses all understanding of the treatment and all interest in it. This transference love is interpreted as a form of resistance. The analytic technique requires that the physician should deny to the patient, who is craving for love, the satisfaction she demands. The treatment must be carried out in abstinence. The analyst must keep firm hold of the transference-love, but treat it as something unreal, as a situation which has to be gone through in the treatment and traced back to its unconscious origins and which must assist in bringing all that is most deeply hidden in the patient’s erotic life into her consciousness and therefore under her control. For the doctor, ethical motives unite with the technical ones to restrain him from giving the patient his love. However highly he may prize love he must prize even more highly the opportunity for helping his patient over a decisive stage in her life.

1912
Onset of Neurosis.
Types of onset of neurosis are described. The first type may be described in general terms as frustration. In the second type, the subject does not fall ill as a result of a change in the external world which has replaced satisfaction by frustration, but as a result of an internal effort. He falls ill of his attempt to adapt himself to reality and to fulfill the demands of reality, an attempt in the course of which he comes up against insurmountable internal difficulties. The third type concerns those people who fall ill as soon as they get beyond the irresponsible age of childhood. The essential feature of the dispositional processes is that their libido has never left its infantile fixations; the demands of reality are not suddenly made upon a wholly or partly mature person, but arise from the very fact of growing older. The fourth type involves people who fall ill who have hitherto been healthy, who have met with no fresh experience and whose relation to the external world has undergone no change. As a result of their having reached a particular period of life, and in conformity with regular biological processes, the quantity of libido in their mental economy has experienced an increase which is in itself enough to upset the equilibrium of their health and to set up the necessary conditions for a neurosis.

1913
The theme of the three caskets (1913).
The theme of the 3 caskets from The Merchant of Venice is discussed. Portia is bound to take as her husband that one who chooses the right casket from among the 3 before him. The 3 caskets are of gold, silver, and lead. Two suitors have already departed unsuccessful: they have chosen gold and silver. Bassanjo, the third, decides in favor of lead; thereby he wins the bride, whose affection was already his before the trial of fortune. Shakespeare did not invent this oracle of the choice of a casket; he took it from a tale in the Gesta Romanorum, in which a girl has to make the same choice to win the Emperor’s son. Here too, the third metal, lead, is the bringer of fortune. The theme is a human one, a man’s choice between 3 women. This same content is found in King Lear when the King resolves to divide his kingdom while he is still alive, among his 3 daughters. He disowns Cordelia and divides the kingdom between the other 2, to his own and the general ruin. The shepherd Paris has to choose between 3 goddesses, of whom he declares the third to be the most beautiful. Cinderella is a youngest daughter, who is preferred by the prince to her 2 elder sisters. Psyche, in Apuleius ‘s story, is the youngest and fairest of 3 sisters. Gold and silver are considered “loud”; while lead is considered dumb. In all the stories, there are 3 women of whom the youngest is the best. The Twelve Brothers, a Grimm Fairy Tale, involves a woman who remains dumb for 7 years in order to save her brothers. The earliest Greek mythology only knew a single Moera. She later developed into 3 sister goddesses. It is argued that what is represented are the 3 forms taken by the figure of the mother in the course of a man’s life: the mother, the wife, and Mother Earth who receives him after death.

1913
The disposition to obsessional neurosis. A contribution to the problem of choice of neurosis (1913).
The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis was read by Freud before the Fourth International Psychoanalytical Congress. The grounds for determining the choice of neurosis are in the nature of dispositions and are independent of experiences which operate pathogenically. The dispositions are inhibitions in development. The order in which the main forms of psychoneurosis are usually enumerated: Hysteria, Obsessional Neurosis, Paranoia, and Schizophrenia (Dementia Praecox), corresponds (even though not exactly) to the order of the ages at which the onset of these disorders occurs. Hysterical forms of illness can be observed even in earliest childhood; obsessional neurosis usually shows its first symptoms in the second period of childhood (between the ages of 6 and 8); while the 2 other psychoneuroses do not appear until after puberty and during adult life. Once the sexual organization which contains the disposition to obsessional neurosis is established it is never afterwards completely surmounted. The impulses of hatred and anal eroticism play a strong part in the symptomatology of obsessional neurosis. Psychoanalysis stands or falls with the recognition of the sexual component instincts, of the erotogenic zones and of the extension thus made possible of the concept of a sexual function in contrast to the narrower genital function. The antithesis between male and female is not present at the stage of pregenital object choice. The processes of the formation of character are more obscure and less accessible to analysis than neurotic ones. The developmental disposition to a neurosis is only complete if the phase of the development of the ego at which fixation occurs is taken into account as well as that of the libido. There remains for hysteria an intimate relation to the final phase of libidinal development, which is characterized by the primacy of the genitals and the introduction of the reproductive function.

1912
Totem and taboo (1913).
Part I. The horror of incest.
The horror of incest is discussed. The Australian aborigines, set before themselves with the most scrupulous care and the most painful severity the aim of avoiding incestuous sexual relations. Their whole social organization seems to serve that purpose or to have been brought into relation with its attainment. Among the Australians the place of all the religious and social institutions which they lack is taken by the system of totemism. A totem is, as a rule, an animal and more rarely a plant or a natural phenomenon, which stands in a peculiar relation to the whole clan. In almost every place where there are totems there is also a law against persons of the same totem having sexual relations with one another and consequently against their marrying. The violation of the prohibition is avenged in the most energetic fashion by the whole clan. Exogamy linked with the totem effects more than the prevention of incest with a man’s mothers and sisters. It makes sexual intercourse impossible for a man with all the women of his own clan by treating them all as blood relatives. Totemic exogamy appears to have been the means for preventing group incest. In an Australian tribe, 12 totem clans are divided into 4 subphratries and 2 phratries. Ml the divisions are exogamous. Various customary prohibitions (avoidances) are discussed such as those in Melanesia where intercourse between a boy and his mother and sisters is avoided by the boy moving out of the house. He subsequently does not meet them in public or speak of them. Similar customs prevail in New Caledonia, New Britain, New Mecklenburg, Fiji and Sumatra. The most widespread and strictest avoidance is that which restricts a man’s intercourse with his mother-inlaw. Incestuous wishes (childhood incestuous wishes that have been repressed) later become unconscious, and are regarded by savage peoples as immediate perils against which the most severe measures of defense must be enforced.

Part II. Taboo and emotional ambivalence. (1).
Taboo has about it a sense of something unapproachable, and it is principally expressed in prohibitions and restrictions. Taboo restrictions are distinct from religious or moral prohibitions. Wundt described taboo as the oldest human unwritten code of laws. The source of taboo is attributed to a peculiar magical power which is inherent in persons and spirits and can be conveyed by them through the medium of inanimate objects. Taboos may be permanent or temporary. Behind all the prohibitions there seems to be something in the nature of a theory that they are necessary because certain persons and things are charged with a dangerous power, which can be transformed through contact with them, almost like an infection. The quantity of this dangerous attribute also plays a part. Some people or things have more of it than others and the danger is actually proportional to the difference of potential of the charges. Anyone who has transgressed one of these prohibitions himself acquires the characteristic of being prohibited. The word taboo denotes everything, whether a person or a place or a thing or a transitory condition, which is the vehicle or source of the mysterious attribute. According to Wundt, the {rue sources of taboo lie deeper than in the interests of the privileged classes: they have their origin in the source of the most primitive and at the same time most lasting of human instincts, in fear of ‘demonic’ powers. The original characteristic of taboo (that a demonic power lies hidden in an object and if the object is touched it takes its vengeance by casting a spell over the wrong-doer) is still ‘objectified fear.’ That fear has not yet split into the 2 forms into which it later develops: veneration and horror. Also according to Wundt, the distinction between sacred and unclean did not exist in the primitive beginnings of taboo; therefore taboo applies both to what is sacred and what is unclean through dread of contact with it.

Part II. Taboo and emotional ambivalence.
(2). Parallel between taboo and obsessional neurosis.
Anyone approaching the problem of taboo from the angle of psychoanalysis, will recognize that the phenomena of taboo are far from unfamiliar. The most obvious and striking point of agreement between the obsessional prohibitions of neurotics and taboos is that these prohibitions are equally lacking in motive and equally puzzling in their origin. As in the case of taboo, the principal prohibition, the nucleus of the neurosis, is against touching; thus sometimes known as touching phobia. Obsessional prohibitions are extremely liable to displacement. Obsessional prohibitions involve just as extensive renunciations and restrictions in the lives of those who are subject to them as do taboo prohibitions; but some of them can be lifted if certain actions are performed. Thereafter, these actions must be performed: they become compulsive or obsessive acts, and there can be no doubt that they are in the nature of expiation, penance, defensive measures, and purification. A continuing conflict between the prohibition and the instinct to do something is called a psychical fixation. The principal characteristic of this psychological constellation is described as the subject’s ambivalent attitude towards a single object or an act connected with that object. The transmissibility of taboo is a reflection of the tendency for the unconscious instinct in the neurosis to shift constantly along associative paths on to new objects. If the violation of a taboo can be made good by atonement or expiation, which involve the renunciation of some possession or some freedom, this proves that obedience to the taboo injunction meant in itself the renunciation of something desirable. It is concluded that taboo is a primaeval prohi5ition forcibly imposed from outside, and directed against the most powerful longings to which human beings are subject. The desire to violate it persists in their unconscious; those who obey the taboo have an ambivalent attitude to what the taboo prohibits.

Part II. Taboo and emotional ambIvalence.
(3). The treatment of enemies.
The taboos connected with the treatment of enemies are discussed. The killing of a man is governed by a number of observances which are included among the usages of taboo. These observances fall into the following 4 groups: I) the appeasement of the slain enemy; 2) restrictions upon the slayer; 3) acts of expiation and purification by him; and 4) certain ceremonial observances. The conclusion that is drawn from all these observances is that the impulses which they express towards an enemy are not solely hostile ones. They are also manifestations of remorse, of admiration for the enemy, and of a bad conscience for having killed him. In the accepted explanation of all the observances of appeasement, restriction, expiation, and purification, 2 principles are combined: the extension of the taboo from the slain man on to everything that has come in contact with him, and the fear of the slain man’s ghost. In Freud’s explanation, stress is put on the unity of the view, which derives all of these observances from emotional ambivalence towards the enemy.

Part II. Taboo and emotional ambivalence.
(3). (b). The taboo upon rulers.
The taboos connected with the treatment of rulers are discussed. The attitude of primitive peoples to their chiefs, kings, and priests is governed by 2 basic principles. A ruler must not only be guarded, he must also be guarded against. Rulers must be guarded against because they are vehicles of the mysterious and dangerous magical power which is transmitted by contact like an electric charge and which brings death and ruin to anyone who is not protected by a similar charge. The need to protect the king from every possible form of danger follows from his immense importance to his subjects. The ceremonial taboo of kings is ostensibly the highest honor and protection for them, while actually it is a punishment for their exaltation, a revenge taken on them by their subjects. An element of distrust may be traced among the reasons for the taboo observances that surround the king. One of the most glaring instances of a sacred ruler being fettered and paralysed by taboo ceremonials was found in the mode of life of the Japanese Mikado in earlier centuries. Some of the taboos laid upon barbarian kings are similar to the restrictions imposed upon murderers. The taboos not only pick out the king and exalt him above all common mortals, but also make his existence a torment and an intolerable burden, and reduce him to a bondage worse than that of his subjects.

Part II. Taboo and emotional ambivalence.
(3). (c). The taboo upon the dead.
(4). Taboo and conscience.
The taboo upon the dead is especially virulent among most primitive peoples. It is manifested in the consequences that follow contact with the dead and in the treatment of mourners. The taboo observances after bodily contact with the dead are the same for Polynesia, Melanesia and a part of Africa. Their most regular feature is the prohibition against those who have had such contact to the touching of food themselves, and the consequent necessity for their being fed by other people. Essentially the same prohibitions apply to those who have been in contact with the dead only in a metaphorical sense. One of the most puzzling, but at the same time instructive, usages in connection with mourning is the prohibition against uttering the name of the dead person, since the name is regarded as an essential part of a man’s personality and as an important possession. Obsessional neurotics behave exactly like savages in relation to names. Those who employ this taboo are afraid of the presence or of the return of the dead person’s ghost. It is supposed that a dearly loved relative turns into a demon at the moment of his death and his survivors can expect nothing but hostility. Here we see the ambivalence of human emotions where a mourner reproaches himself for the death of a loved one, knowing that unconsciously he wished for the death. Unconscious hostility is projected on to demons in the case of taboo of the dead. The explanation of taboo also throws light on the nature and origin of conscience: that conscience arose also on the basis of emotional ambivalence and under the same conditions, (that one of the opposing feelings involved shall be unconscious and kept under repression by the compulsive domination of the other one). Violation of taboo among primitive peoples results in punishment of whoever was responsible for violating the taboo while in obsessional neuroses performance of the forbidden act causes punishment of a person other than the one committing the act. What actually happens in the latter case is that the original wish that the loved person may die is replaced by the fear that he may die, thus giving a neurosis that is compensating for an underlying contrary attitude of brutal egoism. The neuroses are asocial structures; they endeavour to achieve by private means what is effected in society by collective effort. Taboo observances, like neurotic symptoms, have this double sense.

Part III. Animism, magic and the omnipotence of thoughts.
(1). Animism.
(2). Magic.
The psychoanalytic approach states that it is not to be supposed that men were inspired to create their first system of the universe by pure speculative curiosity. The practical need for controlling the world around them must have played its part. Sorcery is essentially the art of influencing spirits by treating them in the same way as one would treat men in like circumstances: appeasing them, making amends to them, propitiating them, intimidating them, robbing them of their power, subduing them to one’s will, etc. Magic, on the other hand, is something different: fundamentally, it disregards spirits and makes use of special procedures and not of everyday psychological methods. Magic has to serve the most varied purposes: it must subject natural phenomena to the will of man, it must protect the individual from his enemies and from dangers, and it must give him power to injure his enemies. One of the most widespread magical procedures for injuring an enemy is by making an effigy of him from any convenient material. Whatever is then done to the effigy is believed to happen to the detested original. There is another procedure by which an enemy can be injured. One gets possession of some of his hair or nails or other waste products or even a piece of his clothing, and treats them in some hostile way. The principle governing magic, the technique of the animistic mode of thinking, is the principle of the omnipotence of thought.

Part III. Animism, magic, omnipotence of thoughts.
(3). Omnipotence of thoughts.
(4). Totemism is a system.
In obsessional neuroses the survival of the omnipotence of thoughts (strange and uncanny events which pursue) is most clearly visible. The primary obsessive acts of neurotics are of an entirely magical character. In primitive man, the process of thinking is sexualized; this attitude may plausibly be brought into relation with narcissism and be regarded as an essential component of it. In only a single field of our civilization, art, has the omnipotence of thoughts being retained. The first picture which man formed of the world, animism, was a psychological one. The technique of animism, magic, reveals in the clearest and most unmistakable way an intention to impose the laws governing mental life upon real things; in this, spirits need not as yet play any part, though spirits may be taken as objects of magical treatment. Spirits and demons are only projections of man’s own emotional impulses. He turns his emotional cathexes into persons, he peoples the world with them and meets his internal mental processes again outside himself. Thus man’s first theoretical achievement, the creation of spirits, seems to have arisen from the observances of taboo. With primitive man, superstition need not be the only or the real reason for some particular custom or observance and does not excuse us from the duty of searching for its hidden motives. Under the domination of an animistic system it is inevitable that every observance and every activity shall have a systematic basis, which we now describe as superstitious.

Part IV. The return of totemism in childhood:
(1). The nature of totemism.
The return of totemism in childhood is discussed. A totem is a class of material objects which a savage regards with superstitious respect, believing that there exists between him and every member of the class an intimate and special relation. There are at least 3 kinds of totems: 1) the clan totem, common to a whole clan, and passing by inheritance from generation to generation; 2) the sex totem, common either to all the males or to all the females of a tribe, to the exclusion in either case of the other sex; and 3) the individual totem, belonging to a single individual and not passing to his descendants. The clan expects to receive protection and care from its totem. The appearance of the totem in or about a house is often regarded as an omen of death. In particularly important circumstances the clansman seeks to emphasize his kinship with the totem by making himself resemble it externally by dressing in the skin of an animal, by incising a picture of the totem upon his own body, etc. The social aspect of totemism is principally expressed in a severely enforced injunction and a sweeping restriction. The members of a totem clan are brothers and sisters and are bound to help and protect one another. The corresponding taboo restriction prohibits members of the same clan from marrying or having sexual intercourse with each other. If we seek to penetrate to the original nature of totemism, we find that its essential characteristics are these: originally, all totems were animals, and were regarded as the ancestors of the different clans. Totems were inherited only through the female line. There was a prohibition against killing the totem. Members of a totem clan were forbidden to practice sexual intercourse with one another.

Part IV. The return of totemism in children.
(2). The origin of totemism; the origin of exogamy and its relation to totemism.
The published theories on the origin of totemism are divided into 3 groups: the nominalist, the sociological, and the psychological. Some of the explanations of totemism exclude any connection with exogamy, so that the 2 institutions fall completely apart. There are 2 opposing views: one which seeks to maintain the original presumption that exogamy forms an inherent part of the totemic system, and the other which denies that there is any such connection and holds that the convergence between these 2 features of the oldest cultures is a chance one. Most of the authorities agree that totemism is older than exogamy. The view which explains horror of incest as an innate instinct must be abandoned. Not only must the prohibition against incest be older than any domestication of animals which might have enabled men to observe the effects of inbreeding upon racial characters, but even today the detrimental results of inbreeding are not established with certainty and cannot easily be demonstrated in man.

Part IV. The return of totemism in childhood.
(3). Animal phobias.
(4). Sacrificial feasts.
There is a great deal of resemblance between the relations of children and of primitive men towards animals. Not infrequently, a strange rift occurs in the excellent relations between children and animals. A child will suddenly begin to be frightened of some particular species of animal and to avoid touching or seeing any individual of that species. This is due to a displacement of affect. Analysis is able to trace the associative paths along which the displacement passes, both the fortuitous paths and those with a significant content. Analysis also enables us to discover the motives for the displacement. It may be said that in these children’s phobias some of the features of totemism reappear, but reversed into their negative. If the totem animal is the father, then the 2 principal ordinances of totemism, the 2 taboo prohibitions which constitute its core, not to kill the totem and not to have sexual relations with a woman of the same totem, coincide in their content with the 2 crimes of Oedipus, who killed his father and married his mother, as well as with the 2 primal wishes of children, the insufficient repression or the reawakening of which forms the nucleus of perhaps every psychoneurosis. The sacramental killing and communal eating of the totem animal, whose consumption is forbidden on all other occasions, is an important feature of totemic religion.

Part IV. The return of totemism in childhood.
(5), (6). Relation of totem meals to father and God.
A festival is a permitted, or rather an obligatory, excess, a solemn breach of a prohibition. It is not that men commit the excess because it is of the essence of a festival; the festive feeling is produced by the liberty to do what is as a rule prohibited. The clansmen acquire sanctity by consuming the totem. Psychoanalysis has revealed that the totem animal is in reality a substitute for the father; and this tallies with the contradictory fact that, though the killing of the animal is as a rule forbidden, yet its killing is a festive occasion, with the fact that it is killed and yet mourned. Psychoanalysis requires us to assume that totemism and exogamy were intimately connected and had a simultaneous origin. The ancient totem meal recurs in the original form of sacrifice. It is supposed that the god himself was the totem animal, and that he developed out of it at a later state of religious feeling. As time went on, the animal lost its sacred character and the sacrifice lost its connection with the totem feast; it became a simple offering to the deity, an act of renunciation in favor of the god. We can trace through the ages the identity of the totem meal with animal sacrifice, with the anthropic human sacrifice and with the Christian Eucharist, and we can recognize in all these rituals the effect of the crime by which men were so deeply weighted down but of which they must none the less have felt so proud. The Christian communion, however, is essentially a fresh elimination of the father, a repetition of the guilty deed.

Part IV. Return of totemism in childhood.
(7). Oedipus complex and society.
An event such as the elimination of the primal father by the company of his sons must inevitably have left ineradicable traces in the history of humanity; and the less it itself was recollected, the more numerous must have been the substitutes to which it gave rise. The beginnings of religion, morals, society, and art converge in the Oedipus complex. This is in complete agreement with the psychoanalytic findings that the same complex constitutes the nucleus of all neuroses, so far as our present knowledge goes. It seems that the problems of social psychology should prove soluble on the basis of one single concrete point: man’s relation to his father. No one can have failed to observe that the existence of a collective mind is taken as the basis of the position. It is supposed that the sense of guilt for an action has persisted for many thousands of years and has remained operative in generations which can have had no knowledge of that action. Without the assumption of a collective mind, social psychology in general cannot exist. Another difficulty might actually be brought forward from psychoanalytic quarters. The earliest moral precepts and restrictions in a primitive society have been explained as reactions to a deed which gave those who performed it the concept of crime. They felt remorse for the deed and decided that it should never be repeated. This creative sense of guilt still persists among us.

1914
Fausse reconnaissance (‘deja raconte’) in psycho-analytic treatment (1914).
It not infrequently happens in the course of an analytic treatment that the patient, after reporting some fact that he has remembered, will go on to say that he has already said that, while the analyst himself feels sure that this is the first time he has heard the story. The explanation of this frequent occurrence appears to be that the patient really had an intention of giving this information, that once or even several times he actually made some remark leading up to it, but that he was then prevented by resistance from carrying out his purpose, and afterwards confused a recollection of his intention with a recollection of its performance. The phenomenon presented by the patient in cases like this deserves to be called a fausse reconnaissance, and is completely analogous to what occurs in certain other cases and has been described as a deja vu. There is another kind of fausse reconnaissance which not infrequently makes its appearance at the close of a treatment. After he has succeeded in forcing the repressed event upon the patient’s acceptance in the teeth of all resistances, and has succeeded, as it were, in rehabilitating it, the patient may say that he now feels as though he had known it all the time. With this, the work of the analysis has been completed.

1914
The Moses of Michelangelo (1914). Part I. Description of critics.
Descriptions by various critics of the Moses of Michelangelo, a fragment of the gigantic tomb which the artist was to have erected for the powerful Pope Julius the Second, is presented. There is not the slightest doubt that it represents Moses holding the Tables of the Ten Commandments. Moses is represented as seated; his body faces forward, his head with its mighty beard looks to the left, his right foot rests on the ground and his left leg is raised so that only the toes touch the ground. The facial expression of Moses is characterized as showing a mixture of wrath, pain, and contempt. A majority of critics describe the statue as the descent from Mount Sinai, where Moses has received the Tables from God, and it is the moment when he perceives that the people are rejoicing around the Golden Calf. The figure of Moses cannot be supposed to be springing to his feet; but is in sublime repose like the other figures and like the proposed statue of the Pope. Without the display of the emotions of anger, contempt and pain it would not have been possible to portray the nature of a superman of this kind. Michelangelo has created, not a historical figure, but a character type, embodying an inexhaustible inner force which tames the recalcitrant world; and he has given a form not only to the Biblical narrative of Moses, but to his own inner experiences, and to his impressions both of the individuality of Julius himself, and also, of the underlying springs of Savonarola’s perpetual conflicts.

Part II. Freud’s description.
In 2 places in the figure of Moses there are certain details which have hitherto not only escaped notice but have not even been properly described. These are the attitude of his right hand and the position of the 2 Tables of the Law. The thumb of the hand is concealed and the index finger alone is in effective contact with the beard. It is pressed so deeply against the soft masses of hair that they bulge out beyond it both above and below. We have assumed that the right hand was, to begin with, away from the beard; that then it reached across to the left of the figure in a moment of great emotional tension and seized the beard; that it was finally drawn back again, taking a part of the beard with it. There are some difficulties involved in this interpretation since the right hand is responsible for the tables which are upside down. The Tables are stood on their heads and practically balanced on one corner. The upper edge is straight, the lower one has a protuberance like a horn on the part nearest the viewer, and the Tables touch the stone seat precisely with this protuberance. It is to prevent the Tables from hitting the ground that the right hand retreated, let go the beard, a part of which was drawn back with it unintentionally, came against the upper edge of the Tables in time and held them near the hind corner, which had now come uppermost. Thus the singularly constrained air of the whole, beard, hand, and tilted Tables, can be traced to that one passionate movement of the hand and its natural consequences.

The Moses of Michelangelo (1914). Part III, IV, and postscript.
In his first transport of fury, Moses desired to act, to spring up and take vengeance and forget the Tables; but he has overcome the temptation, and he will not remain seated and still, in his frozen wrath and in his pain mingled with contempt. Nor will he throw away the Tables so that they will break on the stones, for it is on their especial account that he has controlled his anger; it was to preserve them that he kept his passion in check. As our eyes travel down it, the figure exhibits 3 distinct emotional strata. The lines of the face reflect the feelings which have won the ascendancy; the middle of the figure shows the traces of suppressed movement; and the foot still retains the attitude of the projected action. The Moses of legend and tradition had a hasty temper and was subject to fits of passion. But Michelangelo placed a different Moses on the tomb of the Pope, one superior to the historical or traditional Moses. In his creations Michelangelo has often enough gone to the utmost limit of what is expressible in art; and perhaps in his statue of Moses he has not completely succeeded, if his purpose was to make the passage of a violent gust of passion visible in the signs left behind it in the ensuing calm.

1914
On narcissism: an introduction (1914).
Part I. Discussion of narcissism in various conditions.
The term narcissism is derived from clinical description and was chosen by Paul Nacke in 1899 to denote the attitude of a person who treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated. Psychoanalytic observers were subsequently struck by the fact that individual features of the narcissistic attitude are found in many people who suffer from other disorders; it seemed probable that an allocation of the libido such as described as narcissism might be present far more extensively, and that it might claim a place in the regular course of human sexual development. A pressing motive for occupying ourselves with the conception of a primary and normal narcissism arose when the attempt was made to subsume what we know of dementia praecox or schizophrenia under the hypotheses of the libido theory. The extension of the libido theory receives reinforcement from our observations and views on the mental life of children and primitive peoples. A unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The autoerotic instincts, however, are there from the first; so there must be something added to autoeroticism, a new psychical action, in order to bring about narcissism. Freud contended that we may repudiate Jung’s assertion that the libido theory has come to grief in the attempt to explain dementia praecox, and that it is therefore disposed of for the other neuroses as well.

Part II. Narcissism in organic disease, hypochondria, and erotic life.
Certain special difficulties seem to lie in the way of a direct study of narcissism. The chief means of access to it will probably remain in the analysis of the paraphrenias. Hypochondria, like organic disease, manifests itself in distressing and painful bodily sensations, and it has the same effect as organic disease on the distribution of libido. The hypochondriac withdraws both interest and libido from the objects of the external world and concentrates both of them upon the organ that is engaging his attention. The difference between paraphrenic affections, and the transference neuroses appears to lie the circumstance that, in the former, the libido that is liberated by frustration does not remain attached to objects in phantasy, but withdraws on to the ego. Megalomania would accordingly correspond to the psychical mastering of this latter amount of libido, and would thus be the counterpart of the introversion on to phantasies that is found in the transference neuroses; a failure of this psychical function gives rise to the hypochondria of paraphrenia and this is homologous to the anxiety of the transference neuroses. Since paraphrenia frequently, if not usually, brings about only a partial detachment of the libido from objects, we can distinguish 3 groups of phenomena in the clinical picture: 1) those representing what remains of a normal state of neurosis; 2) those representing the morbid process; and 3) those representing restoration, in which the libido is once more attached to objects, after the manner of a hysteria, or of an obsessional neurosis.

Part III. Ego-ideal, inheritor of narcissism.
Psychoanalytic research has recognized the existence and importance of the masculine protest, but it has regarded it, in opposition to Adler, as narcissistic in nature and derived from the castration complex. We have learned that libidinal instinctual impulses undergo the vicissitude of pathogenic repression if they come into conflict with the subject’s cultural and ethical ideas. For the ego, the formation of an ideal is the conditioning factor of repression. This ideal ego is the target of the self4ove which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. Sublimation is a process that concerns object libido and consists in the instinct’s directing itself towards an other than sexual satisfaction. Idealization is a process that concerns the object; by it that object is aggrandized and exalted in the subject’s mind. There is a special psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured and constantly watches the actual ego and measures it by that ideal. Delusions of being watched present this power (watching, discovering, criticizing) in a regressive form, revealing the origin of the ego ideal. Self-regard appears to be an expression of the size of the ego. The self-regarding attitude is discussed for normal and neurotic people. The relations of self-regard to erotism (libidinal object-cathexes) may be expressed after 2 cases are distinguished: whether the erotic cathexes are ego-syntonic or have suffered repression. The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that stage. This departure is brought about by means of the displacement of libido on to an ego ideal imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about from fulfilling this ideal. The auxiliary relation of the sexual ideal to the ego ideal is discussed. The ego ideal binds not only a person’s narcissistic libido, but also a considerable amount of his homosexual libido, which is in this way turned back into the ego.

1915
Papers on metapsychology (1915).
Instincts and their vicissitudes (1915).
The vicissitudes of instincts are discussed. By the pressure of an instinct, we understand its motor factor, the amount of force or the measure of the demand for work which it represents. The aim of an instinct is in every instance satisfaction, which can only be obtained by removing the state of stimulation at the source of the instinct. The object of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim. By the source of an instinct is meant the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is represented in mental life by an instinct. The essential feature in the vicissitudes undergone by instincts lies in the subjection of the instinctual impulses to the influence of the 3 great polarities that dominate mental life. Of these 3 polarities, we might describe that of activity-passivity as the biological; that of ego-external world as real; and finally that of pleasure-unpleasure as the economic polarity.

1915
Papers on metapsychology (1915).
Repression (1915).
One of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to meet with resistances which seek to make it inoperative. Under certain conditions, the impulse then passes into the state of repression. Repression is a preliminary stage of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation; it is a concept which could not have been formulated before the time of psychoanalytic studies. Repression does not arise in cases where the tension produced by lack of satisfaction of an instinctual impulse is raised to an unbearable degree. It has become a condition for repression that the motive force of unpleasure shall have acquired more strength than the pleasure obtained from satisfaction. Repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present from the beginning. The essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious. We have reason to assume that there is a primal repression, a first phase of repression, which consists in the psychical representative of the instinct being denied entrance into the conscious. The second stage of repression, repression proper, affects conscious mental derivatives of the repressed representative, or such conscious trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it. The motive and purpose of repression is nothing else than the avoidance of unpleasure. The mechanism of repression does not coincide with the mechanisms of forming substitutes. The mechanisms of repression have at least this one thing in common a withdrawal of the cathexis of energy.

1915
Papers on metapsychology (1915).
The unconscious (1915).
Chapter I. Justification for the concept of the unconscious.
We have learned from psychoanalysis that the essence of the process of repression lies, not in putting an end to the idea which represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious. When this happens we say of the idea that it is in a state of being unconscious. The assumption of the existence of something mental that is unconscious is necessary and legitimate. It is necessary because the data of consciousness have a very large number of gaps in them; both in healthy and in sick people, psychical acts often occur which can be explained only by presupposing other acts, of which nevertheless, consciousness affords no evidence. At any given moment consciousness includes only a small content, so that the greater part of what we call conscious knowledge must be, for very considerable periods of time, in a state of latency, that is to say, of being psychically unconscious. The assumption of an unconscious is, moreover, a perfectly legitimate one, inasmuch as in postulating it, we are not departing a single step from our customary and generally accepted mode of thinking. In psychoanalysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense organs.

1915
Papers on metapsychology (1915).
The unconscious (1915).
Chapter II. Various meanings of ‘The Unconscious’-The topographical point of view.
The attribute of being unconscious (Ucs) is only one feature that is found in the psychical and is by no means sufficient to characterize it fully. The unconscious comprises acts which are merely latent, temporarily unconscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones. A psychical act goes through 2 phases as regards its state, between which is interposed a kind of testing (censorship). In the first place the psychical act is unconscious and belongs to the system Ucs; if, on testing, it is rejected by the censorship, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be repressed and must remain unconscious. If, however, it passes this testing, it enters the second phase and henceforth belongs to the second system, the conscious (Cs) system. It is not yet conscious, but it is capable of becoming conscious. In consideration of this capacity for becoming conscious we also call the system Pcs the preconscious.

1915
Papers on metapsychology (1915).
The unconscious (1915).
Chapter III. Unconscious emotions.
The antithesis of conscious and unconscious is not applicable to instincts. An instinct can never become an object of consciousness, only the idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea. If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state we could know nothing about it. The use of the terms “unconscious affect” and “unconscious emotion” has reference to the vicissitudes undergone, in consequence of repression, by the quantitative factor in the instinctual impulse. We know that 3 such vicissitudes are possible: either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all into anxiety; or it is suppressed, i.e., it is prevented from developing at all. In every instance where repression has succeeded in inhibiting the development of affects, we term those affects (which we restore when we undo the work of repression) unconscious. It is possible for the development of affect to proceed directly from the unconscious system; in that case the affect always has the character of anxiety, for which all repressed affects are exchanged. Often, however, the instinctual impulse has to wait until it has found a substitutive idea in the conscious system. The development of affect can then proceed from this conscious substitute, and the nature of that substitute determines the qualitative character of the affect.

1915
Papers on metapsychology (1915).
The unconscious (1915).
Chapter IV. Topography and dynamics of repression.
Repression is essentially a process affecting ideas on the border between the unconscious (Ucs) system and the preconscious Ucs) or conscious (Cs). The idea either remains uncathected, or receives cathexis from the Ucs, or retains the Ucs cathexis which it already had. Freud proposed that when we have succeeded in describing a psychical process in its dynamic, topographical, and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a metapsychological presentation. In anxiety hysteria a first phase of the process is frequently overlooked, and may perhaps be in fact missed; on careful observation, however, it can be clearly discerned. It consists in anxieties appearing without the subject knowing what he is afraid of. In the second phase of anxiety hysteria, the anticathexis from the system Cs has led to substitute formation. The third phase repeats the work of the second on an ampler scale. The system Cs now protects itself against the activation of the substitutive idea by an anticathexis of its environment, just as previously it had secured itself against the emergence of the repressed idea by a cathexis of the substitutive idea. A great deal of what we have found in anxiety hysteria also holds good for the other 2 neuroses. In conversion hysteria, the instinctual cathexis of the repressed idea is changed into the innervation of the symptom. As regards obsessional neurosis, the anticathexis from the system Cs comes most noticeably into the foreground.

1915
Papers on metapsychology (1915). The unconscious (1915).
Chapter V. The special characteristics of the system Ucs.
The nucleus of the unconscious (Ucs) system consists of instinctual representatives which seek to discharge their cathexis, the wishful impulses. There is, in this system no negation, no doubt, no degree of certainty: all this is only introduced by the work of the censorship between the Ucs and the preconscious Pcs) system. Negation is a substitute, at a higher level, for repression. In the Ucs there are only contents, cathected with greater or lesser strength. The characteristics which we may expect to find in processes belonging to the system Ucs are: exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mobility of cathexes), timelessness, and replacement of external by psychical cathexes. Unconscious processes only become cognizable by us under the conditions of dreaming and of neurosis, when processes of the Pcs system are set back to an earlier stage by regression. The processes of the system Pcs display an inhibition of the tendency of cathected ideas towards discharge. It devolves upon the system Pcs to make communication possible between the different ideational contents so that they can influence one another, to give them an order in time, and to set up a censorship or several censorships.

1915
Papers on metapsychology (1915).
The unconscious (1915).
Chapter VI. Communication between the two systems.
The unconscious (Ucs) system is continued into what are known as derivatives; it is accessible to the impressions of life, it constantly influences the preconscious Pcs) system, and is even, for its part, subjected to influences from the Pcs. Among the derivatives of the Ucs instinctual impulses, there are some which unite in themselves characters of an opposite kind. On the one hand, they are highly organized, free from self-contradiction, have made use of every acquisition of the conscious (Cs) system and would hardly be distinguished in our judgement from the formation of that system. On the other hand, they are unconscious and are incapable of becoming conscious. A very great part of this preconscious originates in the unconscious, has the character of its derivatives, and is subjected to a censorship before it can become conscious. The Ucs is turned back on the frontier of the Pcs, by censorship, but derivatives of the Ucs can circumvent this censorship, achieve a high degree of organization and reach a certain intensity of cathexis in the Pcs. When, however, this intensity is exceeded and they try to force themselves into consciousness, they are recognized as derivatives of the Ucs and are repressed afresh at the new frontier of censorship, between the Pcs and the Cs. Thus the first of these censorships is exercised against the Ucs itself, and the second against its Pcs derivatives.

1915
Papers on metapsychology (1915).
The unconscious (1915).
Chapter VII. Assessment of the unconscious.
An assessment of the unconscious is presented. In schizophrenia, we observe a number of changes in speech. The patient often devotes peculiar care to his way of expressing himself. Some reference to bodily organs or innervation is often given prominence in the content of these remarks. In such symptoms of schizophrenia, as are comparable with the substitutive formations of hysteria or obsessional neurosis, the relation between the substitute and the repressed material nevertheless displays peculiarities which would surprise us in these 2 forms of neurosis. In schizophrenia, words are subjected to the same process as that which makes the dream images out of latent dream thoughts; to what we have called the primary psychical process. They undergo condensation, and by means of displacement transfer their cathexes to one another in their entirety. The character of strangeness of the substitutive formation in schizophrenia is the predominance of what has to do with words over what has to do with things. The conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone.

1917
Papers on metapsychology (1915).
A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams (1917).
A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams resolves itself largely into a discussion of the effects produced by the state of sleep on the different systems of the mind. It is the study of dreams which has taught us what we know of the psychical characteristics of the state of sleep. Dreams only show us the dreamer in so far as he is not sleeping; nevertheless they are bound to reveal, at the same time, characteristics of sleep itself. A dream tells us that something was going on which tended to interrupt sleep, and it enables us to understand in what way it has been possible to fend off this interruption. A dream is, therefore, among other things, a projection: an externalization of an internal process. The narcissism of the state of sleep implies a withdrawal of cathexis from all ideas of objects, from both the unconscious and the preconscious portions of those ideas. The completion of the dream process consists in the thought content, regressively transformed and worded over into a wishful phantasy, becoming conscious as a sense perception; while this is happening it undergoes secondary revision, to which every perceptual concept is subject. The dream wish is hallucinated, and, as a hallucination, meets with belief in the reality of its fulfillment. Dreams are a residue of mental activity, made possible by the fact that the narcissistic stage of sleep has not been able to be completely established. In dreams, the withdrawal of cathexis affects all systems equally.

1917
Papers on Metapsychology (1915).
Mourning and melancholia (1917).
Melancholia, whose definition fluctuates even in descriptive psychiatry, takes on various clinical forms, the grouping together of which into a single unity does not seem to be established with certainty; and some of these forms suggest somatic rather than psychogenic affections. The correlation of melancholia and mourning seems justified by the general picture of the 2 conditions. Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person. In some people the same influences produce melancholia instead of mourning and we consequently suspect them of a pathological disposition. The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition to all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-reviling, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment. The disturbance of self-regard is absent in mourning; but otherwise the features are the same. Melancholia borrows some of its features from mourning, and the others from the process of regression from narcissistic object choice to narcissism. The most remarkable characteristic of melancholia is its tendency to change into mania. In mania the ego has recovered from loss of the object. This makes available all of the anticathexis which the painful suffering of melancholia has drawn to itself from the ego and bound. The accumulation of cathexis which is at first bound and then, after the work of melancholia is finished, becomes free and makes mania possible must be linked with regression of the libido to narcissism.

1918
From the history of an infantile neurosis (1918).
Part I. Introductory remarks about the “Wolfman.” The case which Freud reports is characterized by a number of peculiarities which require emphasis. It is concerned with a young man whose health had broken down in his eighteenth year after a gonorrhoeal infection, and who was entirely incapacitated and completely dependent upon other people when he began his psychoanalytic treatment several years later. His early years were dominated by a severe neurotic disturbance, which began immediately before his fourth birthday as an anxiety hysteria (in the shape of an animal phobia), then changed into an obsessional neurosis with a religious content, and lasted as far as into his tenth year. Freud’s description and analysis of the case are restricted to the aspect of infantile neurosis, 15 years after its termination. The first years of the treatment produced scarcely any change. The patient remained for a long time unassailably entrenched behind an attitude of obliging apathy. His shrinking from a self-sufficient existence was a great problem. Freud waited until the patient became strongly enough attached to him to counterbalance this shrinking. Freud told the patient that the treatment had to come to an end at a fixed date; and under the pressure of this limit his resistance and his fixation to the illness gave way. It is concluded that the length of analysis and the quantity of material which must be mastered are of no importance in comparison with the resistance which is met within the course of the work, and are only of importance insofar as they are necessarily proportional to the resistance.

1918
From the history of an infantile neurosis (1918).
Part II. General survey of the patient’s environment and of the history of the case.
A general survey is made of the patient’s environment and of the history of the case. His mother suffered from abdominal disorders, and his father from attacks of depression, which led to his absence from home. As a consequence of her weak health, the patient’s mother had little to do with her children. As far back as he could remember he was looked after by a nurse, an uneducated old woman of peasant birth, with an untiring affection for him. He seems at first to have been a very good natured, tractable, and even quiet child, so that they used to say of him that he ought to have been the girl and his elder sister the boy. But once, when his parents came back from their summer holiday, they found him transformed. He had become discontented, irritable and violent, took offense on every possible occasion, and then flew into a rage and screamed like a savage. This happened during the summer while the English governess was with them. The patient’s sister tormented him by always displaying a picture of a wolf which frightened him. During the years of his childhood he went through an easily recognizable attack of obsessional neurosis. He related that during a long period he was very pious. The patient’s more mature years were marked by a very unsatisfactory relation to his father, who, after repeated attacks of depression, was no longer able to conceal the pathological features of his character. All of the phenomena which the patient associated with the phase of his life that began with his naughtiness disappeared in about his eighth year.

1918
From the history of an infantile neurosis (1918).
Part III. The seduction and its immediate consequences.
A case history of seduction and its immediate con-sequences are discussed. When Freud’s patient was very small, his sister seduced him into sexual practices. His sister took hold of his penis and played with it. The phantasies that the patient had were meant to efface the memory of an event which later on seemed offensive to his masculine self-esteem. According to these phantasies it was not he who had played the passive part towards his sister, but he had been aggressive, had tried to see his sister undressed, had been rejected and punished, and had for that reason got into the rage which the family tradition talked of. The boy’s age at the time at which his sister began her seductions was 3Y4 years. He held aloof from her and her solicitations soon ceased. The patient envied her the respect which his father showed for her mental capacity and intellectual achievements, while he, intellectually inhibited since his neurosis, had to be content with a lower estimation. But he tried to win, instead of her, his nurse, Nanya. He began to play with his penis in Nanya’s presence but Nanya disillusioned him and threatened castration. His sexual life which was beginning to come under the sway of the genital zone, gave way before an external obstacle, and was thrown back by its influence into an earlier phase of pregenital organization. At the suppression of his masturbation, the boy’s sexual life took on a sadistic anal character. There was an intense and constant ambivalence in the patient, shown in the development of both members of the pairs of contrary component instincts. After the refusal by his Nanya, his libidinal expectation detached itself from her and began to contemplate his father as a sexual object. By bringing his naughtiness forward he was trying to force punishments and beatings out of his father, and in that way to obtain from him the masochistic sexual satisfaction that he desired. The signs of alteration in the patient’s character were not accompanied by any symptoms of anxiety until after the occurrence of a particular event (wolf dream).

1918
From the history of an infantile neurosis (1918).
Part IV. The dream and the primal scene. The dream of Freud’s patient in relation to the primal scene is discussed. The patient dreamed that the bedroom window opened and he saw 6 or 7 white wolves in the walnut tree outside the window. In great terror, evidently of being eaten up, he screamed and woke up. Interpretation of this dream was a task which lasted several years. The only piece of action in the dream was the opening of the window. The wolves sat quite still and without making any movement on the branches of the tree. He had always connected this dream with the recollection that during these years of his childhood he was most tremendously afraid of the picture of a wolf in a book of fairy tales. What sprang into activity that night out of the chaos of the dreamer 5 unconscious memory traces was the picture of copulation between his parents, copulation in circumstances which were not entirely usual and were especially favorable for observation. The child’s age at the date of the observation was established as being about 1-1/2 years. The postures which he saw his parents adopt had the man upright, and the woman bent down like an animal. He thought that the posture of the wolf in the fairy tale The Wolf and the Seven Little Goats, might have reminded him of that of his father during the constructed primal scene. At all events, the picture became the point of departure for further manifestations of anxiety. His anxiety was a repudiation of the wish for sexual satisfaction from his father, the trend which had put the dream into his head. The form taken by the anxiety, the fear of him being eaten by the wolf, was only the transposition of the wish to be copulated with by his father, that is, to be given sexual satisfaction in the same way as his mother. His last sexual aim, the passive attitude towards his father, succumbed to repression, and a fear of his father appeared in its place in the shape of the wolf phobia. His mother took the part of the castrated wolf, which let the others climb upon it; his father took the part of the wolf that climbed. He had identified with his castrated mother (no penis) during the dream and was fighting against the fact. His masculinity protested against being castrated (like Mother) in order to be sexually satisfied by Father. It was not only a single sexual current that started from the primal scene but a whole set of them.

1918
From the history of an infantile neurosis (1918).
Part V. A few discussions. Scenes from early infancy, such as those brought up by an exhaustive analysis of neuroses, are not reproductions of real occurrences. They are products of the imagination, which are intended to serve as some kind of symbolic representation of real wishes and interests, and which owe their origin to a regressive tendency, to a turning away from the tasks of the present. The influence of childhood makes itself felt at the beginning of the formation of a neurosis, since it plays a decisive part in determining whether and at what point the individual shall fail to master the real problems of life. The occurrence of a neurotic disorder in the fourth and fifth years of childhood proves, that infantile experiences are in a position to produce a neurosis. In the case of Freud’s patient, the content of the primal scene is a picture of sexual intercourse between the boy’s parents in a posture especially favorable for certain observations. Shortly before his dream, the boy was taken to visit flocks of sheep, and there he saw large white dogs and probably also observed them copulating. What probably supervened during the expectant excitement of the night of his dream was the transference on to his parents of his recently acquired memory picture, with all its details, and it was only thus that the powerful emotional effects which followed were made possible. The transference from the copulating dogs on to his parents was accomplished not by means of his making an inference accompanied by words but by his searching out in his memory a real scene in which his parents had been together and which could be coalesced with the situation of the copulation.

1918
From the history of an infantile neurosis (1918).
Part VI. The obsessional neurosis. Obsessional child neurosis is discussed. When the patient was 4_ years old, and as his state or irritability and apprehensiveness had not improved, his mother determined to make him acquainted with the Bible story in the hope of distracting and elevating him. His initiation into religion brought the previous phase to an end, but at the same time it led to the anxiety symptoms being replaced by obsessional symptoms. Up to then he had not been able to get to sleep easily because he had been afraid of having bad dreams; now he was obliged before he went to bed to kiss all the holy pictures in the room, to recite prayers, and to make innumerable signs of the cross upon himself and upon his bed. His childhood falls into the following epochs: 1) the earliest period up to the seduction when he was 3Y~ years old, during which the primal scene took place; 2) the period of the alteration in his character up to the anxiety dream (4 years old); 3) the period of the animal phobia up to his initiation into religion (4_ years old); and 4) the period of the obsessional neurosis up to a time later than his tenth year. After the rebuff from his Nanya and the consequent suppression of the beginnings of genital activity, his sexual life developed in the direction of sadism and masochism. His knowledge of the sacred story gave him a chance of sublimating his predominant masochistic attitude towards his father.

1918
From the history of an infantile neurosis (1918).
Part VII. Anal erotism and the castration complex.
Anal erotism in relation to the castration complex is discussed. The obsessional neurosis grew up on the basis of a sadistic anal constitution. For a long time before the analysis, feces had the significance of money for the patient. During his later illness he suffered from disturbances of his intestinal function. He found a great deal of enjoyment in anal jokes and exhibitions, and this enjoyment had been retained by him until after the beginning of his later illness. Under the influence of the primal scene he came to the conclusion that his mother had been made ill by what his father had done to her (intercourse); and his dread of having blood in his stool, of being as ill as his mother, was his repudiation of being identified with her in this sexual scene. But the dread was also a proof that in his later elaboration of the primal scene he had put himself in his mother’s place and had envied her this relation with his father. The organ by which his identification with women, his passive homosexual attitude to men, was able to express itself was the anal one. The disorders in the function of this zone had acquired the significance of feminine impulses of tenderness, and they retained it during the later illness as well. He rejected castration, and held to his theory of intercourse by the anus. His identification of his father with the castrator became important as being the source of an intense unconscious hostility towards him and of a sense of guilt which reacted against it.

1918
From the history of an infantile neurosis (1918).
Part VIII. Fresh material from the primal period-Solution.
It happens in many analyses that as one approaches their end new recollections emerge which have hitherto been kept carefully concealed. Early in the analysis, the patient told Freud of a memory of the period in which his naughtiness had been in the habit of suddenly turning into anxiety. He was chasing a beautiful big butterfly but suddenly, when the butterfly had settled on a flower, he was seized with a dreadful fear of the creature, and ran away screaming. In this anxiety scene, a recollection of some female person had been aroused. Behind the screen memory of the hunted butterfly, the memory of the nursery maid lay concealed. When the patient saw this girl scrubbing the floor, he had micturated in the room, and she had rejoined with a threat of castration. When he saw the girl on the floor engaged in scrubbing it, and kneeling down, with her buttocks projecting and her back horizontal, he was faced once again with the posture which his mother had assumed in the copulation scene. She became his mother to him; he was seized with sexual excitement; and, like his father, he behaved in a masculine way towards her. The disturbance of appetite, the wolf phobia, and the obsessional piety constituted the complete series of infantile disorders which laid down the predisposition for his neurotic breakdown after he had passed the age of puberty. Every neurosis in an adult is built upon a neurosis which has occurred in his childhood. The phase used by the patient to sum up the troubles of which he complained was that the world was hidden from him by a veil. The veil was tom in 1 situation only: at the moment when, as a result of an enema, he passed a motion through his anus, at which time he felt well again, and briefly saw the world clearly. He remembered that he had been born with a caul, thus the caul was the “veil” (birth veil) which hid him from the world. The phantasy of re-birth is discussed in relation to the birth veil.

1918
From the history of an infantile neurosis (1918).
Part IX. Recapitulations and problems.
The advantage of having a wealth of information about the patient’s childhood was purchased at the expense of disjointed analysis. The first sign of the patient’s sexual development is in the disturbance of his appetite. This earliest recognizable sexual organization is called the cannibalistic or oral phase, during which the original attachment of sexual excitation to the nutritional instinct still dominates the scene. The sadistic anal organization is regarded as a continuation and development of the oral one. The boy’s anal erotism was not particularly noticeable. His seduction continued to make its influence felt, by maintaining the passivity of his sexual aim and it transformed his sadism into the masochism which was its passive counterpart. The sadistic anal organization continued to exist during the phase of the animal phobia which set in, only it suffered an admixture of anxiety phenomena. The phobia came into existence on the level of the genital organization, and showed the relatively simple mechanism of an anxiety hysteria. The ego, by developing anxiety, was protecting itself against homosexual satisfaction but the process of repression left behind a trace. What became conscious was fear not of the father but of the wolf and the anxiety that was concerned in the formation of these phobias was a fear of castration. Religion achieved all the aims for the sake of which it is included in the education of the individual: It put a restraint on his sexual education, and lowered the importance of his family relationships.

1917
On transformations of instinct as exemplified in anal erotism (1917).
Observations made during psychoanalysis led Freud to suspect that the constant coexistence in any one of the 3 character traits of orderliness, parsimony, and obstinancy indicated an intensification of the anal erotic components in a subject’s sexual constitution, and that these modes of reaction, which were favored by his ego, had been established during the course of his development through the assimilation of his anal erotism. In the development of the libido in man, the phase of genital primacy must be preceded by a pregential organization in which sadism and anal erotism play the leading parts. It appears that, in products of the unconscious such as spontaneous ideas, phantasies, and symptoms, the concepts of feces (money, gift), baby, and penis are ill distinguished from one another and are easily interchangeable. If we penetrate deeply enough into the neurosis of a woman, we meet the repressed wish to possess a penis like a man. The female’s wish for a penis and the wish for a baby are fundamentally identical. The ultimate outcome of the infantile wish for a penis, in women in whom the determinants of a neurosis in later life are absent, is that it changes into the wish for a man, and thus puts up with the man as an appendage to the penis. This transformation, therefore, turns an impulse which is hostile to the female sexual function into one which is favorable to it. Anal erotism finds a narcissistic application in the production of defiance, which constitutes an important reaction on the part of the ego against demands made by other people. A baby is regarded as feces (“lumf”), as something which becomes detached from the body by passing through the bowel. Interest in feces is carried over first to interest in gifts, and then to interest in money.

1919
‘A child is being beaten’: A contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions (1919).
Parts I, II, & III.
People who seek analytic treatment for hysteria or an obsessional neurosis often confess to having indulged in the phantasy: A child is being beaten. The phantasy has feelings of pleasure attached to it, and on their account the patient has reproduced it on innumerable occasions in the past or may even still be doing so. At the climax of the imaginary situation there is almost invariably a masturbatory satisfaction. At first this takes place voluntarily, but later on it does so in spite of the patient’s efforts, and with the characteristics of an obsession. The first phantasies of the kind are entertained very early in life: before school age, and not later than in the fifth or sixth year. This phantasy is cathected with a high degree of pleasure and has its issue in an act of pleasurable autoerotic satisfaction. A phantasy of this kind, arising in early childhood and retained for the purpose of autoerotic satisfaction, can be regarded as a primary trait of perversion. One of the components of the sexual function has developed in advance of the rest, has made itself prematurely independent, has undergone fixation and in consequence been withdrawn from the later processes of development, and has in this way given evidence of a peculiar and abnormal constitution in the individual. If the sexual component which has broken loose prematurely is the sadistic one, then we may expect that its subsequent repression will result in a disposition to an obsessional neurosis. Between the ages of 2 and 4 or 5, the congenital libidinal factors are first awakened. The beating phantasies appear toward the end of this period or after its termination. Analysis shows that these beating phantasies have a hysterical development that involves many transformations (as regards the phantasies’ relation to the author of the phantasy and as regards their object, content and significance). In the first phase of beating phantasies among girls the child beaten is never the one producing the phantasy but is most often a brother or sister. It is always an adult that is beating the child in all these phantasies. The first phase is completely represented in the phrase ‘My father is beating the child.’ The second (and most important) phase can be stated as ‘I am being beaten by my father.’ The third involves a phantasy with strong and unambiguous sexual excitement attached to it, thus providing a means for masturbatory satisfaction.

1919
‘A child is being beaten’: A contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions (1919).
Parts IV & V.
If analysis is carried through the early period to which the beating phantasies are referred and from which they are recollected, it shows us that the child is involved in the agitations of its parental complex. The affections of the girl are fixed on her father. The first phase (sadism) of the beating phantasy in which another disliked sibling is beaten by the father gratifies the child’s jealousy and is dependent upon the erotic side of the child’s life, but is also powerfully reinforced by the child’s egoistic interest. The phantasy of the second phase, being beaten by the father is a direct expression of the girl’s sense of guilt: the phantasy therefore has become masochistic. A sense of guilt is invariably the main factor that transforms sadism into masochism; another factor is the love impulse. This phantasy is not only the punishment for the forbidden genital relation, but also the regressive substitute for that relation, and from this latter source, it derives the libidinal excitation which is attached to it, and which finds its source, it derives the libidinal excitation which is attached to it, and which finds its outlet in masturbatory acts. The third phase of the beating phantasy is again sadistic. A perversion in childhood may become the basis for the construction of a perversion having a similar sense and persisting throughout life, one which consumes the subject’s whole sexual life. Masochism is not the manifestation of a primary instinct, but originates from sadism which has been turned round upon the self, by means of regression from an object to the ego. People who harbor phantasies of this kind develop a special sensitiveness and irritability towards anyone whom they can include in the class of fathers. They are easily offended by a person of this kind, and in that way bring about the realization of the imagined situation of being beaten by their father.

1919
‘A child is being beaten’: A contribution to the study of the origin of sexual perversions (1919).
Part VI.
The little girl’s beating phantasy passes through 3 phases, of which the first and third are consciously remembered. The 2 conscious phases appear to be sadistic; the middle and unconscious one is masochistic in nature; it consists in the child’s being beaten by her father, and it carries with it libidinal charge and a sense of guilt. In the first and third phantasies, the child who is being beaten is someone other than the subject; in the middle phase it is the child herself; in the third phase it is usually boys who are being beaten. The person who does the beating is the father, replaced later on by a substitute taken from the class of fathers. The unconscious phantasy of the middle phase has a genital significance and develops by means of repression and regression out of an incestuous wish to be loved by the father. There are only a few male cases with an infantile beating phantasy that do not have some other gross injury to their sexual activities. They include persons who can be described as masochists, in the sense of being sexual perverts. These men invariably transfer themselves into the part of a woman, while their masochistic attitude coincides with a feminine one. In the male phantasy, being beaten stands for being loved (in a genital sense). The boy’s beating phantasy is passive and is derived from a feminine attitude towards his father. Adler proposes, in his theory of the masculine protest, that every individual makes efforts not to remain on the inferior feminine line of development, and struggles towards the masculine line, from which satisfaction alone can be derived. The theory of psychoanalysis holds firmly to the view that the motive forces of repression must not be sexualized. No great change is effected by the repression of the original unconscious phantasy. Infantile sexuality, which is held under repression, acts as the chief motive force in the formation of symptoms; and the essential part of its content, the Oedipus complex, is the nuclear complex of neuroses. TOP

1920 to 1939

1923
The Ego and the id
Preface and Part I: Consciousness and what is unconscious.
The division of the psychical into what is conscious and what is unconscious is the fundamental premise of psychoanalysis; and it alone makes it possible for psychoanalysis to understand the pathological processes in mental life, which are as common as they are important, and to find a place for them in the framework of science. Being conscious is in the first place a purely descriptive term, resting on perception of the most immediate and certain character. A psychical element is not as a rule conscious for a protracted length of time. Very powerful mental processes or ideas exist which can produce all the effects in mental life that ordinary ideas do, though they themselves do not become conscious. The reason why such ideas cannot become conscious is that a certain force opposes them, that otherwise they could become conscious, and that it would then be apparent how little they differ from other elements which are admittedly psychical. The state in which the ideas existed before being made conscious is called repression, and we assert that the force which instituted the repression and maintains it is perceived as resistance during the work of analysis. We obtain our concept of the unconscious from the theory of repression. The latent, which is unconscious only descriptively, not in the dynamic sense we call preconscious; we restrict the term unconscious to the dynamically unconscious repressed. In each individual there is a coherent organization of mental processes called ego; consciousness is attached to this ego. The ego controls the approaches to motility and from this ego proceeds the repressions by means of which it is sought to exclude certain trends in the mind not merely from consciousness but also from other forms of effectiveness and activity. Resistance, which is also found in the ego, is unconscious, and behaves like the repressed. A part of the ego may be unconscious, and this unconsciousness belonging to the ego is not latent like the preconscious.

Part II: The ego and the id.
All our knowledge is invariably bound up with consciousness. We can come to know even the unconscious (Ucs) only by making it conscious. Consciousness is the surface of the mental apparatus. All perceptions which are received from without and from within are conscious (Cs). The real difference between a Ucs and a preconscious (Pcs) idea (thought) consists in that the former is carried out on some material which remains unknown, whereas the latter (the Pcs) is in addition brought into connection with word presentations. These word presentations are residues of memories; they were at one time perceptions, and like all mnemonic residues they can become conscious again. We think of the mnemonic residues as being contained in systems which are directly adjacent to the perceptual conscious (Pcpt Cs) system, so that the cathexes of those residues can readily extend from within on to the elements of the latter system. The distinction between Cs and Pcs has no meaning where feelings are concerned; the Pcs drops out and feelings are either Cs or Ucs. We can look upon an individual as a psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus the Pcpt system. Pictorially, the ego does not completely envelop the id, but only does so to the extent to which the system Pcpt forms its surface. The ego is not sharply separated from the id but part merges into it. The repressed ego merges into the id as well, and is merely a part of it. The ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world through the medium of the Pcpt Cs; in a sense it is an extension of the surface differentiation. The ego is first and foremost a body ego. Not only what is lowest but also what is highest in the ego can be unconscious.

Part III: The ego and the super-ego (ego ideal).
The ego ideal or superego is not firmly connected with consciousness. The transformation of an erotic object choice into an alteration of the ego is a method by which the ego can obtain control over the id. The transformation of object libido into narcissistic libido implies an abandonment of sexual aims. Behind the ego ideal there lies hidden an individual’s first and most important identification, his identification with the father in his own personal prehistory. In both sexes, the relative strength of the masculine and feminine sexual dispositions is what determines whether the outcome of the Oedipus situation shall be an identification with the father or with the mother. The broad general outcome of the sexual phase dominated by the Oedipus complex may be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of the 2 identifications of father identification and m6ther identification in some way united with each other. The modification of the ego retains its special position; it confronts the other contents of the ego as an ego ideal or superego. The superego is not simply a residue of the earliest object choices of the id; it also represents an energetic reaction formation against those choices. The ego ideal is the heir of the Oedipus complex. It is easy to show that the ego ideal answers to everything that is expected of the higher nature of man.

Part IV: The two classes of instincts.
Two classes of instincts are distinguished, one of which, the sexual instincts or Eros, is by far the more conspicuous and accessible to study. It comprises not merely the uninhibited sexual instinct proper and the instinctual impulses of an aim inhibited or sublimated nature derived from it, but also the self-preservative instinct. The second class of instincts is called the death instinct. It appears that, as a result of the combination of unicellular organisms into multicellular forms of life, the death instinct of the single cell can successfully be neutralized and the destructive impulses be diverted on to the external world through the instrumentality of a special organ. The sadistic component of the sexual instinct would be a classical example of a serviceable instinctual fusion and the sadism which has made itself independent as a perversion would be typical of a defusion. Love is regularly accompanied by hate (ambivalence); in human relationships, hate is frequently a fore-runner of love. It seems a plausible view that the displaceable and neutral energy, which is no doubt active both in the ego and in the id, proceeds from the narcissistic store of libido, that is desexualized Eros. This displaceable libido is employed in the service of the pleasure principle to obviate blockages and to facilitate discharge. This displaceable energy may also be described as sublimated energy. The transformation of erotic libido into ego libido involves an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualization.

Part V: the dependent relationships of the ego.
The ego is formed out of identifications which take the place of abandoned cathexes by the id. The first of these identifications, the superego, owes its special position in relation to the ego, to 2 factors I) it was the first identification and one which took place while the ego was still feeble, and 2) it is the heir to the Oedipus complex. The superego is always close to the id and can act as its representative towards the ego. Part of the sense of guilt normally remains unconscious, because the origin of conscience is intimately connected with the Oedipus complex, which belongs to the unconscious. A sense of guilt expresses itself differently under different conditions. The normal, conscious sense of guilt is based on the tension between the ego and the ego ideal. The sense of guilt is excessively strongly conscious in obsessional neurosis and melancholia but remains unconscious in hysteria. The obsessional neurotic, in contrast to the melancholic, never performs self-destruction. The id is totally nonmoral; the ego strives to be moral, and the superego can be super-moral and then become as cruel as only the id can be. The ego owes service to 3 masters and consequently, is menaced by 3 dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the superego. The great significance which the sense of guilt has in the neuroses makes it conceivable that common neurotic anxiety is reinforced in severe cases by the generating of anxiety between the ego and the superego (fear of castration, of conscience, of death). The id has no means of showing the ego either love or hate.

Appendix A: the descriptive and the dynamic unconscious.
Appendix B: The great reservoir of libido.
In the descriptive sense there are 2 kinds of unconscious: the latent unconscious and the repressed unconscious. Unconscious, in its dynamic sense, covers only one thing, the repressed unconscious. The fact that the latent unconscious is only descriptively unconscious does not imply that it is the only thing that is descriptively unconscious. In this book Freud speaks of the id as “the great reservoir of libido”. This appears to contradict his reference to the ego as such a reservoir in a number of other writings both before and after this. The contradiction is diminished if we consider other passages where he indicates that it is the undifferentiated ego-id that is the original “great reservoir” and that after differentiation the ego becomes a storage tank for narcissistic libido.

1923
Remarks on the theory and practice of dream-interpretation
Parts I -VI.In interpreting a dream there are several choices concerning technical procedures: 1) a chronological procedure in which the dreamer brings up his associations to the elements of the dream in the order in which those elements occurred; 2) starting from one particular element of the dream, for example, the most striking piece of it or the piece with the most sensory intensity; 3) asking the dreamer what events of the previous day are associated in his mind with the dream he has just described; and 4) leaving it to the dreamer to decide with which associations to the dream he shall begin. When the pressure of resistance is high, one may succeed in discovering what the things are with which the dream is concerned, but not what they mean. When the resistance is kept within moderate limits, the familiar picture of the work of interpretation comes into view: the dreamer’s associations begin by diverging widely from the manifest elements, so that a great number of subjects and ranges of ideas are touched on, after which, a second series of associations converge from these on to the dream thoughts that are being sought. Dreams from below are provoked by the strength of an unconscious (repressed) wish. Dreams from above correspond to thoughts or intentions of the day before which have contrived during the night to obtain reinforcement from repressed material that is debarred from the ego. The interpretation of a dream falls into 2 phases: the phase in which it is translated and the phase in which it is judged or has its value assessed. One should not let the second phase influence the work of the first phase. Deciding on the value of a correctly translated dream is difficult and all other indications, including those of waking life, must be taken into account.

1923
Remarks on the theory and practice of dream-interpretation
Parts VII & VIII. The question of the value to be assigned to dreams is intimately related to the other question of their susceptibility to influence from suggestion by the physician. The fact that the manifest content of dreams is influenced by the analytic treatment stands in no need of proof. Latent dream thoughts have to be arrived at by interpretation and can be influenced or suggested by the analyst. A portion of these latent dream thoughts correspond to preconscious thought formations, thought formations with which the dreamer might well have reacted to the physician’s remarks. They are perfectly capable of being conscious. One never exercises any influence on the mechanism of dream formation itself, on the dream work in the strict sense of the word. Every true dream contains indications of the repressed wishful impulses to which it owes the possibility of its formation. With these and with material which refers to scenes from the dreamer’s past, it is often difficult to prove that they are not the result of suggestion; but the way in which fragments fit together like a complicated jigsaw puzzle finally convinces us that this is not so. It may well be that dreams during psychoanalysis succeed in bringing to light what is repressed to a greater extent than dreams outside that situation. But it cannot be proved, since the 2 situations are not comparable: the employment of dreams in analysis is something very remote from their original purpose. Positive transference gives assistance to the compulsion to repeat.

1923
Remarks on the theory and practice of dream-interpretation
Part IX. Dreams that occur in a traumatic neurosis are the only genuine exceptions and punishment dreams are the only apparent exceptions to the rule that dreams are directed towards wish fulfillment. In the latter class of dreams we are met by the remarkable fact that actually nothing belonging to the latent dream thoughts is taken up into the manifest content of the dream. Something quite different appears instead, which must be described as a reaction formation against the dream thoughts, a rejection and complete contradiction of them. This must be ascribed to the critical agency of the ego which has been temporarily reestablished even during sleep, and which replaces the objectionable dream wish with a punishment dream. Astonishment is sometimes expressed at the fact that the dreamer’s ego can appear 2 or more times in the manifest dream, once as himself and again disguised behind the figures of other people. During the course of the construction of the dream, the secondary revision has evidently sought to obliterate this multiplicity of the ego, which cannot fit in with any possible scenic situation but it is reestablished by the work of interpretation. Separation of the ego from an observing, critical, punishing agency (an ego ideal) must be taken into account in the interpretation of dreams, and often accounts for the multiple appearances of the ego in the same dream.

1925
Some additional notes on dream-interpretation as a whole
(B). Moral responsibility for the content of dreams.
Moral responsibility for the content of dreams is discussed. The manifest content is a deception, a facade. When the content of the dream is spoken of, what must be referred to can only be the content of the preconscious thoughts and of the repressed wishful impulse which are revealed behind the facade of the dream by the work of interpretation. Our interest in the genesis of manifestly immoral dreams is greatly reduced when we find from analysis that the majority of dreams are revealed as the fulfillments of immoral, egoistic, sadistic, perverse or incestuous, wishful impulses. Dreams do not always offer immoral wish fulfillments, but often energetic reactions against them in the form of punishment dreams. In other words, the dream censorship can not only express itself in distortions and the generation of anxiety, but can go so far as to blot out the immoral subject matter completely and replace it by something else that serves as an atonement, though it allows one to see what lies behind. One must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one’s dreams. The ethical narcissism of humanity should rest content with the knowledge that the fact of distortion in dreams, as well as the existence of anxiety dreams and punishment dreams, afford just as clear evidence of his moral nature as dream interpretation gives of the existence and strength of his evil nature.

1925
Some additional notes on dream-interpretation as a whole
(C). The occult significance of dreams
The occult significance of dreams is discussed. There would seem to be 2 categories of dreams with a claim to being reckoned as occult phenomena: prophetic dreams and telepathic dreams. In Freud’s opinion, there is no validity to prophetic dreams. Telepathy is not a dream problem: our judgment upon whether it exists or not need not be based on a study of telepathic dreams. Freud believes that there may be some truth to the phenomenon of telepathy. He mentions a class of material which is exempt from doubts which are otherwise justified: unfulfilled prophecies by professional fortune tellers. An example is given in which a fortune teller predicted that a woman would give birth to 2 children by age 32. The woman remained childless but in analysis at age 43 it became evident that her dominant unconscious wish at the time of the prophecy had been to have 2 children before age 32 as her mother had done and thus to satisfy her wish for her own father by putting herself in her mother’s place. Freud concluded that the strongest unconscious wish had made itself manifest to the fortune teller by being directly transferred to him while his attention was being distracted by the performances he was going through. If there are such things as telepathic messages, the possibility cannot be dismissed of their reaching someone during sleep and coming to his knowledge in a dream.

1924
Neurosis and psychosis
Neurosis and psychosis are discussed. Neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and its id, whereas psychosis is the analogous outcome of a similar disturbance in the relations between the ego and the external world. All the analyses show that the transference neuroses originate from the ego’s refusing to accept a powerful instinctual impulse in the id or to help it to find a motor outlet, or from the ego’s forbidding that impulse the object at which it is aiming. In such a case the ego defends itself against the instinctual impulse by the mechanism of repression. The repressed material struggles against this fate and creates a substitute representation, the symptom. The ego finds its unity threatened and impaired by this intruder, and it continues to struggle against the symptom, just as it fended off the original instinctual impulse. The etiology common to the onset of psychoneurosis and of a psychosis always remains the same. It consists in a frustration, a nonfulfillment, of one of those childhood wishes which are forever undefeated and which are so deeply rooted in our phylogenetically determined organization. The pathogenic effect depends on whether the ego remains true to its dependence on the external world and attempts to silence the id, as in the transference neuroses, or whether it lets itself be overcome by the id and thus torn away from reality, as in the psychoses. A third group of illnesses, the narcissistic neuroses, are characterized by a conflict between the ego and the superego. The thesis that neuroses and psychoses originate in the ego’s conflicts with its various ruling agencies needs to be supplemented in one further point. One would like to know in what circumstances and by what means the ego can succeed in merging from such conflicts, which are certainly always present, without falling ill. This is a new field of research, in which economic considerations and the ego’s capacity to avoid a rupture by deforming itself will be 2 important factors.

1924
The loss of reality in neurosis and psychosis
The loss of reality in neurosis and psychosis is discussed. In a neurosis, the ego, in its dependence on reality, supresses a piece of the id, whereas in a psychosis, this same ego, in the service of the id, withdraws from a piece of reality. For a neurosis, the decisive factor would be the predominance of the influence of reality, whereas for a psychosis it would be the predominance of the id. In a psychosis, a loss of reality would necessarily be present, whereas in a neurosis, it would seem, this loss would be avoided. Every neurosis disturbs the patient’s relation to reality in some way and serves him as a means of withdrawing from reality. The neurosis consists in the processes which provide a compensation for the portion of the id that has been damaged. Neurosis is characterized as the result of a repression that has failed. When a psychosis comes into being, something analogous to the process in a neurosis occurs, though, of course, between different agencies of the mind. In neurosis, a piece of reality is avoided by a sort of flight, whereas in psychosis it is remodeled. In psychosis, the initial flight is succeeded by an active phase of remodeling; in neurosis, the initial obedience is succeeded by a deferred attempt at flight. Neurosis does not disavow reality, it only ignores it; psychosis disavows it and tries to replace it. In psychosis the transforming of reality is carried out upon the memory traces and ideas and judgments previously derived from reality and is continually being enriched with fresh perceptions. This task of procuring perceptions to correspond to the new reality is effected by means of hallucination. It is probable that in psychosis the rejected piece of reality constantly forces itself upon the mind as the repressed instinct does in neurosis. Distinctions between neurosis and psychosis are a result of the topographical difference in the initial situation for the pathogenic conflict, namely whether in it the ego yielded to its allegiance to the real world or to its dependence on the id.

1925
A note upon the ‘Mystic writing-pad’
The Mystic Writing Pad is a slab of dark brown resin or wax over which is laid a thin transparent sheet, the top end of which is firmly secured to the slab. The transparent sheet contains 2 layers, which can be detached from each other except at the top end. The upper layer is a transparent piece of celluloid. One writes with a pointed stylus upon the celluloid portion of the covering sheet which rests on the wax slab. If one wishes to destroy what has been written, all that is necessary is to raise the double covering sheet from the wax slab by a light pull. If, while the Mystic Pad has writing on it, the celluloid is cautiously raised from the waxed paper, the writing can be seen on the surface of the latter. The Pad provides not only a receptive surface that can be used over and over again, but also permanent traces of what has been written. The ‘Mystic writing pad’ is used as a concrete representation of Freud’s views on the functioning of the perceptual apparatus of the mind. The unusual capacity of the mental apparatus to contain an unlimited receptive capacity for new perceptions and nevertheless lay down permanent memory traces is divided between 2 different systems: A perceptual conscious system Pcpt. Cs.) which receives perceptions but retains no permanent trace of them, while the permanent traces of the excitations which have been received are preserved in ‘mnemonic systems’ lying behind the perceptual system. The perceptual apparatus consists of 2 layers, an extemal protective shield against stimuli whose task it is to diminish the strength of excitations coming in, and a surface behind it which receives the stimuli, namely the Pcpt Cs. The Pad solves the problem of combining the 2 functions (permanent and temporary memory) by dividing them between 2 separate but interrelated component parts or systems. The layer which receives the stimuli (Pcpt Cs.) forms no permanent traces; the foundations of memory come about in other adjoining systems.

1925
Negation
Negation is discussed. The content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness on condition that it is negated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed. To affirm or negate the content of thoughts is the task of the function of intellectual judgment. The function of judgment is concerned in the main with 2 sorts of decisions. It affirms or disaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it asserts or disputes that a presentation has an existence in reality. Judging is the intellectual action which decides the choice of motor action, which puts an end to the postponement due to thought and which leads over from thinking to acting. Judging is a continuation, along the lines of expediency, of the original process by which the ego took things into itself or expelled them from itself, according to the pleasure principle.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part I. Inhibitions reflect restrictions of ego functions.
The 2 concepts of inhibitions and symptoms are not upon the same plane. Inhibition does not necessarily have a pathological implication. A symptom actually denotes the presence of some pathological process. The sexual function is liable to a great number of disturbances which can be classed as simple inhibitions. Disturbances of the sexual function are brought about by a great variety of means: 1) the libido may simply be turned away; 2) the function may be less well carried out; 3) it may be hampered by having conditions attached to it, or modified by being diverted to other aims; 4) it may be prevented by security measures; 5) if it cannot be prevented from starting, it may be immediately interrupted by the appearance of anxiety; and 6) if it is nevertheless carried out, there may be a subsequent reaction of protest against it and an attempt to undo what has been done. The function of nutrition is most frequently disturbed by a disinclination to eat, brought about by a withdrawal of libido. In some neurotic conditions, locomotion is inhibited by a disinclination to walk or a weakness in walking. In inhibition in work, the subject feels a decrease in his pleasure in it or becomes less able to do it well. Inhibitions are described as resistances of the functions of the ego which have been either imposed as a measure of precaution or brought about as a result of an impoverishment of energy. Inhibitions are undertaken by the ego in order to avoid coming into conflict with the id or with the superego.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part II. Symptoms reflect intersystemic conflicts.
A symptom is a sign of, and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfaction which has remained in abeyance; it is a consequence of the process of repression. Repression proceeds from the ego when the latter refuses to associate itself with an instinctual cathexis which has been aroused in the id. The ego is able, by means of repression, to keep the idea which is the vehicle of the reprehensible impulse from becoming conscious. The ego is the seat of anxiety. In order for the ego to oppose an instinctual process in the id it has only to give a signal of unpleasure in order to enlist the aid of the pleasure principle in overpowering the id. The ego also obtains its influence in virtue of its intimate connections with the phenomenon of consciousness. The ego wards off internal and external dangers alike along identical lines. Just as the ego controls the path to action in regard to the external world, so it controls access to consciousness. In repression, it exercises its power in both directions, acting in the one manner upon the instinctual impulse itself and in the other upon the psychical representative of that impulse. Most regressions dealt with in therapeutic work are cases of after-pressure. A symptom arises from an instinctual impulse detrimentally affected by regression. The impulse finds expression through a substitute which is seduced, displaced, and inhibited. Freud showed that the ego can exert control over the id as well as be dependent on it. The same applied to the superego. He warned against making a “Weltanschauung” out of any one statement since conceptions in analysis are always open to revision.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part III. Relation of ego to the id and to symptoms.
The ego is the organized portion of the id. As a rule, the instinctual impulse which is to be repressed remains isolated. The initial act of repression is followed by a tedious or interminable sequel in which the struggle against the instinctual impulse is prolonged into a struggle against the symptom. In this secondary defensive struggle the ego presents 2 faces with contradictory expressions. One line of behavior, it adopts, springs from the fact that its very nature obliges it to make what must be regarded as an attempt at restoration or reconciliation. The presence of a symptom may entail a certain impairment of capacity, and this can be exploited to appease some demand on the part of the superego or to refuse some claim from the external world. In this way the symptom gradually comes to be the representative of important interests. In obsessional neurosis and paranoia the forms which the symptoms assume become very valuable to the ego because they obtain for it, not certain advantages, but a narcissistic satisfaction which it would otherwise be without. All of this results in the secondary gain from illness which follows a neurosis. The second line of behavior adopted by the ego is less friendly in character, since it continues in the direction of repression.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part IV. Anxiety produces repression.
An infantile hysterical phobia of animals, Little Hans’s phobia of horses, is presented. Little Hans refused to go out into the street because he was afraid that a horse would bite him. He was in the jealous and hostile Oedipus attitude towards his father, whom nevertheless he dearly loved. Here is a conflict due to ambivalence: a well-grounded love and a no less justifiable hatred directed towards one and the same person. Little Hans’s phobia must have been an attempt to solve this conflict. The instinctual impulse which underwent repression in Little Hans was a hostile one against his father. Little Hans alleged that what he was afraid of was that a horse would bite him. The idea of being devoured by the father is typical age-old childhood material. It has the familiar parallels in mythology and in the animal kingdom. Two instinctual impulses have been overtaken by repression, sadistic aggressiveness towards the father and a tender passive attitude to him. The formation of his phobia had had the effect of abolishing his affectionate object cathexis of his mother as well. The motive force of the repression was the fear of impending castration. His fear that a horse would bite him can be given the full sense of a fear that a horse would bite off his genitals, would castrate him. A comparison of the phobias presented by Wolf Man and that of Little Hans showed that, although there were marked differences in their histories, the outcome was the same. This was explained by examining the anxiety of the 2 patients. Anxiety was seen as response to fear of castration either seen as real or impending. It was this anxiety, occurring in the ego, which set the process of regression into motion which ultimately led to the phobia formation. Anxiety now had 2 sources: one from the id (disturbed libido), and the other from the ego.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part V. Defences other than repression.
Conversion hysteria exhibits no anxiety whatever. The formation of symptoms in conversion hysteria is obscure. It presents a manifold and varied picture with no uniform explanation available. The more common symptoms of conversion hysteria are motor paralyses, contractures, involuntary actions or discharges, pains, and hallucinations. They are cathectic processes which are either permanently maintained or intermittent. The symptoms belonging to the obsessional neuroses fall into 2 groups, each having an opposite trend. They are either prohibitions, precautions, and expiations or they are substitutive satisfactions which often appear in symbolic disguise. In enforcing regression, the ego scores its first success in its defensive struggle against the demands of the libido. It is perhaps in obsessional cases more than in normal or hysterical ones that the motive force of defense is the castration complex and that what is being fended off are the trends of the Oedipus complex. The reaction formations in the ego of the obsessional neurotic should be regarded as yet another mechanism of defense. Other defense mechanisms alluded to in this condition are: undoing, regression, isolation. Ambivalence is also described as contributing greatly to the formation of obsessional neurosis for some unknown reason. The chief task during the latency period seems to be the fending off of the temptation to masturbate. This struggle produces a series of symptoms which appear in a typical fashion in the most different individuals and which in general have the character of a ceremonial. The advent of puberty opens a decisive chapter in the history of an obsessional neurosis. The overstrict superego insists on the suppression of sexuality. In obsessional neurosis, the conflict is aggravated in 2 directions: the defensive forces become more intolerant and the forces that are to be fended off become more intolerable. Both effects are due to regression of the libido. Obsessional states which have no guilt attached are mentioned. These seem more closely related to the satisfaction of masochistic impulses.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part VI. Undoing and isolation.
There are 2 activities of the ego which form symptoms and which deserve special attention because they are surrogates of repression. The 2 activities are undoing what has been done and isolating. The first of these has a wide range of application. It is, as it were, negative magic, and endeavors, by means of motor symbolism, to blow away not merely the consequences of some event but the event itself. In obsessional neurosis the technique of undoing what has been done is first met within the diphasic symptoms in which one action is cancelled out by a second, so that it is as though neither action had taken place. This aim of undoing is the second underlying motive of obsessional ceremonials, the first being to take the rational precautions in order to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of some particular event. The second technique, isolating, is peculiar to obsessional neurosis. When something unpleasant has happened to the subject, or when he himself has done something which has a significance for his neurosis, he interpolates an interval during which nothing further must happen. It is especially difficult for an obsessional neurotic to carry out the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis. His ego is more watchful and makes sharper isolations, probably because of the high degree of tension due to conflict that exists between his superego and his id. In endeavoring to prevent associations and connections of thought, the ego is obeying one of the oldest and most fundamental commands of obsessional neurosis, the taboo on touching. The avoidance of touching is of paramount importance in this illness because it is the immediate aim of the aggressive as well as the loving object cathexes.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part VII. Anxiety is a signal of dangerous separation.
In animal phobias, the ego has to oppose a libidinal object cathexis c6inirig from the id, a cathexis that belongs either to the positive or negative Oedipus complex, because it believes that to give way to it would entail the danger of castration. The aggressive impulse flows mainly from the destructive instinct. As soon as the ego recognizes the danger of castration, it gives the signal of anxiety and inhibits, through the pleasure-un-pleasure agency, the impending cathectic process in the id. At the same time the phobia is formed. Now the castration anxiety is directed to a different object and expressed in a distorted form, so that the patient is afraid, not of being castrated by his father, but of being bitten by a horse or devoured by a wolf. Phobias have the character of a projection in that they replace an internal, instinctual danger by an external, perceptual one. The anxiety felt in animal phobias is an affective reaction on the part of the ego to danger; and the danger which is being signalled in this way is the danger of castration. A phobia generally sets in after a first anxiety attack has been experienced in specific circumstances, such as in the street or in a train or in solitude. Anxiety is a reaction to a situation of danger. It is obviated by the ego’s doing something to avoid that situation or to withdraw from it. Symptoms are then viewed as created so as to avoid a danger situation whose presence was signalled by the generation of anxiety. The narcissistic neuroses are explained in terms of a sexual factor being present, namely narcissism, which emphasizes the libidinal nature of the instinct of self-preservation. Since the unconscious can not conceive of its annihilation, and since the unconscious must contribute something to the formation of the narcissistic neuroses, then the fear of death must be analogous to the fear of castration. The ego responds to being abandoned by the protecting superego, the powers of destiny. Also, the protective shield against excessive amounts of external excitation is broken.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part VII. Anxiety reproduces feelings of helplessness.
Anxiety is an affective state. Analysis of anxiety states reveals the existence of: 1) a specific character of unpleasure, 2) acts of discharge, and 3) perceptions of those acts. Anxiety states are regarded as a reproduction of the trauma of birth. Anxiety arose originally as reaction to a state of danger. It is reproduced whenever the danger stage recurs. Only a few of the manifestations of anxiety in children are comprehensible to us. They occur, for instance, when a child is alone, or in the dark or when it finds itself with an unknown person instead of one to whom it is used. These 3 instances can be reduced to a single condition, namely, that of missing someone who is loved and longed for. The child’s mnemonic image of the person longed for is no doubt intensely cathected, probably in a hallucinatory way at first. But this has no effect; and now it seems as though the longing turns into anxiety. Economic disturbance caused by an accumulation of amounts of stimulation which need disposal is the real essence of the “danger”. The nonsatisfaction of a growing tension due to need against which the infant wants to be safeguarded repeats the danger situation of being born. From this point anxiety undergoes various transformations parallel to the various stages of libidinal development. The significance of the loss of object as a determinant of anxiety extends for a long period of time. The castration anxiety, belonging to the phallic phase, is also a fear of separation and is thus attached to the same determinant. In this case the danger is of being separated from one’s genitals. The next transformation is caused by the power of the superego. Castration anxiety develops into moral anxiety. Loss of love plays much the same part in hysteria as the threat of castration does in phobias and fear of the superego in obsessional neurosis. The present conception of anxiety is that of a signal given by the ego in order to affect the pleasure-unpleasure agency. There is no anxiety of the superego or id. The id only can be the site of processes which cause the ego to produce anxiety.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part IX. Relation between symptom formation and anxiety.
The relationship between the formation of symptoms and the generating of anxiety is considered. There are 2 very widely held opinions on this subject. One is that anxiety is itself a symptom of neurosis. The other is that there is a much more intimate relation between the 2. According to the second opinion, symptoms are only formed in order to avoid anxiety. Symptoms are created in order to remove the ego from a situation of danger. If the symptoms are prevented from being formed, the danger does in fact materialize. Symptom formation puts an end to the danger situation. The defensive process is analogous to the flight by means of which the ego removes itself from a danger that threatens it from outside. The defensive process is an attempt at flight from an instinctual danger. The study of the determinants of anxiety shows the defensive behavior of the ego transfigured in a rational light. Each danger situation corresponds to a particular period of life or developmental phase of the mental apparatus and is justifiable for it. A great many people remain infantile in their behavior in regard to danger and do not overcome determinants of anxiety which have grown out of date. Signs of childhood neuroses can be detected in all adult neurotics; however, all children who show those signs do not become neurotic in later life. It must be, therefore, that certain determinants of anxiety are relinquished and certain danger situations lose their significance as the individual becomes more mature. Moreover, some of these danger situations manage to survive into later times by modifying their determinants of anxiety so as to bring them up to date. Other determinants of anxiety, such as fear of the superego, are destined not to disappear at all.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part X. Repetition is the consequence of repression.
Anxiety is the reaction to danger. If the ego succeeds in protecting itself from a dangerous instinctual impulse through the process of repression, it has inhibited and damaged the particular part of the id concerned; but it has at the same time given it some independence and has renounced some of its own sovereignty. Among the factors that play a part in the causation of neuroses and that have created the conditions under which the forces of the mind are pitted against one another, 3 emerge into prominence: a biological, a phylogenetic, and a purely psychological factor. The biological factor is the long period of time during which the young of the human species is in a condition of helplessness and dependence. The existence of the phylogenetic factor is based only upon inference. We have been led to assume its existence by a remarkable feature in the development of the libido. The sexual life of man does not make a steady advance from birth to maturity, but after an early efflorescence up to the fifth year, it undergoes a very decided interruption; and it then starts on its course once more at puberty taking up again the beginnings broken off in early childhood. The third, psychological, factor resides in a defect of our mental apparatus which has to do precisely with its differentiation into an id and an ego, and which is therefore also attributable ultimately to the influence of the external world. The ego cannot protect itself from internal instinctual dangers as well as it can from reality. It acquiesces in the formation of symptoms in exchange for impairing the instinct.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part XI. Addenda: A. Modification of earlier views.
An important element in the theory of repression is the view that repression is not an event that occurs once but that it requires a permanent expenditure of energy. If this expenditure were to cease, the repressed impulse, which is being fed all the time from its sources, would on the next occasion, flow along the channels from which it had been forced away, and the repression would either fail in its purpose or would have to be repeated an indefinite number of times. It is because instincts are continuous in their nature that the ego has to make its defensive action secure by a permanent expenditure. This action undertaken to protect repression is observable in analytic treatment as resistance. Resistance presupposes what is called anticathexis. The resistance that has to be overcome in analysis proceeds from the ego, which clings to its anticathexes. Five types of resistance were noted: the ego resistances subdivided into regression resistance, transference resistance, and gain from illness; the id resistance i.e., the compulsion to repeat; the superego resistance, the sense of guilt or the need for punishment. The ego is the source of anxiety. Anxiety is the general reaction to situations of danger. The term defense is employed explicitly as a general designation for all the techniques which the ego makes use of in conflicts which may lead to a neurosis. Repression is retained for a special method of defense. The concept of defense covers all the processes that have the same purpose, the protection of the ego against instinctual demands. Repression is subsumed under it as a special case.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part XI. Addenda: B. Supplementary remarks on anxiety.
Anxiety has an unmistakable relation to expectation: it is anxiety about something. It has a quality of indefiniteness and lack of object. In precise words we use the word fear rather than anxiety if it has found an object. There are 2 reactions to real danger. One is an affective reaction, an outbreak of anxiety. The other is a protective action. A danger situation is a recognized, remembered, expected situation of helplessness. Anxiety is the original reaction to helplessness in the trauma and is reproduced later on in the danger situation as a signal for help. The ego, which experienced the trauma passively, now repeats it actively in a weakened version, in the hope of being able itself to direct its course. There seems to be a close connection between anxiety and neurosis because the ego defends itself against an instinctual danger with the help of the anxiety reaction just as it does against an external real danger; however, this line of defensive activity eventuates in a neurosis owing to an imperfection of the mental apparatus.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Part XI. Addenda. C. Anxiety, pain and mourning.
The situation of the infant’s missing its mother is not a danger situation but a traumatic one. It is a traumatic situation if the infant happens to be feeling a need which its mother should be the one to satisfy. It turns into a danger situation if this need is not present at the moment. The first determinant of anxiety, which the ego itself introduces, is loss of perception of the object. Later on, experiences teaches the child that the object can be present but angry with it; and then loss of love from the object becomes a new and much more enduring danger and determinant of anxiety. Pain is the actual reaction to loss of an object while anxiety is the reaction to the danger which the loss entails. Pain occurs in the first instance and as a regular thing whenever a stimulus which impinges on the periphery breaks through the devices of the protective shield against stimuli and proceeds to act like a continuous instinctual stimulus, against which muscular action, which is as a rule effective because it withdraws the place that is being stimulated from the stimulus, is powerless. When there is physical pain, a high degree of what may be termed narcissistic cathexis of the painful place occurs. This cathexis continues to increase and tends to empty the ego. The transition from physical to mental pain corresponds to a change from narcissistic cathexis to object cathexis. Mourning occurs under the influence of reality testing; for the latter function demands categorically from the bereaved person that he should separate himself from the object, since it no longer exists. Mourning is entrusted with the task of carrying out this retreat from the object in all those situations in which it was the recipient of a high degree of cathexis.

1926
Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety
Appendix A: ‘Repression’ and ‘defence’.
Repression and defense are discussed. Both repression and defense occurred very freely during Freud’s Breuer period. The first appearance of repression was in the Preliminary Communication, and of defense in the first paper on The Neuropsychoses of Defence. In the Studies on Hysteria, repression appeared about a dozen times and defense somewhat more often than that. After the Breuer period, there was a falling off in the frequency of the use of defense. It was not dropped entirely, however. But repression was already beginning to predominate and was almost exclusively used in the Dora case history and the Three Essays. Soon after this, attention was explicitly drawn to the change, in a paper on sexuality in the neuroses, dated June, 1905. After 1905, the predominance of repression increased still more. But it was not long before the usefulness of defense as a more inclusive term than repression began unobtrusively to make its appearance, particularly in the metapsychological papers. Thus, the vicissitudes of the instincts, only one of which is repression, were regarded as modes of defense against them and projection was spoken of as a mechanism or means of defense.

1926
The question of lay analysis. Conversations with an impartial person. Editor’s note.
In the late spring of 1926 proceedings were begun in Vienna against Theodor Reik, a prominent nonmedical member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. He was charged, on information laid by someone whom he had been treating analytically, with a breach of an old Austrian law against quackery, a law which made it illegal for a person without a medical degree to treat patients. Freud intervened energetically. He argued the position privately with an official of high standing, and went on to compose the pamphlet, The Question of Lay Analysis, for immediate publication. The publication of Freud’s booklet brought into the foreground the strong differences of opinion on the permissibility of nonmedical psychoanalysis which existed within the psychoanalytic societies themselves. From early times, Freud held the opinion that psychoanalysis was not to be regarded as purely a concern of the medical profession.

1926
The question of lay analysis
Introduction & Part I.
The question of lay analysis is discussed. Layman is equivalent to nondoctor. In Germany and America, every patient can have himself treated how and by whom he chooses, and anyone who chooses can handle any patients. The law does not intervene until it is called in to expiate some injury done to the patient. But in Austria, there is a preventive law, which forbids non-doctors from undertaking the treatment of patients, without waiting for its outcome. A patient recognizes that he is ill and goes to doctors, by whom people expect nervous disorders to be removed. The doctors lay down the categories into which these complaints are divided. They diagnose them under different names: neurasthenia, psychasthenia, phobias, obsessional neurosis, hysteria. They examine the organs which produce the symptoms and find them healthy. They recommend interruptions in the patient’s accustomed mode of life and these means bring about temporary improvements, or no results at all. Eventually the patients hear that there are people who are concerned quite specially with the treatment of such complaints and start an analysis with them. The analyst and the patient talk to each other. We call on the patient to be completely straight. forward with his analyst, to keep nothing back intentionally that comes into his head, and then to put aside every reservation that might prevent his reporting certain thoughts or memories.

1926
The question of lay analysis
Part II.
The question of lay analysis is discussed. We picture the unknown apparatus which serves the activities of the mind as being really like an instrument constructed of several parts, agencies, each of which performs a particular function and which have a fixed spatial relation to one another. We recognize in human beings a mental organization which is interpolated between their sensory stimuli and the perception of their somatic needs on the one hand and their motor acts on the other, and which meditates between them for a particular purpose. This organization is called their ego. There is another mental region, more extensive, more imposing and more obscure than the ego: this is called the id. We suppose that the ego is the layer of the mental apparatus (of the id) which has been modifie4 by the influence of the external world. The ego and the id differ greatly from each other in several respects. The rules governing the course of mental acts are different in the ego and the id; the ego pursues different purposes and by other methods. Everything that happens in the id is, and remains, unconscious; processes in the ego can become conscious. But not all of them are, nor always, nor necessarily; and large portions of the ego can remain permanently unconscious. The ego is the external, peripheral layer of the id. We require that everyone who wants to practice analysis on other people shall first himself submit to an analysis.

1926
The question of lay analysis
Part III.
The question of lay analysis is discussed. The bodily needs, in so far as they represent an instigation to mental activity, are given the name of instincts. These instincts fill the id: all the energy in the id originates from them. The forces in the ego are derived from those in the id. These instincts want satisfaction. If the id’s instinctual demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise. The instincts in the id press for immediate satisfaction at all costs, and in that way they achieve nothing or even bring about appreciable damage. It is the task of the ego to guard against such mishaps, to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world. There is no natural opposition between ego and id. If the ego experiences an instinctual demand from the id which it would like to resist but which it cannot control, the ego treats the instinctual danger as if it were an external one; it makes an attempt at flight. The ego institutes a repression of the instinctual impulses. The ego has made an attempt to suppress certain portions of the id in an inappropriate manner, this attempt has failed and the id has taken its revenge in the neurosis. A neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and the id. The therapeutic aim is to restore the ego and give it back command over the id. The ego is urged to correct the repressions. This involves analyzing back to childhood through the patient’s symptoms, dreams and free associations.

1926
The question of lay analysis
Part IV.The question of lay analysis is discussed. Analysis is founded on complete candor. This obligation to candor puts a grave moral responsibility on the analyst as well as on the patient. Factors from sexual life play an extremely important, a dominating, perhaps even a specific part among the causes and precipitating factors of neurotic illness. The recognition of sexuality has become the strongest motive for people’s hostility to analysis. Sexual life is not simply something spicy; it is also a serious scientific problem. Analysis has to go back into the early years of the patient’s childhood, because the decisive repressions have taken place then, while his ego was feeble. Sexual instinctual impulses accompany life from birth onwards, and it is precisely in order to fend off those instincts that the infantile ego institutes repressions. The sexual function undergoes a complicated process of development. If obstacles arise later on to the exercise of the sexual function, the sexual urge, the libido, is apt to hark back to the earlier point of fixation. The diphasic onset of sexual life has a great deal to do with the genesis of neurotic illnesses. It seems to occur only in human beings, and it is perhaps one of the determinants of the human privilege of becoming neurotic. The children’s 2 excretory needs are cathected with sexual interest. It takes quite a long time for children to develop feelings of disgust. Children regularly direct their sexual wishes towards their nearest relatives. It is the sexual wishes towards the parent of the opposite sex with concomitant hostility felt toward the other parent which constitutes the basis for the Oedipus complex. The revival of this complex in puberty may have serious consequences. The child’s first choice of the object therefore is an incestuous one. The evidence for this is supported through the study of history, mythology, and anthropology.

1926
The question of lay analysis
Part V.
The question of lay analysis is discussed. The analyst infers, from what the patient says, the kind of impressions, experiences and wishes which he has repressed because he came across them at a time when his ego was still feeble and was afraid of them instead of dealing with them. When the patient has learned this, he puts himself back in the old situations and manages better. The limitations to which his ego was tied then disappear, and he is cured. The material has to be interpreted at the right moment which is when the patient has come so near the repressed material that only a few more stages are needed to get to it. It can be shown that patients profess a desire to get well, but on the other hand do not want to get well. This results from the “gain from illness.” This represents one of the resistances to psychoanalysis. There are 3 other resistances: the sense of guilt and need for punishment stemming from the superego; the need for the instinctual impulse to find satisfaction along a path it has always known, an id resistance; repression resistance coming from the ego. The emotional relation which the patient adopts towards the analysis is of a quite peculiar nature. This emotional relation is in the nature of falling in love. This love is of a positively compulsive kind. It has taken the place of the neurosis. The patient is repeating, in the form of falling in love with the analyst, mental experiences which he has already been through once before; he has transferred on to the analyst mental attitudes that were lying ready in him and were intimately connected with his neurosis. This transference love, because of its being really a pathological love, acts as a resistance to analysis (and is thus the fifth major resistance in analysis). He is also repeating his old defensive actions. The whole skill in handling the transference is devoted to bringing it about. There are 2 Institutes at which instruction in psychoanalysis is given. Anyone who has passed through a course of instruction, who has been analyzed himself, who has learned the delicate technique of psychoanalysis (the art of interpretation, fighting resistances, handling the transference), is no longer a layman in the field of psychoanalysis.

1926
The question of lay analysis
Part VI.
The question of lay analysis is discussed. It seems as if the neuroses are a particular kind of illness and analysis is a particular method of treating them, a specialized branch of medicine. However, doctors have no historical claim to the sole possession of analysis. In his medical school, a doctor receives a training which is more or less the opposite of what he would need as a preparation for psychoanalysis, particularly since medical education gives a false and detrimental attitude towards the neuroses. The activity of an untrained analyst does less harm to his patients than that of an unskilled surgeon. Freud maintains that no one should practice analysis who has not acquired the right to do so by a particular training. It is said that the authorities, at the instigation of the medical profession, want to forbid the practice of analysis by laymen altogether. Such a prohibition would also affect the nonmedical members of the Psychoanalytic Society, who have enjoyed an excellent training and have perfected themselves greatly by practice. According to Austrian law, a quack (layman) is anyone who treats patients without possessing a state diploma to prove he is a doctor. Freud proposes another definition: a quack is anyone who undertakes a treatment without possessing the knowledge and capacities necessary for it.

1926
The question of lay analysis
Part VII.
The question of lay analysis is discussed. A medical doctor has a decided advantage over a layman in analytic practice regarding the question of diagnosis. The patient may exhibit the external picture of a neurosis, and yet it may be something else: the beginning of an incurable mental disease or the preliminary of brain destruction. If a later physical illness can bring about an enfeeblement of the ego then that illness can also produce a neurosis. If an analyst, medical or otherwise, suspects organic illness, Freud maintains that the analyst should call in the help of a medical doctor. He lists 3 reasons for it: 1) it is not a good plan for a combination of organic and psychical treatments to be carried out by the same person; 2) the relation in the transference may make it inadvisable for the analyst to examine the patient physically; and 3) the analyst has every reason for doubting whether he is unprejudiced, since his interests are directed so intensely to the psychical factors. For the patient, it is a matter of indifference whether the analyst is a doctor or not, provided only that the danger of his condition being misunderstood is excluded by the necessary medical report before the treatment begins and on some possible occasions during the course of it. Analytic training cuts across the field of medical education, but neither includes the other. Freud did not believe that a medical education was necessary for an analyst. He did not consider it desirable for an analyst. He did not consider it desirable for psychoanalysis to be swallowed up by medicine and be subsumed as a subordinate area of psychiatry. The training of social workers analytically to help combat neuroses was envisioned. He thought that the internal development of psychoanalysis could never be affected by regulation or prohibition.

1927
The question of lay analysis
Postscript. (1927).
The charge against Dr. Theodor Reik, in the Vienna Courts, was dropped. The prosecution’s case was too weak, and the person who brought the charge as an aggrieved party proved an untrustworthy witness. Freud’s main thesis in The Question of Lay Analysis was that the important question is whether an analyst possesses a medical diploma but whether he has had the special training necessary for the practice of analysis. A scheme of training for analysts has still to be created. It must include elements from the mental sciences, from psychology, the history of civilization and sociology, as well as from anatomy, biology, and the study of evolution. Psychoanalysis is a part of psychology; not of medical psychology, not of the psychology of morbid processes, but simply of psychology. He enjoins his American colleagues not to exclude lay analysts from receiving training since this might interest them in raising their own ethical and intellectual level while gaining influence over them so as to try and prevent their unscrupulous practices.

1927
The future of an illusion
Editor’s note (1961) and
Part I. Civilization rests upon renunciation of instinctual wishes.

The Future of an illusion began a series of studies which were to be Freud’s major concern for the rest of his life. Human civilization presents 2 aspects to the observer. It includes all the knowledge and capacity that men have acquired in order to control the forces of nature and extract its wealth for the satisfaction of human needs, and, all the regulations necessary in order to adjust the relations of men to one another and especially the distribution of the available wealth. One gets an impression that civilization is something which was imposed on a resisting majority by a minority which understood how to obtain possession of the means to power and coercion. It is only through the influence of individuals who can set an example and whom masses recognize as their leaders that they can be induced to perform the work and undergo the renunciations on which the existence of civilization depends. All is well if these leaders are persons who possess superior insight into the necessities of life and who have risen to the height of mastering their own instinctual wishes. But there is a danger that in order not to lose their influence they may give way to the mass more than it gives way to them, and it therefore seems necessary that they will be independent of the mass by having means to power at their disposal.

Part II. Consequences of instinctual renunciation.
Part III. In what does the peculiar value of religious ideas lie.
Every civilization rests on a compulsion to work and a renunciation of instinct and therefore inevitably provokes opposition from those affected by these demands. The fact that an instinct cannot be satisfied is a frustration. The regulation by which this frustration is established is called a prohibition, and the condition which is produced by this prohibition is called a privation. The privations which affect everyone include the instinctual wishes of incest, cannibalism, and lust for killing. People will be only too readily inclined to include among the psychical assets of a culture its ideals. The narcissistic satisfaction provided by the cultural ideal rests upon pride in what has already been successfully achieved and is also among the forces which are successful in combating the hostility to culture within the cultural unit. A different kind of satisfaction is afforded by art to the participants in a cultural unit; it offers substitutive satisfaction for the oldest and still most deeply felt cultural renunciation. A store of religious ideas was created, born from man’s need to make his helplessness tolerable and built up from the material of memories of the helplessness of his own childhood and the childhood of the human race. The possession of these ideas protects him in 2 directions, against the dangers of nature and Fate, and against the injuries that threaten him from human society itself.

Part IV. Origins of religion.
Freud tried to show that religious ideas have arisen from the same need as have all the other achievements of civilization: from the necessity of defending oneself against the crushingly superior force of nature. To this, a second motive was added: the urge to rectify the shortcomings of civilization which made themselves painfully felt. When the growing individual finds that he is destined to remain a child forever, that he can never do without protection against strange superior powers, he lends those powers the features belonging to the figure of his father; he creates for himself the gods whom he dreads, whom he seeks to propitiate, and whom he nevertheless entrusts with his own protection. Thus his longing for a father is a motive identical with his need for protection against the consequences of his human weakness. The defense against childish helplessness is what lends its characteristic features to the adult’s reaction to the helplessness which he has to acknowledge, a reaction which is precisely the formation of religion.

Part V. The psychological significance of religious ideas.
Part VI. Religious ideas are illusions.
Religious ideas are teachings and assertions about facts and conditions of external or internal reality which tell one something one has not discovered for oneself and which lay claim to one’s belief. Since they give us information about what is most important and interesting to us in life, they are particularly highly prized. Religious teachings base their claim to belief firstly because they were already believed by our primal ancestors; secondly, we possess proofs which have been handed down to us from these same primeval times; and thirdly, it is forbidden to raise the question of their authentication at all. Illusions are derived from human wishes. Freud maintains that religious doctrines are psychological illusions and are therefore insusceptible of proof.

Part VII. Relations between civilization and religion.
Religion has performed great services for human civilization. It has contributed much, but not enough, towards the taming of the asocial instincts. It has ruled human society for many thousands of years and has had time to show what it can achieve. If it had succeeded in making the majority of mankind happy, in comforting them, in reconciling them to life and in making them into vehicles of civilization, no one would dream of attempting to alter the existing conditions. However, there is an appalling large number of people who are dissatisfied with civilization and unhappy with it. Civilization has little to fear from educated people and brain workers. In them, the replacement of religious motives for civilized behavior by other, secular motives would proceed unobtrusively; moreover, such people are to a large extent themselves vehicles of civilization. But it is another matter with the great mass of the uneducated and oppressed, who have every reason for being enemies of civilization. Either these dangerous masses must be held down most severely and kept most carefully away from any chance of intellectual awakening, or else the relationship between civilization and religion must undergo a fundamental revision.

Part VIII. Religion is a substitute for rationality.
When civilization laid down the commandment that a man shall not kill the neighbor whom he hates or who is in his way or whose property he covets, this was clearly done in the interest of man’s communal existence, which would not otherwise be practicable. The primal father was the original image of God, the model on which later generations have shaped the figure of God. God actually played a part in the genesis of that prohibition; it was His influence, not any insight into social necessity, which created it. Men knew that they had disposed of their father by violence, and in their reaction to that impious deed, they determined to respect his will thence forward. The store of religious ideas includes not only wish fulfillments but important historical recollections. The analogy between religion and obsessional neurosis has been repeatedly demonstrated. Many of the peculiarities and vicissitudes in the formation of religion can be understood in that light. It is proposed that certain religious doctrines should cease to be put forward as the reasons for the precepts of civilization. The religious teachings are viewed as neurotic relics and Freud states that the time has come for replacing the effects of repression by the results of the rational operation of the intellect.

Part IX. Is rationality possible.
Part X. Relation of religion to science.
A believer is bound to the teachings of religion by certain ties of affection. It is certainly senseless to begin by trying to do away with religion by force and at a single blow. Religion is comparable to a childhood neurosis, and just as so many children grow out of their similar neurosis, so mankind will surmount this neurotic phase. The primacy of the intellect lies in a distant future, but probably not in an infinitely distant one. It will presumably set for itself the same aims as those whose realization you expect from your God, namely, the love of man and the decrease of suffering. Our mental apparatus has been developed precisely in the attempt to explore the external world, and it must therefore have realized in its structure some degree of expediency. It is itself a constituent part of the world which we set to investigate, and it readily admits of such an investigation. The task of science is fully covered if we limit it to showing how the world must appear to us in consequence of the particular character of our organization. The ultimate findings of science, precisely because of the way in which they are acquired, are determined not only by our organization but by the things which have affected that organization. The problem of the nature of the world without regard to our percipient mental apparatus is an empty abstraction, devoid of practical interest. Science is no illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere.

1930
Civilization and its discontents
1930
Civilization and its discontents
Part I. Man’s need for religion arises from feelings of helplessness.
It is impossible to escape the impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement, that they seek power, success and wealth for themselves and admire them in others, and that they underestimate what is of true value in life. However, we are in danger of forgetting how variegated the human world and its mental life are. One objection to Freud’s treatment of religion as an illusion was that he had not properly appreciated the true source of religious sentiments, which were in an oceanic feeling of something limitless, of being one with the external world as a whole. The genetic explanation of such a feeling concludes that originally the ego includes everything and later it separates an external world from itself. Our present ego feeling is only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive, all embracing feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it. Thus, although we are willing to acknowledge that the “oceanic” feeling exists in many people, it is not the origin of the religious attitude, which can be traced back to the feeling of infantile helplessness.

1930
Civilization and its discontents
Part II. Man copes with unhappiness through diversion, substitution and intoxication.
The question of the purpose of human life has been raised countless times; it has never yet received a satisfactory answer. Men strive after happiness. This endeavor has two sides: it aims at an absence of pain and unpleasure, and at the experiencing of strong feelings of pleasure. One of the methods of averting suffering is the chemical one, intoxication. Another technique is the employment of displacements of libido which our mental apparatus permits of and through which its function gains so much in flexibility. In another procedure, satisfaction is obtained from illusions, which are recognized as such without the discrepancy between them and reality being allowed to interfere with enjoyment. Another procedure regards reality as the sole enemy and as the source of all suffering, with which it is impossible to live, so that one must break off all relations with it if one is to be happy in any way. Happiness in life can be predominantly sought in the enjoyment of beauty. The man who is predominantly erotic will give first preference to his emotional relationships to other people; the narcissistic man, who inclines to be self-sufficient, will seek his main satisfactions in his internal mental processes; the man of action will never give up the external world on which he can try out his strength. Religion restricts the play of choice and adaptation, since it imposes equally on everyone its own path to the acquisition of happiness and protection from suffering.

1930
Civilization and its discontents
Part III. Man’s conflict with civilization: Liberty versus equality.
Suffering comes from three sources: the superior power of nature, the feebleness of our own bodies, and the inadequacy of the regulations which adjust the mutual relationships of human beings in the family, the state and society. Civilization describes the whole sum of the achievement and the regulations which distinguish our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve two purposes: to protect men against nature and to adjust their mutual relations. We recognize as cultural all activities and resources which are useful to men for making the earth serviceable to them and for protecting them against the violence of the forces of nature. The first acts of civilization were the use of tools, the gaining of control over fire and the construction of dwellings. Psychoanalytic experience regularly testifies to the connection between ambition, fire, and urethral eroticism. We recognize that countries have attained a high level of civilization if we find that in them everything which can assist in the exploitation of the earth by man and in his protection against the forces is attended to and effectively carried out. Beauty, cleanliness, and order occupy a special position among the requirements of civilization. No feature seems better to characterize civilization than its esteem and encouragement of man’s higher mental activities, his intellectual, scientific, and artistic achievements, and the leading role that it assigns to ideas in human life. Foremost among those ideas are the religious systems; next come the speculations of philosophy; and finally what might be called man’s ideals-his ideas of a possible perfection of individuals, or of peoples, or of the whole of humanity and the demands he sets up on the basis of such ideas.

1930
Civilization and its discontents
Part IV. Two pillars of civilization: Eros and Ananke.
After primal man had discovered that it lay in his own hands, literally, to improve his lot on earth by working, it cannot have been a matter of indifference to him whether another man worked with or against him. The other man acquired the value for him of a fellow worker. Man’s discovery that sexual love afforded him the strongest experiences of satisfaction, and in fact provided him with the prototype of all happiness, must have suggested to him that he should continue to seek the satisfaction of happiness in his life along the path of sexual relations and that he should make genital eroticism the central point of his life. With the assumption of an erect posture by man and with the depreciation of his sense of smell, it was not only his anal eroticism which threatened to fall victim to organic repression, but the whole of his sexuality, leading since then to a repugnance which prevents its complete satisfaction and forces it away from the sexual aim into sublimations and libidinal displacements. The love which founded the family continues to operate in civilization both in its original form, in which it does not renounce direct sexual satisfaction, and in its modified form as aim-inhibited affection. In each, it continues to carry on its function of binding together considerable numbers of people, and it does so in a more intensive fashion than can be effected through the interest of work in common. The tendency on the part of civilization to restrict sexual life is no less clear than its other tendency to expand the cultural unit.

1930
Civilization and its discontents
Part V. Security at the cost of restricting sexuality and aggression.
Psychoanalytic work has shown us that it is precisely the frustrations of sexual life which people known as neurotics, cannot tolerate. The neurotic creates substitutive satisfactions for himself in his symptoms, and these either cause him suffering in themselves or become sources of suffering for him by raising difficulties in his relations with his environment and the society he belongs to. Men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures whose instinctual endowments include a powerful share of aggressiveness. The existence of this inclination to aggression is the factor which disturbs our relations with our neighbor and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure of energy. In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. The communist system is based on an untenable psychological illusion, for in abolishing private property, we have in no way altered the differences in power and influence which are misused by aggression, nor have we altered anything in its nature. Because of civilization’s imposition of such great sacrifices on man’s sexuality and aggression, civilized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities of happiness for a portion of security.

1930
Civilization and its discontents
Part VI. Arguments for an instinct of aggression and destruction.
The theory of the instincts is the one part of analytic theory that has felt its way the most painfully forward. At first the ego instincts (hunger) and the object instincts (love) confronted each other. The introduction of the concept of narcissism convinced Freud that the instincts could not all be of the same kind. Besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to join it into ever larger units, there must exist another, contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units. Thus, as well as Eros, there was an instinct of death, the activities of which were not easy to demonstrate. A portion of the instinct is diverted towards the external world and comes to light as an instinct of aggressiveness and destructiveness. Sadism and masochism are examples of Eros and the death instinct appearing as allies with each other. Even where it emerges without any sexual purpose, the satisfaction of the instinct through destructiveness is accompanied by an extraordinarily high degree of narcissistic enjoyment. The inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition. It constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization. Civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then places, peoples, and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind. The work of Eros is precisely this. The aggressive instinct is the derivative and the main representative of the death instinct which we have found alongside of Eros and which shares world dominion with it. The evolution of civilization must present the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species.

1930
Civilization and its discontents
Part VII. Development of the superego and its severity.
Civilization obtains mastery over the individual’s dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city. There are 2 origins of the sense of guilt: one arising from fear of an authority, and the other, later on, arising from fear of the superego. The first insists upon a renunciation of instinctual satisfactions; the second, as well as doing this, presses for punishment, since the continuance of the forbidden wishes cannot be concealed from the superego. The severity of the superego is simply a continuation of the severity of the external authority, to which it has succeeded and which it has in part replaced. Since civilization obeys an internal erotic impulsion which causes human beings to unite in a closely knit group, it can only achieve this aim through an ever increasing reinforcement of the sense of guilt. If civilization is a necessary course of development from the family to humanity as a whole, then there is inextricably bound up with it an increase of the sense of guilt, which will perhaps reach heights that the individual finds hard to tolerate.

1930
Civilization and its discontents
Part VIII. Conclusions about effects of civilization upon psyche.
The superego is an agency which has been inferred by Freud; conscience is a function which Freud ascribes, among other functions, to that agency. This function consists in keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of the superego, is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. In the developmental process of the individual, the program of the pleasure principle, which consists in finding the satisfaction of happiness, is retained as the main aim. Integration in, or adaptation to, a human community appears as a scarcely avoidable condition which must be fulfilled before this aim of happiness can be achieved. The development of the individual seems to be a product of the interaction between two urges, the urge towards happiness, which is usually called egoistic, and the urge towards union with others in the community, which is called altruistic. It can be asserted that the community evolves a superego under whose influence cultural development proceeds. The cultural superego has set up its ideals and set up its demands. Among the latter, those which deal with the relations of human beings to one another are comprised under the heading of ethics. The fateful question for the human species seems to be whether and to what extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disturbance of their communal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction.

1927
Fetishism
Freud had an opportunity of studying analytically a number of men whose object choice was dominated by a fetish. The most extraordinary case seemed to be one in which a young man had exalted a certain sort of shine on the nose into a fetishistic precondition. The fetish, which originated from his earliest childhood, had to be understood in his native English, not German. The shine on the nose was in reality a glance at the nose. The nose was thus the fetish. In every instance, the meaning and the purpose of the fetish turned out, in analysis, to be the same. The fetish is a substitute for the penis: the woman’s (the mother’s) penis that the little boy once believed in and does not want to give up. The fetish achieves a token of triumph over the threat of castration and serves as a protection against it. It also saves the fetishist from becoming a homosexual, by endowing women with the characteristic which makes them tolerable as sexual objects. Because the fetish is easily accessible, the fetishist can readily obtain the sexual satisfaction attached to it. The choice of the fetish object seems determined by the last impression before the uncanny and traumatic one – In very subtle instances both the disavowal and the affirmation of the castration have found their way into the construction of the fetish itself. In conclusion, Freud says that the normal prototype of fetishes is a man’s penis, just as the normal prototype of interior organ is a woman’s real small penis, the clitoris.

1927
Humour
Humor is discussed. There are two ways in which the humorous process can take place. It may take place in regard to a single person, who himself adopts the humorous attitude, while a second person plays the part of the spectator who derives enjoyment from it; or it may take place between two persons, of whom one takes no part at all in the humorous process, but is made the object of humorous contemplation by the other. Like jokes and the comic, humor has something liberating about it; but it also has something of grandeur and elevation, which is lacking in the other two ways of obtaining pleasure from intellectual activity. The grandeur in it clearly lies in the triumph of narcissism, the victorious assertion of the ego’s invulnerability. The rejection of the claims of reality and the putting through of the pleasure principle bring humor near to the regressive or reactionary processes which engage our attention so extensively in psychopathology. In a particular situation the subject suddenly hypercathects his superego and then, proceeding from it, alters the reactions of the ego. A joke is the contribution to the comic by the unconscious. In just the same way, humor would be the contribution made to the comic through the agency of the superego. If the superego tries, by means of humor, to console the ego and protect it from suffering, this does not contradict its origin in the parental agency.

1928
A religious experience
In the autumn of 1927, G. S. Viereck, a journalist, published an account of a conversation with Freud, in the course of which he mentioned Freud’s lack of religious faith and his indifference on the subject of survival after death. This interview was widely read and brought many letters. One was from an American physician who wrote to tell Freud of his religious experience. The physician described a woman who was in the dissecting room and he thought that God would not allow such a thing to happen. For the next several days, he meditated and then received the proof that he needed that there is a God. Freud thinks that the doctor is swayed by the emotion roused in him by the sight of a woman’s dead body which reminded him of his mother. It roused in him a longing for his mother which sprang from his Oedipus complex; this was immediately completed by a feeling of indignation against his father. His ideas of father and God had not yet become widely separated; his desire to destroy his father could become conscious as doubt in the existence of God and could seek to justify itself in the eyes of reason as indignation about the illtreatment of a mother object. The outcome of the struggle was displayed in the sphere of religion and it was of a kind predetermined by the fate of the Oedipus complex: complete submission to the will of God the Father. He had had a religious experience and had undergone conversion. This case may throw some light on the psychology of conversion in general.

1928
Dostoevsky and parricide
The essay on Dostoevsky and Parricide falls into two distinct parts. The first deals with Dostoevsky’s character in general, with his masochism, his sense of guilt, his epileptic attacks and his double attitude in the Oedipus complex. The second discusses the special point of his passion for gambling and leads to an account of a short story by Stefan Zweig which throws light on the genesis of that addiction. The essay contains Freud’s first discussion of hysterical attacks since his early paper on the subject written 20 years before, a restatement of his later views on the Oedipus complex and the sense of guilt, and a sidelight on the problem of masturbation. Above all, Freud had an opportunity here for expressing his views on a writer whom he placed in the very front rank of all.

1928
Dostoevsky and parricide
Four facets may be distinguished in the rich personality of Dostoevsky: the creative artist, the neurotic, the moralist, and the sinner. Dostoevsky called himself an epileptic, and was regarded as such by other people. It is highly probable that this so-called epilepsy was only a symptom of his neurosis and must be classified as hysteroepilepsy. Dostoevsky’s attacks did not assume epileptic form until after his eighteenth year, when his father was murdered. Prior to that, however, he suffered in his early years from lethargic, somnolent states, signifying an identification with someone whom he wished dead. Parricide, according to a well-known view, is the principal and primal crime of humanity as well as of the individual. It is the main source of the sense of guilt. It comes from the Oedipus complex. What makes hatred of the father unacceptable is fear of the father; castration is terrible, whether as a punishment or as the price of love. The addition of a second factor to the fear of punishment, the fear of the feminine attitude, a strong innate bisexual disposition, becomes the reinforcement of the neurosis. The publication of Dostoevsky’s posthumous papers and of his wife’s diaries has thrown a glaring light on the period in Germany when he was obsessed with a mania for gambling, which no one could regard as anything but an unmistakable fit of pathological passion. If the addiction to gambling, with the unsuccessful struggles to break the habit and the opportunities it affords for self-punishment, is a repetition of the compulsion to masturbate, we shall not be surprised to find that it occupied such a large space in Dostoevsky’s life. In all cases of severe neurosis, the efforts to suppress autoerotic satisfaction and their relation to fear of the father are well known.

1936
A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis (1936).
An open letter to Romain Rolland on the occasion of his seventieth birthday is presented. When Freud stood on the Acropolis and cast his eyes around upon the landscape, a surprising thought entered his mind: “So all this really does exist, just as we learned at school!” The whole psychical situation, which seemed so confused and is so difficult to describe, can be satisfactorily cleared up by assuming that at the time Freud had a momentary feeling: “‘What I see here is not real.” Such a feeling is known as a feeling of derealization. These derealizations are remarkable phenomena which are still little understood. They are spoken of as sensations, but they are obviously complicated processes, attached to particular mental contents and bound up with decisions made about those contents. There are two general characteristics of the phenomena of derealization. The first is that they all serve the purpose of defense; they aim at keeping something away from the ego, at disavowing it. The second is their dependence upon the past, upon the ego’s store of memories and upon earlier distressing experiences which have since, perhaps, fallen victim to repression.

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay II. If Moses was an Egyptian.
Part 6. One hundred years of history suppressed.
With the setting up of the new god, Yahweh, at Kadesh, it became necessary to do something to glorify him. It became necessary to fit him in, to make room for him, to wipe out the traces of earlier religions. The man Moses was dealt with by shifting him to Midian and Kadesh, and by fusing him with the priest of Yahweh who founded the religion. Circumcision, the most suspicious indication of dependence on Egypt, was retained but no attempts were spared to detach the custom from Egypt. The patriots were brought into the Biblical stories for two reasons: 1) to acknowledge that Yahweh was worshipped by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, although not under that name; and 2) to link their memory with particular localities in Canaan. Freud concluded that between the Exodus from Egypt and the fixing of the text of the Bible under Ezra and Nehemiah some 800 years elapsed. The form of the Yahweh religion changed to conform with the original religion of Moses.

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay III. Moses, his people and monotheist religion:
Part I. Prefatory Notes I (Vienna) & II (London).
Two prefatory notes to Moses, His People and Monotheist Religion, are presented. Freud proposes to add a final portion to his two essays on Moses in Imago. Psychoanalytic research such as this is viewed with suspicious attention by Catholicism. If psychoanalytic work leads to a conclusion which reduces religion to a neurosis of humanity and explains its enormous power in the same way as a neurotic compulsion, we may be sure of drawing the resentment of our ruling powers down upon us. Freud does not intend these essays for public display or to cause sensationalism. He predicts that sometime in the future they may be read and evaluated without bias. The first prefatory note was written in Vienna, the second in London. When Germany invaded Austria, Freud escaped to London where he felt relatively free to publish his views on Moses. Since Freud wrote Totem and Taboo he never doubted that religious phenomena are only to be understood on the pattern of the individual neurotic symptoms familiar to him. Freud concludes that if he could not find support in an analytic interpretation of the exposure myth and could not pass from there to Sellin’s suspicion about the end of Moses, the whole thing would have had to remain unwritten.

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay III. Moses, his people and monotheist religion.
Part I. D. Application.

Freud’s construction of early history asserts that in primeval times, primitive man lived in small groups, each under the domination of a powerful male. The lot of his sons was a hard one: if they roused their father’s jealousy they were killed, castrated, or driven out. Their only resource was to collect together in small communities, to get themselves wives by robbery, and, when one or other of them could succeed in it, to raise themselves into a position similar to their father’s in the primal group. Totemism is regarded as the first form in which religion was manifested in human history. The first step away from totemism was the humanizing of the being who was worshipped. The reestablishment of the primal father in his historic rights was a great step forward but it could not be the end. The killing of Moses by his Jewish people, recognized by Sellin from the trace of it in tradition becomes an indispensable part of Freud’s construction, an important link between the forgotten event of primeval times and its later emergence in the form of the monotheist religions. It is plausible to conjecture that remorse for the murder of Moses provided the stimulus for the wishful phantasy of the Messiah who was to return and lead his people to redemption and the promised world dominion. Some deep motives for hatred of the Jews are analysed and include: jealousy of those people who declare themselves the firstborn, favorite children of God and their practice of circumcision which recalls castration.

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay III. Moses, his people and monotheist religion.
Part II. A. The people of Israel.
Of all the peoples who lived round the basin of the Mediterranean in antiquity, the Jewish people is almost the only one which still exists in name and also in substance. It has met misfortunes and ill treatment with an unexampled capacity for resistance; it has developed special character traits and has earned the hearty dislike of every other people. We may start from a character trait of the Jews which dominates their relation to others. There is no doubt that they have a particularly high opinion of themselves, that they regard themselves as more distinguished, of higher standing, as superior to other people. At the same time they are inspired by a peculiar confidence in life, such as is derived from the secret ownership of some precious possession, a kind of optimism: pious people would call it trust in God. They really regard themselves as God’s chosen people, they believe that they stand especially close to him; and this makes them proud and confident. If one is the declared favorite of the dreaded father, one need not be surprised at the jealousy of one’s brothers and sisters. The course of world history seemed to justify the presumption of the Jews, since, when later on it pleased God to send mankind a Messiah and redeemer, he once again chose him from the Jewish people. It was the man Moses who imprinted this trait upon the Jewish people. He raised their self-esteem by assuring them that they were God’s chosen people, he enjoined them to holiness and pledged them to be apart from others.

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay III. Moses, his people and monotheist religion.
Part II. D. Renunciation of instinct.
It is not obvious and not immediately understandable why an advance in intellectuality, a setback to sensuality, should raise the self-regard both of an individual and of a people. It seems to presuppose the existence of a definite standard of value and of some other person or agency which maintains it. If the id in a human being gives rise to an instinctual demand of an erotic or aggressive nature, the simplest and most natural thing is that the ego, which has the apparatus of thought and the muscular apparatus at its disposal, should satisfy the demand by an action. This satisfaction of the instinct is felt by the ego as pleasure. Instinctual renunciation can be imposed for both internal and external reasons. The religion which began with the prohibition against making an image of god develops more and more in the course of centuries into a religion of instinctual renunciations; it is content with a marked restriction of sexual freedom. God, however, becomes entirely removed from sexuality and elevated into the ideal of ethical perfection. Moses made his people holy by introducing the custom of circumcision. Circumcision is the symbolic substitute for the castration which the primal father once inflicted upon his sons in the plenitude of his absolute power, and whoever accepted that symbol was showing by it that he was prepared to submit to the father’s will, even if it imposed the most painful sacrifice on him. A part of the precepts of ethics is justified rationally by the necessity for delimiting the rights of the individual with respect to society and those of individuals with respect to one another.

Other Works (1937-1939)

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay II. If Moses was an Egyptian.
Part 6. One hundred years of history suppressed.
With the setting up of the new god, Yahweh, at Kadesh, it became necessary to do something to glorify him. It became necessary to fit him in, to make room for him, to wipe out the traces of earlier religions. The man Moses was dealt with by shifting him to Midian and Kadesh, and by fusing him with the priest of Yahweh who founded the religion. Circumcision, the most suspicious indication of dependence on Egypt, was retained but no attempts were spared to detach the custom from Egypt. The patriots were brought into the Biblical stories for two reasons: 1) to acknowledge that Yahweh was worshipped by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, although not under that name; and 2) to link their memory with particular localities in Canaan. Freud concluded that between the Exodus from Egypt and the fixing of the text of the Bible under Ezra and Nehemiah some 800 years elapsed. The form of the Yahweh religion changed to conform with the original religion of Moses.

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay III. Moses, his people and monotheist religion:
Part I. Prefatory Notes I (Vienna) & II (London).
Two prefatory notes to Moses, His People and Monotheist Religion, are presented. Freud proposes to add a final portion to his two essays on Moses in Imago. Psychoanalytic research such as this is viewed with suspicious attention by Catholicism. If psychoanalytic work leads to a conclusion which reduces religion to a neurosis of humanity and explains its enormous power in the same way as a neurotic compulsion, we may be sure of drawing the resentment of our ruling powers down upon us. Freud does not intend these essays for public display or to cause sensationalism. He predicts that sometime in the future they may be read and evaluated without bias. The first prefatory note was written in Vienna, the second in London. When Germany invaded Austria, Freud escaped to London where he felt relatively free to publish his views on Moses. Since Freud wrote Totem and Taboo he never doubted that religious phenomena are only to be understood on the pattern of the individual neurotic symptoms familiar to him. Freud concludes that if he could not find support in an analytic interpretation of the exposure myth and could not pass from there to Sellin’s suspicion about the end of Moses, the whole thing would have had to remain unwritten.

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay III. Moses, his people and monotheist religion.
Part I. D. Application.

Freud’s construction of early history asserts that in primeval times, primitive man lived in small groups, each under the domination of a powerful male. The lot of his sons was a hard one: if they roused their father’s jealousy they were killed, castrated, or driven out. Their only resource was to collect together in small communities, to get themselves wives by robbery, and, when one or other of them could succeed in it, to raise themselves into a position similar to their father’s in the primal group. Totemism is regarded as the first form in which religion was manifested in human history. The first step away from totemism was the humanizing of the being who was worshipped. The reestablishment of the primal father in his historic rights was a great step forward but it could not be the end. The killing of Moses by his Jewish people, recognized by Sellin from the trace of it in tradition becomes an indispensable part of Freud’s construction, an important link between the forgotten event of primeval times and its later emergence in the form of the monotheist religions. It is plausible to conjecture that remorse for the murder of Moses provided the stimulus for the wishful phantasy of the Messiah who was to return and lead his people to redemption and the promised world dominion. Some deep motives for hatred of the Jews are analysed and include: jealousy of those people who declare themselves the firstborn, favorite children of God and their practice of circumcision which recalls castration.

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay III. Moses, his people and monotheist religion.
Part II. A. The people of Israel.
Of all the peoples who lived round the basin of the Mediterranean in antiquity, the Jewish people is almost the only one which still exists in name and also in substance. It has met misfortunes and ill treatment with an unexampled capacity for resistance; it has developed special character traits and has earned the hearty dislike of every other people. We may start from a character trait of the Jews which dominates their relation to others. There is no doubt that they have a particularly high opinion of themselves, that they regard themselves as more distinguished, of higher standing, as superior to other people. At the same time they are inspired by a peculiar confidence in life, such as is derived from the secret ownership of some precious possession, a kind of optimism: pious people would call it trust in God. They really regard themselves as God’s chosen people, they believe that they stand especially close to him; and this makes them proud and confident. If one is the declared favorite of the dreaded father, one need not be surprised at the jealousy of one’s brothers and sisters. The course of world history seemed to justify the presumption of the Jews, since, when later on it pleased God to send mankind a Messiah and redeemer, he once again chose him from the Jewish people. It was the man Moses who imprinted this trait upon the Jewish people. He raised their self-esteem by assuring them that they were God’s chosen people, he enjoined them to holiness and pledged them to be apart from others.

1939
Moses and monotheism: Three essays
Essay III. Moses, his people and monotheist religion.
Part II. D. Renunciation of instinct.
It is not obvious and not immediately understandable why an advance in intellectuality, a setback to sensuality, should raise the self-regard both of an individual and of a people. It seems to presuppose the existence of a definite standard of value and of some other person or agency which maintains it. If the id in a human being gives rise to an instinctual demand of an erotic or aggressive nature, the simplest and most natural thing is that the ego, which has the apparatus of thought and the muscular apparatus at its disposal, should satisfy the demand by an action. This satisfaction of the instinct is felt by the ego as pleasure. Instinctual renunciation can be imposed for both internal and external reasons. The religion which began with the prohibition against making an image of god develops more and more in the course of centuries into a religion of instinctual renunciations; it is content with a marked restriction of sexual freedom. God, however, becomes entirely removed from sexuality and elevated into the ideal of ethical perfection. Moses made his people holy by introducing the custom of circumcision. Circumcision is the symbolic substitute for the castration which the primal father once inflicted upon his sons in the plenitude of his absolute power, and whoever accepted that symbol was showing by it that he was prepared to submit to the father’s will, even if it imposed the most painful sacrifice on him. A part of the precepts of ethics is justified rationally by the necessity for delimiting the rights of the individual with respect to society and those of individuals with respect to one another.